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ABSTRACT
Egan and Larson (2015) found that access to one’s smartphone resulted in an increase
in one’s sense of psychological power. Psychological power is associated with a variety
of behavioral outcomes, many of them moral in nature (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,
2003). This dissertation attempted to conceptually replicate the findings obtained by
Egan and Larson (2015) and to extend them by testing whether smartphone-induced
power had moral implications. Specifically, Study 1 tested whether access to one’s
smartphone increased psychological power, and in turn risk taking and moral orientation.
Study 2 tested whether access to one’s smartphone increased psychological power, and in
turn cheating. Further, both studies also investigated the possible moderating role played
by smartphone psychological ownership (how psychologically attached an individual is
to his or her smartphone). Results failed to replicate the effect of smartphone access on
psychological power but did show that smartphone psychological ownership played a
significant role in psychological power.

xiv

CHAPTER I
SMARTPHONES AND SOCIETY
People behave differently when they have their smartphone with them versus
when they do not. Certainly, some of those behavioral differences result from distraction.
Frequently throughout the day, a person’s smartphone chirps, beeps, and buzzes,
temporarily distracting him or her from other activities. But distraction alone fails to
explain all of the behavioral changes provoked by smartphones. Certain behaviors that
would have been very difficult, or even impossible, without a smartphone become much
easier. Smartphone users have access to a wide variety of resources through their mobile
device. They can access information, other people, and a multitude of tools. For
instance, a person can explore an unfamiliar area of town confident that the GPS
capabilities available through their phone will help them navigate their way back home
safely. These tools, housed in this device, give their user power to accomplish tasks.
However, when the device fails – is lost, broken, stolen, malfunctions, or runs out of
battery – those resources are not available, and the power that they imparted is lost.
Not surprisingly then, people report feeling anxious and uncomfortable without
their smartphone. In fact, clinical psychologists are studying a phenomenon referred to
as nomophobia which is characterized by the anxiety resulting from overdependence on
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one’s mobile phone and the fear of being without it (Bragazzi & Del Puente, 2014;
Elmore, 2014; Guthrie, 2013). Nomophobia was considered for inclusion in the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).
Ultimately, it was not included, but researchers are continuing to investigate is as a
possible specific phobia for future inclusion (Bragazzi & Del Puente, 2014). As
illustrated by experiences such as nomophobia, the impact of smartphones on their users
can be profound. To a lesser extent though they influence their user in subtler ways that
still have important implications. Of particular interest in this dissertation is that they
may sometimes compel people to behave in ways that are inconsistent with social norms
or even moral values.
The internet is rife with instances of people shaming others for their inappropriate
smartphone use. For instance, the blog Parents on Phones (hosted on the popular social
media site Tumblr1) is dedicated to sharing pictures of parents caught neglecting their
children while using their smartphone. The intent appears to be to shame parents for this
behavior presumably to discourage others from doing so also. Researchers at Boston
University Medical Center took a more rigorous and systematic approach to investigating
this behavior. They conducted a field study wherein observations were made of
caregivers and children at a fast food restaurant. They found that parents who were the
most absorbed in using their mobile phone responded the most severely to children’s
misbehavior (Radesky, Kistin, Zuckerman, Nitzberg, Gross, Kaplan-Sanoff, Augustyn, &
Silverstein, 2014).

1

http://parentsonphones.tumblr.com/
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Both the Parents on Phones blog and findings like those obtained by Radesky et
al. (2014) have contributed to a growing public discourse concerned with mobile etiquette
and finding ways to preserve social norms that seem to be deteriorating as a result of
smartphone use. For instance, recently both the Pew Research Center and Microsoft
conducted studies to identify the smartphone-related behaviors that others find most
inappropriate or offensive. Topping the list compiled by Microsoft, 21.48% of people
reported that the behavior that irritated them the most is when people watch videos, play
games, or listen to music in public spaces without using headphones. Second on the list,
20.89% of people said that it was most irritating when people converse loudly on their
mobile phone in public. So, the top two most irritating mobile-phone usage behaviors
were both related to noise resulting from other people using their device (Fraser, 2011).
The results obtained by Pew ironically revealed that while 82% of those surveyed
reported disapproving of mobile phone use at restaurants, family dinners, meetings,
movie theaters, and church/worship services, 89% admitted to having used their mobile
phone at their most recent social gathering. In fact, 22% of respondents said that they
either frequently (6%) or occasionally (16%) use their phone in an attempt to “Avoid
interacting with others who are near you.” The trend toward public and sometimes
inappropriate cell phone use seems the most prevalent among younger users (ages 18 to
29) (Rainie & Zickuhr, 2015).
New rules, regulations, and even laws are being adopted to help deal with the
growing problem of inappropriate mobile phone usage – signs asking patrons to refrain
from using their mobile phone in the checkout line, policies banning the use of selfie
sticks (used to take pictures of oneself with a smartphone) at amusement parks, and laws
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accompanied by stiff fines for texting while driving. People appear either unaware of or
unable to adhere to long-standing social norms surrounding social interaction while using
these devices.
From the parent neglecting her child in favor of her smartphone, the driver
attending to his phone rather than to the road, the clerk too busy texting to assist the
customer, to the spouse checking his phone while his wife sits across from him at the
restaurant; smartphones appear to be making us poorer parents, drivers, employees, and
partners. Renny Gleason (2009), game developer turned consultant, gave a TED Talk
entitled Our Antisocial Phone Tricks wherein he took a humorous approach to the
paradoxically antisocial behaviors spawned by these apparently “social” technologies.
He makes a very serious point though by remarking that when we attend to our
smartphone, rather than a physically present person, we are essentially telling that person,
“You are less interesting than virtually anything that could come to me through this
device.” Gleason (2009) urged the developers attending his TED talk to design
technologies that make their users better rather than worse people. I would add that the
responsibility also rests at the individual level to use technologies in ways that make us
better rather than worse people. However, a theoretical framework and empirical
evidence are lacking to inform smartphone users just how to do to that. A first step in
filling this gap is understanding the impact that these devices have on how we perceive
ourselves and others.
In the following pages I explore the possibility that the apparent unwillingness or
inability to successfully regulate our own smartphone use and to abide by longstanding
social norms stems from the impact that these devices have on users’ level of
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psychological power. Specifically, I test the prediction that access to one’s smartphone
increases feelings of psychological power. Increased psychological power is associated
with sequella such as increased risk taking (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), a
general sense that rules do not apply to oneself (Lammers, Stapel2, & Galinsky, 2010),
and at times, more immoral behavior (e.g., Lammers, et al. 2010; Lammers, Stoker,
Jordan, Pollmann, & Stapel, 2011; Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney, 2013).
This prediction is depicted in Figure 1 below. Access to one’s smartphone was expected
to result in increased psychological power, which was expected to lead to more cheating,
more risk taking, and a relative shift toward a deontological moral orientation.
Figure 1. Proposed moderated mediation model of the influence of smartphone custody
on psychological power (moderated by smartphone psychological ownership) and in turn
cheating, risk-taking, and moral orientation tested in the current dissertation.

Smartphone
Psychological
Ownership

Smartphone
Custody (access
vs. deprivation)

Cheating

Level of
Psychological Power

Risk taking

Moral
Orientation

2

All articles wherein Diederik Stapel is listed as an author have been checked and were not among those
retracted.
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Over the next two chapters, relevant theoretical perspectives will be discussed
along with corresponding empirical research. In Chapter 2, I will describe theory and
research related to the impact of artifacts and possessions on individuals. In Chapter 3, I
will review the Approach/Inhibition Theory of psychological power and relevant
research. Chapters 4 and 5 respectively report on a pair of studies done including specific
predictions, methodology, and results. Chapter 6 presents some supplementary analysis.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings along with a general discussion.

CHAPTER II
PEOPLE AND POSSESSIONS
The Psychological Impact of Smartphones
“Millions of items in the outward order are present to my sense which
never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no
interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those
items which I notice shape my mind – without selective interest experience
is an utter chaos.” (James, 1890, p. 402)
The issue, as illustrated in the quote above, is that the things to which we attend
should be those to which we agree to attend. But this often seems not to be the case in
the technologically-saturated environment that we occupy. Perhaps for this reason, many
have described modern life as chaotic (e.g., Carl Honoré’s TED Talk In praise of
slowness). The modern world is comprised of many relatively recent additions. More
than ever, people are presented with a glut of things to which they can and sometimes
must attend. Many of those things actively vie for our attention – televisions, radios,
announcements, advertisements. I argue that one object, more than any other, not only
vies for individuals’ attention, but is extremely successful in capturing it: smartphones.
They do so by bringing into the palm of our hand myriad things onto which we can focus
our attention. News stories delivered in real time, photographs from friends and family
streaming in throughout the day, games, and access to a seemingly unlimited supply of
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music and videos – none of which we may have had access to were it not for the
smartphone.
Not surprisingly then, some have attributed the behavioral changes resulting from
smartphones primarily to the distraction that they introduce (e.g., Przybylski &
Weinstein, 2013; Misra, Cheng, Genevie, & Yuan, 2014). As demanding as they can be
however, they present their user with much more than just distraction. They also provide
options and abilities that otherwise would not have existed because they house valuable
resources and information. Having access to these resources and information gives a
smartphone user power that they did not have without it.
Smartphones as Tools
In the most basic sense, a smartphone is a tool. Throughout history, humans have
been dependent on and thus invested in their tools. “The Paleolithic hunter who spent
days chipping stone tools regained the psychic energy invested fashioning them, and
more, through the saving in time and the added efficiency in procuring calories that the
use of the tool provided.” (Rochberg-Halton & Csikszentmihalyi, 1981, p. 53). We no
longer live in Paleolithic times. We no longer hunt with stone tools. Most often, our
tools are technological, but we invest in them the same way. The time spent setting up email rules, programming calendar events and reminders, downloading applications,
upgrading software, and being active on social media are modern man’s version of
sharpening his tools so that when the time comes to use that tool effectively, it will be
ready.
Smartphones are extremely versatile and customizable tools. They are also
compact and lightweight. We do not have to expend much energy in using them or even

9

fashioning them. Amber Case (2010), cyborg anthropologist and founder of Geoloqi
Inc., refers to smartphones as a “little Marry Poppins technology” because like Poppins’
famous bag, we can add as many things to it as we like and it does not get any heavier.
In fact, Case (2010) argues that with a smartphone in our hand, we are cyborgs. We are
enhanced human beings as a result of the technology. According to The MerriamWebster Dictionary, a cyborg is “a bionic human” or “a person whose body contains
mechanical or electrical devices and whose abilities are greater than the abilities or
normal humans.” In a very real sense, these devices give their user abilities beyond what
a normal human possesses. The essential thesis of this dissertation is that those superhuman abilities confer a sense of power on the user, and that habitual and/or long-term
use of the device results in a cumulative increase in perceptions of psychological power.
Smartphone Sources of Influence
There are three specific ways that smartphones influence their users. First, they
have become the medium of the day. A large amount of communication, information
consumption, media consumption, and other behaviors are accomplished through the
smartphone. Second, as mentioned already, they grant access to a variety of resources.
Their mere presence serves as a reminder of those resources and the capacity that users
have as a result. Third, we physically use smartphones and when we do, the impact that
the posture we assume causes embodiment effects. This dissertation will focus primarily
on the second source on influence – the fact that smartphones grant access to resources
and so are a tool that bestows power on the holder. However, because these sources of
influence are interrelated and also to present a more balanced picture of how smartphones
influence behavior, all three sources are discussed.
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Smartphones as a medium. Smartphones as a medium do not necessarily
increase or decrease power. But, as a medium, smartphones do perform mediational and
even hermeneutic roles that can have profound, albeit subtle, consequences. As the
medium by which their users interact with others and the outside world, smartphones can
change how that user interprets the world, others, and reality by allowing us access to
information and choices that we would not have had otherwise (Verbeek, 2011).
McLuhan eloquently points out the power of the medium in the following quote:
“The medium, or process of our time – electric technology – is reshaping
and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of
our personal life. It is forcing us to reconsider and reevaluate practically
every thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for
granted…Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the
media by which men communicate than by the content of the
communication.” (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967, p. 8)
In the early 1980’s, Rochberg-Halton and Csikszentmihalyi (1981)
pointed out that because the electronic technology is assumed to be neutral, few
had studied the impact of using it (the television in particular, at that time)
irrespective of the content accessed through it. This is the case also with
smartphones. Despite users’ habitual use of smartphones (e.g., Oulasvirta,
Rattenbury, Ma, & Raita, 2012) research thus far has focused mainly on content.
For instance, there is a fairly active literature on the effectiveness of mobile
persuasive technologies, many of which are delivered as smartphone applications
(e.g., Eslambolchiar, Wilson, & Komninos, 2010). But, the device, the medium,
is not neutral and it is changing society, the way we interact, and our expectations
of one another.
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Miller-Ott and Kelley (2015) provide support for McLuhan’s claim. They found
that people’s expectations of their romantic relationships are shifting based on the
ubiquitous presence of mobile phones and the expectation of constant availability.
Participants in their focus groups reported a greater expectation for undivided attention
on dates and other intimate settings compared with less intimate settings, but still
tolerated some phone use. Specifically, they expressed greater acceptance of their partner
taking a call from someone important (like a mom or boss), and if the usage was brief and
forewarned. Although they said that being on the phone was rude, they said they neither
turn their phone off during dates nor expect their partner to either (Miller-Ott & Kelley,
2015). It would appear that people are adjusting their expectations to accommodate
inconsiderate behavior even in intimate social settings. However, smartphone use
appears to be having a negative impact on intimate relationships despite these adjusted
expectations.
Roberts and David (2016) studied a behavior referred to as Pphubbing. This term
is an abbreviation of the phrase “partner phubbing”, with the word phubbing being
derived by combining the words phone and snubbing. Thus Pphubbing refers to
snubbing one’s partner while using one’s cell phone. In a series of two studies Roberts
and David (2016) developed a valid and reliable measure of Pphubbing and found that
Pphubbing led to less relationship satisfaction. The relationship was mediated by
conflicts resulting over cell phone use and was moderated by attachment style, with those
with anxious attachment styles experiencing more conflict and more negative outcomes
from Pphubbing behavior (Roberts & David, 2016).
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Smartphones as a reminder of resources. For some objects, their presence
alone – whether or not it is actually used or interacted with – has psychological
implications. Just having access to such an object changes the way the actors feel about
or interpret a situation. Verbeek (2011) points out that when a man has access to a gun,
the tool in his possession redefines him. While he possesses it, he is a potential gunman.
What the man is capable of with that object changes everything about the situation. In a
subtler way, this is what happens with access to a smartphone. If smartphones, similar to
guns, fundamentally change how actors interpret the situation we would expect effects
based on their presence alone. This is exactly what was found by Przybylski and
Weinstein (2013).
Przybylski and Weinstein (2013) conducted a laboratory study wherein
participants had either an important or casual conversation either in the presence of a cell
phone or not. The phone did not belong to either participant and was not used; however,
its presence alone negatively impacted ratings made of participant’s conversation
partner’s trust and empathy, and also of the overall quality of the conversation. This was
especially true if the topic of the conversation was important rather than casual
(Przybylski & Weinstein, 2013).
Misra, et al. (2014) conceptually replicated this study in a field setting. Again, the
importance of the topic was manipulated (meaningful or casual), but the presence of
mobile devices was allowed to vary naturally. Trained observers noted whether either
participant either held his or her mobile device or placed it on the table at which
participants were seated at any point during a 10-minute conversation. When this
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occurred, participants again rated their conversation partner as showing less empathic
concern and the quality of the conversation as lower (Misra, et al., 2014).
Both Przybylski and Weinstein (2013) and Misra et al. (2014) explained their
findings in terms of the distraction posed by the presence of a mobile phone. However,
this explanation seems unlikely, especially for the study done by Przybylski and
Weinstein (2013) where the phone neither belonged to nor was used by either participant.
In these studies, psychological power would seem to provide a more parsimonious
explanation. If the smartphone’s presence reminded participants of access to valuable
resources available through the smartphone, thus making them feel more psychologically
powerful, the expected results would be very similar (or identical) to those observed.
Results obtained by Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) can similarly be interpreted
as the reminder of resources influencing power. In a series of nine studies, Vohs et al.
(2006) tested and found support for the hypothesis that either the mere presence or
primed thoughts of money make people feel self-sufficient, and that self-sufficiency in
turn produces both positive (increased motivation) and negative (increased interpersonal
conflict) behaviors. In 2008, these same authors published another study conceptually
replicating these findings showing that self-sufficiency caused people to work harder, but
also to attend less to others’ needs and also led to more interpersonal conflict (Vohs,
Mead, & Goode, 2008). In both studies by Vohs et al. (2006; 2008), self-sufficiency was
the explanation used.
However, money is a resource; a very flexible resource like a smartphone.
Having money often means having power. Thus, the presence of money just as likely
could have increased feelings of psychological power and as a result also feelings of self-
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sufficiency. Increased psychological power is associated with attention to rewards,
disinhibited behavior, (Keltner, et al., 2003), and a greater preference for social distance
(Lammers, Galinsky, Gordjin, & Otten, 2012). Thus increased psychological power
would also have resulted in the same behaviors observed by Vohs et al. (2006; 2008)
(i.e., greater persistence on tasks, a preference for working alone, and increased
interpersonal conflict). In fact, psychological power has empirically been linked with
feelings of self-sufficiency (e.g., Lammers, et al., 2012). Similarly, if the presence of a
smartphone increased feelings of psychological power in the Przybylski and Weinstein
(2013) and Misra et al. (2014) studies, that also would have increased participants’
preference for social distance and could have reduced the feeling of connectedness and
perceived empathic concern between conversation partners.
Most relevant to this dissertation, Egan and Larson (2015) conducted a study that
specifically looked at whether the mere presence of a smartphone influenced perceptions
of psychological power. Using the same manipulation that will be described in Chapters
4 and 5, access to one’s smartphone was experimentally manipulated and measures of
psychological power, social self-efficacy, and general self-efficacy were taken. As
predicted, access to one’s smartphone had a significant impact on psychological power as
measured in a point-taking game (i.e., the self-versus-public-goods social dilemma
measure adapted from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Specifically, compared
with those in the smartphone deprivation condition (as well as participants in both a
student ID access and deprivation condition for comparison), participants with access to
their smartphone took significantly more points for themselves from a pool of points
shared by all participants in a group data collection session. Given their capacity to aid
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users in accomplishing tasks, it seemed intuitive that access to one’s smartphone might
also increase perceptions of self-efficacy; however, that prediction was not supported3
using either the measure of general or social self-efficacy (Egan & Larson, 2015).
Embodiment effects and power. There is a final means by which smartphones
may influence users’ sense of power. Whenever individuals use a device, that use
requires physically holding or interacting with the device. The way that the device
requires a user to sit or stand can result in embodiment effects; some of which result in
either an increase or decrease in feelings of power. Embodiment effects refer to the
various ways that feedback from the body influence the brain and cognitive processes.
For instance, smiling makes people feel happier and interpret jokes as being funnier
because the individual interprets the smiling behavior as information about mood or as a
source of information about the target being evaluated (e.g., Schwarz, 2013). Holding an
open, expansive posture makes people feel more powerful while holding a closed,
constricted posture makes people feel less powerful (e.g., Bos & Cuddy, 2013; Yap, et
al., 2013).
In two studies, Yap et al. (2013) studied the impact of artifacts on human behavior
by looking at embodiment effects. In the first study, they arrange a workspace in which
participants completed a creative task (made a collage). Depending on the arrangement
of the items on the desk and the size of the mat on which to work, participants were
inclined to assume a constricted or expansive posture while working. Expansive postures

3

Limitations of the self-efficacy measures may have prevented significant differences from being observed.
Specifically, both the general and social self-efficacy measures were self-report which are inherently more
prone to responder bias. Also, the measure of general self-efficacy is not widely accepted in the selfefficacy literature as self-efficacy is considered to be a context dependent construct that should be
measured at the level of specific goals and behaviors.
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result in embodied effects of high power whereas constricted postures result in embodied
effects of low power. As a result, participants who worked in the more cramped
workspace were less likely to cheat on a subsequent part of the experiment than were
those who worked in the less-cramped workspace.
In the second study, Yap et al. (2013) used a driving simulation to measure the
effects of constricted versus expanded postures on driving behaviors; specifically traffic
violations. They conceptually replicated the findings reported above, finding that those
whose drivers’ seats were placed lower to the ground and closer to the wheel committed
fewer traffic violations than did those whose seats were up higher and further away from
the steering wheel. The low, close placement of the driving seat required participants to
assume a constricted posture, inducing feelings of lower power that led to more inhibited
behavior (i.e., less aggressive driving and fewer traffic violations.) The higher, further
placement of the driving seat allowed participants to assume a more expansive posture,
inducing feelings of higher power that led to less inhibited behavior (i.e., more aggressive
driving and more traffic violations.)
These two studies demonstrate the importance that objects situated in an
environment have on psychological power and in turn behavior. Yap et al. (2013) point
out that, “Each day, our bodies are continually stretched and contracted by our working
and living environments – by the seats and levers in our cars and the furniture and work
spaces in our homes and offices.” (p. 2281). In addition to seats and levers, our
environments are also littered with various technological devices, like computers, tablets,
and mobile phones.
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More directly relevant to this dissertation, Bos and Cuddy (2013) found that the
size of various pieces of technology influenced feelings of psychological power. They
had participants use one of four technologies during the first part of the experiment – a
desktop computer, a laptop computer, a tablet, or a smartphone. After completing the
first stage, participants were told to wait for the experimenter to return. The measure of
power was the length of time that a participants waited before going to find the
experimenter who had ostensibly failed to return when he or she said they would. Higher
levels of power are associated with greater action taking and thus a greater likelihood to
be assertive – in this context, going to get the tardy experimenter. It was found that
device size negatively correlated with amount of time spent waiting. In other words, the
larger the device the less time participants spent waiting.
The results obtained by Bos and Cuddy (2013) are consistent with the
embodiment effects on power observed by Yap et al. (2013). Those using the
smartphone were required to assume a small, constricted posture by the small size of the
device – resulting in lower levels of psychological power and less assertive behavior.
Whereas those using the desktop computer could assume a larger, more expansive
posture – resulting in higher levels of psychological power and more assertive behavior
(Bos & Cuddy, 2013).
Smartphone Psychological Ownership
The influence of smartphones on psychological power are not expected to be the
same for everyone. People vary both in how much they use their smartphone and in the
tasks for which they use their smartphone. But, smartphone users vary in a more
fundamental way than just how much or for what purpose they use their device. Some
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people feel more connected to their device. This experience is common of all
possessions. We neither legally nor psychologically own all of the objects that we think
of as ours to the same extent (e.g., Litwinski, 1947; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003).
Litwinski (1947) was one of the first to formally explain this aspect of ownership.
He identified three stages to acquiring an object. Appropriation is the simple occupation,
or state of currently using a thing. I occupy a park bench and feel a sense of ownership of
it while I am sitting on it. If someone came along and asked me to move because it was
their bench, I would feel that my legitimate claim to the bench, having been using it first,
was violated. Possession is the next more advanced stage of ownership; a “stage of
growing providence.” (Litwinski, 1947, p. 242) Just as I temporarily occupied the park
bench, I temporarily occupy my apartment, but I feel a greater sense of ownership over it
than over the park bench because I have a contractual right to it and pay to have
exclusive, although temporary, use of it. Finally, property is the most “provident and the
least precarious of the three.” (Litwinski, 1947, p. 242) This stage includes what
Litwinski (1947) considered the fundamental feature of ownership – the legitimate
expectation to exclusive use of the object at will in the future. Once I acquire the deed to
a house, I expect to have exclusive use of that property at all future points without
interruption. This is the level of possession that people have of their smartphones. More
importantly though, some people are highly connected to or invested in their smartphone
whereas others are not as much. This individual difference can be thought of an
individual’s level of smartphone psychological ownership (SPO).
Pierce et al. (2003) distinguish psychological ownership from legal ownership
based on three features. First, the object is vested with meaning and emotion. Second, a
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relationship exists between owner and object where the owner closely associates the
object with the self. Third, both cognition and affect are implicated in psychological
ownership. Take for example, an outfit. The owner may know that he or she owns the
pieces of clothing, but it may not represent his or her identity or be endowed with any
particular meaning or emotion. However, if that outfit is a law enforcement uniform, it is
inherently vested with meaning and symbolism that likely represents a core concept of
the owner’s identity. Thus, psychological ownership felt toward the uniform is likely to
be greater than that felt toward the generic outfit.
Feelings of ownership serve an important psychological purpose. Specifically,
Pierce et al. (2003) theorize that feelings of psychological ownership serve three motives:
(1) efficacy and effectance, (2) self-identity, and (3) “having a place” (p. 8). In other
words, our belongings can help us feel more capacious, can help us form and maintain a
sense of self-identity, and can create a safe place to psychically dwell (e.g., a “homeaway-from-home”). To the extent that smartphones serve these purposes they fulfill
important psychological needs. People differ on how much psychological ownership
they feel toward their device depending on how and for what purpose they use their
phone.
Pierce et al. (2003) also suggest that feelings of psychological ownership develop
toward an object by way of three, additive and complementary routes – control over the
object, intimate knowledge of the object, and investing the self into the object. Those
who engage in these behaviors more are likely to feel more psychological ownership over
their device, and their device likely serves a more meaningful psychological purpose for
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them. If so, having versus being denied access to it will likely have a greater impact for
that individual.
In this chapter, I have attempted to build an argument, based both on theory and
empirical evidence, for the assertion that smartphones impact users’ feelings of
psychological power. If that assertion is true, then one would expect that having access
to a smartphone would produce effects consistent with elevated levels of psychological
power, and that not having access to a smartphone (i.e., being deprived of access to it)
would produce effects consistent with lowered levels of psychological power. In Chapter
3, I will provide a review both of the theory and empirical findings consistent with high
and low levels of psychological power so as to illustrate what behaviors might be affected
by the presence or absence of a smartphone.

CHAPTER III
PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER
Psychological power is commonly defined as “asymmetric control over valuable
resources and outcomes within a specific situation and set of social relations.” (Galinsky,
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008, p. 1451) Stated otherwise,
psychological power is “an individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by
providing or withholding resources or administering punishments.” (Keltner, et al., 2003,
p. 265) Both definitions illustrate the point that psychological power is sociallydependent in that control is not just over resources, but it is control over the behaviors of
others provided by the control over resources. For this reason, it is sometimes called
social power (Galinsky, et al., 2003). A person may be powerful in one situation,
depending on the others he or she is around and the resources he or she has access to in
that context, but be powerless in another situation where he or she is around different
people who have access to more, different, or greater resources than he or she does.
Another important distinction is that a person may legitimately possess a great
deal of power as a result of the resources over which he or she has control, or a person
may have a high sense of psychological power because he or she perceives themselves as
having a great deal of control or influence. While these may and often do coincide, they
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do not necessarily have to. A person may have access to valuable resources but not
realize their value. In this case a person would possess a great amount of psychological
power without having a great sense of psychological power. Alternately, a person may
feel that he or she has a great deal of control or access to valuable resources but that
inflated sense of psychological power may be illegitimate if the resources possessed do
not actually allow the individual to influence or obtain valuable outcomes.
Theoretical Foundation
Approach/Inhibition Theory
Elevated psychological power results in an activation of the behavioral approach
system (BAS) which increases an individual’s focus on rewards and freedoms. On the
other hand, reduced psychological power results in an activation of the behavioral
inhibition system (BIS) which increases an individual’s focus on threats, social
constraint, and punishment. This causes high-power individuals to tend toward action
while low-power individuals to tend toward inaction (Keltner, et al., 2003).
Galinsky et al. (2008) point out that it is not just that the powerful are actually
subject to fewer threats than the powerless (although they are because they often hold the
resources and the ability to administer rewards and punishment), it is also that they attend
to fewer of the threats to which they are subject. This is because power leads to the
activation of the BAS and causes people to focus on potential rewards rather than
potential losses. In addition, powerful people are typically more self-focused as opposed
to other-focused, so they also tend not to notice threats as much as do the powerless
(Keltner, et al., 2003).
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The Approach/Inhibition theory of psychological power very parsimoniously
accounts for the wide variety of behavioral outcomes associated with various states of
psychological power. For instance, for some time it was assumed that power corrupted
individuals (e.g., Kipnis, 1972). However, more recent research found that sometimes
power can cause people to behave more morally (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001).
This appears to be the case in two situations in particular. First, when thoughts of
responsibility are primed along with thoughts of power, people tend to behave in
prosocial ways. Also, those who naturally have a pro-other rather than a pro-self social
value orientation tend to behave ethically when given power. In both situations, power
enables actions that are a default way of behaving based either on the demands of the
situation or individual differences. So rather than corrupting necessarily, power simply
activates the BAS which results in taking action, both moral and immoral (Keltner, et al.,
2003).
Sources of Power
In their now classic theory French, Raven, and Cartwright (1959) identified five
bases of psychological power. Reward power refers to the ability that an individual has
to administer or withhold rewards from another individual. Its counterpart is coercive
power, which refers to the ability that an individual has to administer or withhold
punishment from another individual. Legitimate power refers to the belief on the part of
an individual that another party has a legitimate right to give direction or control their
behavior in some way. This is the type of power afforded to the President of the United
States. The President has legitimate power to the extent that citizens respect the
Constitution and the democratic process by which he or she is elected. Thus, even if a
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citizen does not endorse a given candidate, given a fair election, he or she should accept
the legitimate power conferred on the new President by that process. Referent power
arises when an individual identifies with, or feels “oneness” with another person or
group. Identifying with a person or group will compel the individual to comply with the
wishes of that group. Finally, expert power derives from specialized knowledge or
expertise. Specifically, when an individual believes that another person possesses a piece
of information, and trusts the other party to be truthful in delivering that information, the
expert has power in that situation. Both conditions are necessary for expert power.
Conceivably, smartphones could influence any one of these bases of power. Most
obviously though, they are poised to influence expert power. As anyone who has played
a trivia game or solved a crossword can attest, access to a smartphone can give you a
decided edge compared with someone without one. In more common, everyday settings,
the information and processing capacity afforded a user by their smartphone can make a
user the resident expert. The one with the smartphone can make dinner reservations
using the Open Table mobile application, can quickly calculate a tip or split a dinner tab,
can request a ride using mobile applications like Uber, can read movie reviews, and buy
movie tickets all from his or her smartphone. Thus, in a simple social outing involving
dinner and a movie, the smartphone user has a potential advantage compared with a nonuser that may give him or her more power in that social setting.
Empirical Evidence
There is a robust body of literature on the effects of psychological power that
seems consistently to support the Approach/Inhibition framework. A concise account of
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that literature is provided here. For a more complete review of this literature, see Keltner,
et al. (2003).
Biological Markers
Psychological power influences people at a very basic level. Carney, Cuddy, and
Yap (2010) measured both risk-taking behavior and neuroendocrine levels after having
participants hold either a high- or low-power pose for one minute. In line with previous
research, participants in the high-power pose condition reported feeling more powerful,
and showed more risk-taking behavior on a gambling task. Also, high-power was
associated with lower cortisol levels and higher testosterone levels. Cortisol is a hormone
related to the experience of stress, while testosterone is a hormone related to dominant
and aggressive behavior. These effects were the same for male and female participants.
Carney’s et al. (2010) findings are especially important because cortisol levels are
associated with negative health outcomes such as impaired immune function, high blood
pressure, and memory loss.
Inoculation against Outside Influence
Some effects of elevated psychological power are positive. The definition of
psychological power points out that power grants the holder both “control over and
independence from others in obtaining important outcomes.” (Galinsky et al., 2008, p.
1451) So, power is not just the ability to influence, but the ability to resist influenced by
others. In a series of five studies, Galinsky et al. (2008) convincingly demonstrated this
effect of power. They found that high power primed participants were less influenced by
examples provided when completing a creative task, were more likely to voice opinions
that were different from those of others, behaved in ways more consistent with their
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social value orientation regardless of the reputation of the individual with whom they
were interacting, and felt that they had more freedom in the choice to make
counterattitudinal statements4. Thus, high-power individuals are more likely to behave in
more individualistic or idiosyncratic ways, as they are less constrained by social norms
and group influence than are their lower-power counterparts (Galinsky, et al., 2008).
Increased Assertiveness and Risk Taking
High-power individuals also tend to be more assertive, which can be either good
or bad depending on the situation. For instance, they will not wait as long before taking
action (Bos & Cuddy, 2013), and are more likely to take action to alter annoying stimuli
in their environment (i.e., a fan blowing on participants in a cold experimental lab)
(Galinsky, et al., 2003). Galinsky et al. (2003) found that high-power participants
engaged in more risk-taking behavior in a Vegas-style blackjack task. High power
individuals tend to take more risks, in part, because they are more optimistic when
anticipating the outcome of those behaviors (e.g., sexual activity, information sharing)
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).
Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior
In part, because of the disinhibiting effects and the reduced conformity to social
norms, elevated power can increase socially inappropriate behavior (Keltner, et al.,
2003); which can ironically lead to a decrease in power due to negative outcomes
resulting from others’ disapproval of the atypical behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).
Keltner et al. (2003) cite several studies wherein evidence was found that high-power is

4

This last effect resulted in more cognitive dissonance among high-power primed participants.
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associated with more rude and less prosocial behavior. For instance, Brown and Levison
(1987) found that elevated power lead to an increase likelihood of violating social norms
surrounding politeness in communication. Similarly, Ward and Keltner (1998) provided
groups of three participants with a plate of five cookies to share. Thus, each of the three
participants could comfortably take a cookie, and one could comfortably take a second
cookie while still leaving a cookie on the plate. Not surprisingly, the high-power primed
participant was more likely to take a second cookie, leaving the other two participants in
the uncomfortable spot of wanting, but not feeling comfortable taking the last cookie
(Ward & Keltner, 1998).
Some of the antisocial behaviors associated with high-power may be the result of
high-power individuals’ preference for more social distance between themselves and
others. Lammers et al. (2012) found that the relationship between power and social
distance was mediated by feelings of self-sufficiency and moderated by how legitimate a
person’s claim to power was. So, if high-power people feel more self-sufficient, and feel
less like they may depend on others either at present or in the future, they may be more
willing to treat them in antisocial ways. This is consistent with activation of the BAS that
causes an increase in the focus on one’s own goals and rewards to the exclusion of
considering the consequences for others.
Cheating. Lammers et al. (2011) found that those who occupied higher-power
roles within organizations were more likely not only to report greater intentions to engage
in sexual infidelity, but also reported more actual infidelity. This was true both of male
and female participants in a sample of 1,561 professionals. Yap et al. (2013) manipulated
psychological power by having participants hold either a high or low power pose. When
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administering compensation, the experimenters intentionally overpaid participants by
four dollars. Those who had held the low power pose were more likely to behave
ethically by reporting the overpayment while those who had held the high power pose
were more likely to steal the money by failing to report the overpayment. Similarly,
Lammers et al. (2010) manipulated power using a writing prompt and then gave
participants an opportunity to cheat in order to receive more raffle entries. Participants
were asked to roll two ten-sided die and to report each number rolled in order to
determine the number of entries earned. High power participants were more likely than
low power participants to cheat by over reporting the number of raffle entries earned.
Thus using three different ways of either assessing or manipulating power (organizational
status, power posing, and writing prompt), and three different measures of cheating
behavior (sexual infidelity, stealing money, lying/cheating to receive more raffle entries)
these studies consistently find that people with power tend to cheat more.
Moral judgments. Power also fundamentally influences moral decision making
and judgment. Lammers and Stapel (2009) found that high-power individuals were more
inclined to endorse moral decisions founded on deontological (rule-based) arguments
whereas low-power individuals were more inclined to endorse moral decisions founded
on consequentialist (outcome-based) arguments. However, when rule-based outcomes
did not result in a preferential outcome for the high-power individual they were inclined
to make exceptions to the rule in favor of their own self-interest.
Similarly, a study by Lammers et al. (2010) found that high-power individuals
were more likely to condemn other people for their cheating, while they themselves
engaged in more cheating behavior. They also found that high-power individuals were
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less strict in judging their own transgressions than they were in judging other people’s
transgressions. This effect though was reversed when the source of the power was
illegitimate. Those with illegitimate claims to power were actually stricter in judging
themselves than they were in judging other people. The authors refer to this phenomenon
as hypercrisy; a term they derived from the Greek prefix hyper- meaning “too much” and
the root kritein that means “being critical.” (Lammers, et al., 2010, p. 742).
General Predictions
In Chapter 2, I provided a theoretical rationale for the reason that smartphones
influence feelings of psychological power along with empirical evidence that would
appear to provide preliminary support for that claim. In Chapter 3, I reviewed relevant
literature on psychological power. If access to one’s smartphone does increase feelings
of psychological power, then it is expected that that access to one’s smartphone will
result in the same behavioral outcomes associated with elevated levels of power acquired
otherwise. The current study aimed to conceptually replicate the findings obtained by
Egan and Larson (2015) and also to extend them by demonstrating that these results
extend to other behaviors influenced by psychological power, namely those implicated in
moral decision making and behavior.

CHAPTER IV
STUDY 1
The central hypothesis of this study is that a) access to one’s smartphone
influences feelings of psychological power such that people feel more powerful with than
without their device, and that b) smartphone-induced power produces predictable, moral
behaviors consistent with states of elevated psychological power that either occur
naturally or are experimentally manipulated in more traditional ways like role
assignment, writing prompts, or power posing. A pair of studies that experimentally
manipulate access to or deprivation from one’s smartphone were conducted to test this
hypothesis. In this chapter I report on the first of those two studies.
Study 1 specifically investigated whether having access to versus being deprived
of access to one’s smartphone influenced psychological power, moral orientation, and
risk taking. Previous research has found that high power is associated with deontological
moral reasoning while low power is associated with consequentialist moral reasoning
(Lammers & Stapel, 2009). In the current study, it was predicted that those allowed
access to their smartphone would feel a greater sense of psychological power compared
with those deprived of access to their smartphone; thus it was also predicted that
participants in the smartphone access condition would show a relative preference for
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moral decisions based on rule-based arguments compared with participants in the
smartphone deprivation condition.
High levels of psychological power are also associated with activation of the
BAS, which causes people to focus on possible gains/rewards and have a greater
willingness to take risks, whereas low levels of power are associated with activation of
the BIS which causes people to focus on possible loss/punishment and be less willingness
to take risks (Carney, et al., 2010; Keltner, et al., 2003). Because it was also predicted
that access to one’s smartphone would increase feelings of psychological power, it was
predicted that participants in the smartphone access condition would be more likely to
take risks compared with those in the smartphone deprivation condition.
In this study, the object (smartphone or student ID) to which one is allowed or
deprived access is also manipulated for comparison. No differences were predicted based
on object. The student ID conditions (access and deprivation) served as a control to rule
out the possibility that simply being allowed access versus being deprived of access to a
personal belonging influenced feelings of power. Justification for the choice of this
comparison object is provided below.
Based on the theory of psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 2003), it was
anticipated that the effect of smartphone access versus deprivation would not be the same
for those who possessed stronger feelings of psychological ownership over their
smartphone compared with those who possessed weaker feelings of psychological
ownership over their smartphone. The theory predicts that being deprived of an object
toward which an individual possesses strong feelings of psychological ownership could
result in negative affective states and may have behavioral implications.
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Furthermore, Pierce et al. (2003) argue that it may not simply be the level of
psychological ownership of an object that matters, but also the routes by which those
feelings develop and the motives they serve. Therefore, the relationship between
smartphone psychological ownership (SPO) and power may not be a simple matter or
higher or lower levels of SPO. The relationship may be different, for instance, for those
using their smartphone primarily for efficacy/effectance motives compared with those
using their device for self-identity motives. Thus, at a minimum, strength of feelings of
psychological ownership toward one’s smartphone was predicted to moderate the effect
of smartphone custody on psychological power, which may then also moderate the effect
of smartphone custody on risk taking and moral orientation. However, it was also
thought that a more nuanced relationship may exist between SPO and power. Thus, that
possibility was explored by investigating how various subscales of the measure of SPO
related to power, and a corresponding research question has been added to the hypotheses
(below). Based on the arguments provided, the following specific predictions are made:


Hypothesis 1: A significant object-by-custody interaction is predicted such that
compared with those in the smartphone deprivation condition, those in the
smartphone access condition will exhibit more psychological power as measured
using the BIS/BAS scales. No such difference is expected in the student ID
condition.



Hypothesis 2: A significant object-by-custody interaction is predicted such that
compared with those in the smartphone deprivation condition, those in the
smartphone access condition will exhibit more risk-taking behavior as measured
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by the gambling task. No such difference is expected in the student ID
condition.


Hypothesis 3: A significant object-by-custody interaction is predicted such that
compared with participants in the smartphone deprivation condition, participants
in the smartphone access condition will report a stronger preference for moral
decision making based on deontological/rule-based arguments. No such
difference is expected in the student ID condition.



Hypothesis 4: Psychological power will partially mediate the effect of
smartphone custody on risk taking.



Hypothesis 5: Psychological power will partially mediate the effect of
smartphone custody on moral orientation.



Hypothesis 6: Smartphone psychological ownership will moderate the effect of
smartphone custody on psychological power such that those with higher levels of
smartphone psychological ownership will be more affected by the custody
manipulation, and those with lower levels of smartphone psychological
ownership will be less effected by the custody manipulation.



Research Questions: Does the relationship between smartphone psychological
ownership and psychological power differ depending on the route by which
those feelings developed or the motives served by those feelings?5

5

This question will not be addressed in the current chapter, but will be given detailed attention in Chapter
6.
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Method
Design and Participants
The study employed a 2 (custody: access vs. deprivation) by 2 (object:
smartphone vs. student ID) by 2 (moral outcome: accept vs. reject) by 2 (order: moral
orientation first vs. risk taking first) between-subjects design. Psychological power was
measured using the BIS/BAS Scales (Carver & White, 1994), which will be described
more fully below. Moral orientation refers to whether a person prefers a
deontological/rule-based approach to moral reasoning or a consequentialist/outcomebased approach to moral reasoning, and was measured using a vignette with a follow-up
question as was done in Lammers and Stapel (2009). Risk taking was operationalized as
the choice to gamble (or not) with some or all of one’s monetary compensation from the
study.
The design resulted in 16 conditions. No differences were predicted based on
order. The order in which the measures of moral orientation and risk taking occurred
were counterbalanced to address the possibility that the temporal distance between the
custody manipulation and dependent measures had an impact. It was thought that the
effect of smartphone custody might possibly wear off and that results would be weaker
for measures taken further temporally from the custody manipulation. On the other hand,
Kamenetz (2015) reported that the longer individuals are unable to check their
smartphone the more anxiousness they experience. Thus, the effect may have
strengthened over time. Counterbalancing was used to control the effect of either
possibility.
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No differences were predicted based on moral outcome. Both outcomes can be
supported using either rule-based or outcome-based logic. This factor was included in
the study, as it was by Lammers and Stapel (2009), to test whether the predicted effects
occur regardless of moral outcome. This factor was also collapsed for main analysis after
preliminary analysis revealed that there were no significant effects due to moral outcome.
Thus, the design as analyzed was a 2 (object: smartphone vs. student ID) x 2 (custody:
access vs. deprivation) factorial design. The following discussion focuses only on those
four conditions resulting from the custody and object factors.
Data was collected from 158 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses (PSYC100, PSYC101, and PSYC304) at Loyola University Chicago.
They were recruited using the Sona Systems participant management software (PSYC100
and PSYC101) and email (PSYC304). Recruitment material indicated that participants
needed to be fluent English speakers who currently owned and used a smartphone. They
either received two experimental credits toward a course requirement (PSYC100/101) or
extra credit (PSYC304) for their participation. In addition, they were compensated
between $0 and $6.00 depending on a series of choices that they made during the
experiment.
Procedure
Data collections was conducted in a laboratory setting with small groups of
participants taking part simultaneously. The decision to collect data in a group setting
was made because psychological power is a socially dependent construct (Keltner, et al.,
2003), thus it is necessary either to prime the thought of others or to collect data with
others present.
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Assignment to both an object condition (smartphone vs. student ID) and an order
condition (moral orientation first vs. risk taking first) was decided based on session date.
Both the object and order condition to be run during a given session were either randomly
decided or run based on cell sizes (i.e., the session needed to maintain an even number of
observations per cell was run). Thus, participants blindly self-selected an object and
order condition based on the date of the session that they select.
Upon arrival at the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
custody conditions (access vs. deprivation) and one of the moral outcome conditions
(accept vs. reject). This was accomplished through randomized distribution of paperand-pencil material packets. Packet order was randomized ahead of time.
See Figure 2 (below) for a diagram of the order of data collection.
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Figure 2. Order of procedures used during Study 1. *Note that steps seven and eight are
counterbalanced. Depending on order condition, participants either completed the moral
orientation measure first and then the risk-taking measure or the risk-taking measure first
and then the moral orientation measure.

1. Informed Consent

2. Smartphone Scale of
Psychological
Ownership

3. Smartphone Use
Questionnaire

4. Demographics

5. Custody
Manipulation

6. Psychological Power
(BIS/BAS Scales)

7. Moral Orientation or
Risk Taking*

8.Risk-Taking or Moral
Orienataion*

9. Exit Survey

Order of procedures was determined by the paper-and-pencil participant material
packet. Experimenters followed a script to walk participants through the session sectionby-section at the pace. Verbal and written instructions accompanied each section.
First, participants received an informed consent document. Written consent was
collected from each participant. Second, participants completed the measure of
smartphone psychological ownership (SPO). Third, they completed the smartphone use
questionnaire. Forth, they provided demographic information (both basic and
smartphone). Fifth, the custody manipulation was introduced. Participants were told
either that “During the next part of the experiment, you will be asked for a piece of
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information that you will be [required to obtain (access condition)]/[tempted to obtain,
but not permitted to obtain (deprivation condition)] from your [smartphone]/[student
ID].” Based on condition assignment, they were asked either to put their
smartphone/student ID on the desk in front of them (access condition), or to place it in a
clear container, which was then placed on the experimenter’s desk (deprivation
condition).
Next began the collection of the primary dependent measures. After the custody
manipulation, participants completed the measure of psychological power. In the moral
orientation first order condition, participants completed the moral orientation decisionmaking task (Lammers & Stapel, 2009) followed by the risk-taking measure.
Alternately, participants in the risk taking first order condition completed the risk-taking
measure next followed by the moral orientation decision-making task. All participants
within a session complete the measures in the same order. This was done to simplify the
instructions and reduce the potential for confusion and participant error. Finally,
participants completed a mood measure, were probed for suspicion, were allowed to
retrieve their personal belonging if applicable (i.e., smartphone or student ID), were
partially debriefed, and thanked. At the very end, after the data collection material
packets had been collected. Participants who had opted not to wager any of their
compensation were paid first ($3.00). Next, those who had decided to wager completed a
double-or-nothing game (described in detail below) and were compensated accordingly.
All compensation was paid out in cash at the end of the session.
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Materials
A complete set of materials used in Study 1 can be found in Appendix A. It
contains a full copy of the paper-and-pencil participant material packet used. The version
provided is the smartphone deprivation, moral orientation first version. Other versions
vary only slightly from the provided version. Variations are described in detail in the
following section.
Manipulated predictors. There were four manipulated predictors: custody
(access vs. deprivation), object (smartphone vs. student ID), moral outcome (accept vs.
reject), and order (moral orientation first vs. risk taking first). Recall that no predictions
were made based on either moral outcome or order and that these factors were collapsed
for main analyses. The two student ID conditions (i.e., student ID access and student ID
deprivation) served as control conditions to rule out the possibility that simply being
allowed access to versus deprived of access to a personal belonging influenced feelings
of psychological power. Thus, the two experimental conditions of primary interest were
the smartphone access and smartphone deprivation conditions.
Smartphones were expected to influence psychological power in ways that other
personal belongings do not, in part because they make accessible knowledge and
resources (e.g., utilities, activities, social networks) that are not available otherwise.
Student ID was chosen as the specific control object because it possesses some of the
same qualities as does a smartphone: it is used frequently and exclusively by the owner, it
provides access to areas on campus including the library and dormitories, it can be used
to pay for items and check out books, it is personalized with the picture, name, and
student identification number unique to that individual. Thus, it has multiple functions
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that are not served by another belonging, and that allow its user access to areas and items
not available without it.
Measured predictor. There was one measured predictor – SPO. SPO was
measured using an 18-item scale where higher numbers indicating stronger feelings of
SPO. This measure was used in a previous study where it produced good reliability (α =
.85) (Egan & Larson, 2015). This scale was developed based on the three routes by
which feelings of psychological ownership toward an object develop (i.e., controlling the
object, knowing the object intimately, and investing the self into the object) and the three
motives served by psychological ownership (i.e., self-efficacy/effectance, self-identity,
and having a place) suggested by Pierce et al. (2003). Specifically, 3 items were written
for each route and each motive, resulting in 18 items. This measure is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 6 where the results of factor analysis are discussed.
Smartphone use questionnaire. Participants also completed a 13-item measure
indicating how much they use their smartphone for various activities (e.g.,
sending/receiving text messages, listening to music, playing games). This item was
included both to provide support for the cover story that the purpose of the study was to
better understand how college students use their smartphones, and to help validate the
measure SPO. The theory of psychological ownership (Pierce, et al., 2003) predicts a
significant positive correlation between how much an object is used and how much
psychological ownership is felt toward that object.
Psychological power. Currently, there is not a standard, direct way to measure
psychological power. Within the field, it is typical to measure power by measuring its
effects either on perception or behavior. For instance, Bos and Cuddy (2013)
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operationalized power as the amount of time that a participant waited for an experimenter
that was ostensibly tardy. Galinsky et al. (2003) measured power as action taking in the
form of either averting or turning off a fan blowing on participants in an already cold
room. Galinsky et al. (2003) and Egan and Larson (2015) measured power as the number
of points taken for oneself in a shared resource dilemma. Ward and Keltner (1998)
measured power by observing how many cookies each participant in an interacting group
took.
There are also self-report measures of psychological power. The Personal Sense
of Power Scale developed by Anderson, Oliver, and Keltner (2012) is a somewhat
transparent self-report measure that asks relatively directly about the amount of influence
that one feels that he or she has in various settings. The BIS/BAS Scales developed by
Carver and White (1994) share a theoretical framework with the Approach/Inhibition
theory of psychological power (Keltner, et al., 2003) that is used as a basis for the
predictions tested in this dissertation. Approach/Inhibition theory posits that high-power
is associated with an activation of the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) whereas low
power is associated with an activation of the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS). The
BIS/BAS Scales were designed to measure levels of BIS and BAS activation. As such,
they were thought to be well-suited to serve as a measure of psychological power, and
were used in the current study.
The BIS scale is made up of seven items. It is designed to measure “reactions to
the anticipation of punishment” (p. 322, Carver & White, 1994). The BAS scale is made
up of three subscales: Drive, Fun Seeking, and Reward Responsiveness. The Drive
subscale includes four items designed to measure “the persistent pursuit of desired
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goals.” (Carver & White, 1994, p. 322). The Fun Seeking subscale includes four items
designed to measure “a desire for new rewards and a willingness to approach a
potentially rewarding events on the spur of the moment” (Carver & White, 1994, p. 322).
And the Reward Responsiveness subscale includes five items designed to measure
“positive responses to the occurrence or anticipation of reward.” (Carver & White, 1994,
p. 322)
The four subscales were created based on factor analysis of data from a sample of
732 college students. Carver and White (1994) administered the BIS/BAS Scales along
with measures of related constructs6. The BIS/BAS Scales were found to reliably
correlate in the predicted direction with those existing measures. Also, initial reliability
analysis yielded acceptable reliability for the BIS (α = .74), the BAS Reward
Responsiveness subscale (α = .73), and the BAS Drive subscale (α = .76). Reliability
was just below acceptable for the BAS Fun Seeking subscale (α = .66). Heubeck,
Wilkinson, and Cologon (1998) largely replicated the validity and reliability testing done
by Carver and White (1994). Furthermore, the BIS/BAS Scales were used in previous
research where significant effects of power were observed on the BAS scales, but not on
the BIS scale (Smith & Bargh, 2008). This is consistent with other work in the field that
has more often observed effects among participants primed with high-power than among
those primed with low-power regardless of the measure of power used. As Smith and

6

The Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Extraversion, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
Hypomania subscale, California Psychological Inventory Socialization scale, Life Orientation Test
optimism scale, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule negativity affectivity and positive affectivity,
General Temperament Survey negative temperament, positive temperament, and disinhibition-constraint
scales, Susceptibility to Punishment, MacAndrews & Steele BIS scale, and the Tridimensional Personality
Questionnaire harm avoidance, novelty seeking, and reward dependence scales.
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Bargh (2008) said, “Power appears to transform those who possess it, rather than those
who lack it.” (p. 18)
All of the BIS/BAS subscale items employ a one (strongly disagree) to four
(strongly agree) response scale. The original scales were written such that higher
numbers indicated less of the corresponding construct; however, as was done by Smith
and Bargh (2008), in the current study the scales were anchored such that higher numbers
indicate more of the corresponding construct.
Moral orientation. The measure of moral orientation used was a very slight
adaptation7 of the one used by Lammers and Stapel (2009)8. In this moral reasoning task,
participants read about a high school girl, Carol, who is faced with the decision either to
keep a promise to an old friend or to show kindness to a new girl at school by accepting
her invitation to go to the theater together. There are two outcomes. In the “accept
scenario”, Carol accepts the invitation from the new girl and breaks her promise to her
old friend. In the “reject scenario”, Carol rejects the invitation from the new girl and
keeps her promise to her old friend. For either outcome, there is both a rule-based
rationale (accept: “It is generally a good rule to welcome in and be friendly to new
people.”; reject: “It is generally a good rule for people to keep their promises.”) and an
outcome-based rationale (accept: “Tina needs new friends at her new school, because
otherwise she will feel lonely and left out.”; reject: “Corinne needs someone to help her
with her problem.”) to support that decision. Participants were asked, given the outcome

7

Minor changes were made to wording for clarity. The original version can be found in Appendix B for
comparison.
8
Used in Study 1 of that article. Adapted from Doneberg and Hoffman (1988).
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to which they were randomly assigned, which is the best argument in favor of that
decision. The rationale endorsed by the participant served as the measure of
deontological or consequentialist moral orientation. The response scale ranged from one
to nine where lower numbers indicated endorsement of the outcome-based argument and
higher numbers indicated endorsement of the rule-based argument.
Risk taking. Risk taking was operationalized by having participants decide
whether or not to gamble with their monetary compensation, and if so, how much to
gamble. The task was described to participants as a “Double-or-Nothing Game” wherein
participants: 1) decided whether or not to play, 2) decided how much (if any) money to
wager, and 3) decided whether an odd or an even roll of a die would constitute a winning
outcome [see Appendix C for a copy of the experimenter’s script used to explain the
Double-or-Nothing task]. Each participant was compensated $3.00. During the
experiment, participants decided whether or not to gamble with their compensation for a
chance to double it. If they chose not to gamble, they were paid $3.00 for their
participation. If they chose to gamble, they made two additional choices. First, they
decided how much of their compensation they wanted to gamble (in $0.25 increments
from $0.25 to $3.00). Second, they decided whether they wanted the winning outcome of
the roll of the die to be an even number or an odd number. After they had recorded their
choices, they removed that page from the packet of experimental material, folded it in
half, and passed it to the experimenter. At the very end of the experiment, participants
were called to the experimenter’s desk one at a time. Those who chose not to gamble
were paid, retrieved their personal belonging (if applicable), and were dismissed. Those
who chose to gamble rolled a fair, six-sided die. Depending on the winning outcome that
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they selected (evens or odds) and their roll of the die (the number on which the die
landed), the experimenter paid them an amount between $0.00 and $6.00 depending on
the amount gambled. They then retrieved their personal item (if applicable) and were
dismissed.
Demographics. Several pieces of demographic information were obtained from
each participant including self-reported gender (multiple choice) and age (open-ended).
Additionally, several pieces of information were collected to better understand
participants’ status as a smartphone user. Specifically, they were asked the make and
model of their smartphone, at what age they first got a smartphone, how long they have
had their current device, how satisfied they are with their current device, and how well
their current device functions.
Exit survey. On the final page of the participant material packet, participants
completed an exit survey wherein they were asked about their current affective state as
influenced by the experiment as well as asked to guess the nature of the hypothesis being
tested. The mood measure was included to rule out mood effects as an explanation.
Participants were asked the extent to which they felt each of six emotions as a result of
the study. Three items were positively valenced (happy, excited, and peaceful), and three
were negatively valenced (angry, sad, and anxious). Both positive moods and increased
risk taking are associated with elevated power whereas negative moods and less risk
taking are associated with decreased power (Keltner, et al., 2003). Thus, it was
anticipated that a correlation might exist between mood and risk taking; however,
previous research using the same object and custody manipulations as were employed
here did not find mood effects (Egan & Larson, 2015) nor were they expected to in the
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current study. Also, because Kamenetz (2015) suggests that being deprived of access to
one’s smartphone may be anxiety inducing, anxiety was included as one of the items on
the mood measure. However, I did not observe higher self-reported anxiety in the
smartphone deprivation condition.
The hypothesis guess item asked participants, “If you had to guess, what would
you say that the purpose of this study was?” Because the access and deprivation
conditions were run concurrently, it was important to assess whether participants 1)
accurately identified their custody condition, and 2) made any connection between the
custody manipulation and the various dependent measures. Hypothesis guesses were
coded as either not close, close, or accurate. Not close indicated that the guess was
general and in line with the cover story that the study was to better understand how
college students use their smartphone. A guess was considered “close” if the participant
either mentioned the custody manipulation or mentioned one of the dependent measures
(power, risk taking, or moral decision making). A guess was considered “accurate” if the
participant both mentioned the custody manipulation and one of the dependent measures.
The majority of guesses were not close (62.2%). Only eight guesses were coded as
accurate (5.1%). See Table 1 (below) for a breakdown of hypothesis guess accuracy by
condition. Guess accuracy was not particularly high in any one condition suggesting that
the true nature of the study was not especially transparent in one condition in particular.
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Table 1. Accuracy of hypothesis guess by condition.
Object
Custody
Access

Deprivation

Guess Accuracy
Not Close
Close
Accurate
Not Close
Close
Accurate

Smartphone
22
13
3
25
16
1

Student ID
24
12
2
26
10
2

One additional item was included in the exit survey. This item asked participants
either to “try to recall” (deprivation condition) or “check and report” (access condition)
either what type of shirt they were wearing in their student ID photo (student ID
condition) or how many mobile applications they currently have installed on their
smartphone (smartphone condition). This same item was used in Egan and Larson
(2015). The item was included to provide some rationale for the custody manipulation.
Debriefing. Debriefing was accomplished in an email9 sent to all participants at
the end of data collection. The text used in the debriefing email can be found in
Appendix D. Participants were made aware of the true nature of the study, told specific
hypotheses, and provided with references for journal articles to read if interested.
Results
All data was collected during the Spring 2016 semester. After removing two
participants that had been run in solo sessions10 and one outlier11, a total of 155
undergraduates (Male = 48, Female = 107) took part in Study 1. Participants were typical

9

Participant names and email addresses were not collected as a part of the study; however, the SonaSystem allows experimenters to email participants, which is how debriefing emails were delivered.
10
Attempts were made to always ensure at least two participants, but on two occasions as the result of “noshows” solo sessions were unavoidable.
11
Discussed below.
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college age (M = 19.16, SD = 1.03), and reported having gotten their first smartphone
when they were about 14 (M = 14.62, SD = 1.92), meaning that on average participants
had owned/used a smartphone for about 4.5 years (M = 4.55, SD = 2.02)12. The majority
reported having an Apple iPhone (83.9%). Participants reported having had their current
device on average for almost a year (M = 11.50, SD = 9.37)13. They also reported that
their current device worked well (M = 8.43, SD = 1.49) and that they were satisfied with
it (M = 8.57, SD = 1.55)14.
Sessions ranged in size from 2 to 15 participants (M = 7.25, SD = 3.55). The most
common session size was eight participants (20.6%). Cell sizes were kept fairly
balanced. Table 2 (below) lists the number of observations made per condition.
Table 2. Number of observations per condition with all 16 conditions.
Custody

Order
Risk-Taking First

Access

Moral Orientation
First
Risk-Taking First

Deprivation

Moral Orientation
First

Moral Outcome
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject

Object
Student ID
8
9
10
10
8
11
10
10

Smartphone
11
8
9
10
10
11
9
11

Ultimately, no differences were found as a result of moral outcome, and this
condition was collapsed resulting in eight conditions. While a significant difference was
observed based on order15, because (a) this factor was nearly balanced on the other

12

Demographics are without outlier in the sample.
One participant reported having had her current device for 156 months (13 years) which was far longer
than she reported having been a smartphone owner (3 years). Thus, it seems that she either misunderstood
the question or miscalculated the number of months she had owned her current device. Thus, her response
on that item only was removed and treated as missing data (was not replaced).
14
Both on a 10-point scale where higher numbers indicate greater functionality/satisfaction.
15
Discussed in detail below.
13
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conditions of interest and (b) the significant difference was not of theoretical interest
order was also collapsed leaving four conditions in the final design. Cell sizes were
adequate and balanced in the eight resulting conditions (see Table 3 below).
Table 3. Number of observations per condition after moral outcome and order were
collapsed.
Custody

Object
Student ID

Smartphone

Access

37

38

Deprivation

39

41

Preliminary Analysis
Missing data. For each scale or variable, the percent of missing data is reported
and then the method for dealing with the missing data points is explained.
For the scale of SPO, there were 155 participants and 18 items on the scale
resulting in 2,790 data points. Of those, only four were missing (0.14%). Each missing
value was from a different participant and each was from a different scale item. Thus,
missing values appear to be completely at random rather than systematic. Missing values
were replaced by the average of the item average and the participant’s average for the rest
of the items on the scale of SPO.
There were no missing values on the measure of smartphone use. There was one
missing value for smartphone make/model. The participant wrote in that he or she did
not know the make/model of his or her device. That data point was left missing. There
were no missing data for the remainder of the smartphone demographics (age at which
participant first got a smartphone, how many months the current device had been owned,
how well the current device functioned and how satisfied participants were with it). All
participants also reported their age and gender.
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The BAS measure is divided into three subscales (Drive, Reward Responsiveness,
and Fun Seeking). For the Drive subscale, there were 4 items (for each of the 155
participants) resulting in 632 data points. Four values were missing (0.63%). All four
missing values were on the fourth Drive subscale item16 that appeared as the first item on
the BIS/BAS questionnaire. Thus, the missing values may not be completely at random;
however, due to the very low percentage of missing values it was decided that it was
appropriate to replace the values. Thus, the same imputation was used to replace these
missing values as was described above (using the average of the item mean and
participant’s subscale mean).
No missing values were observed on the Reward Responsiveness or the Fun
Seeking subscale of the BAS or on the BIS subscale. No missing values were observed
on the item measuring moral orientation or on any of the items associated with the mood
check.
Thus of the 10,385 data points checked, only 9 were missing (0.09%) and 8 of the
9 were replaced.
Reliability, validity, and variable creation. For each of the scales discussed
below, where applicable, missing values were replaced before internal consistency
reliability was obtained.
Smartphone psychological ownership. After reverse scoring items 5 and 9,
Cronbach’s alpha for all 18 items measuring SPO was acceptable (α = .89). By removing

This item asked participants the extent to which they agreed with the statement, “When I go after
something, I use a ‘no holds barred’ approach.” It is possible that some participants were not familiar with
this figure of speech, especially if they were not native English speakers, and did not respond for that
reason.
16
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reverse scored item number 5, alpha could be increase to .90, but as this is a very small
improvement to an already reliable scale and to ensure that the measures used in Study 1
and Study 2 are the same, all 18 items were included in the average of SPO (M = 4.05,
SD = 0.84).
Theoretically, this measure may be expected to positively correlate with average
use, smartphone tenure (how long an individual has been a smartphone owner/user), how
many months they have owned their current device, how well their device functions and
how satisfied they are with their current device. To estimate the validity of this measure,
correlations were checked between the above mentioned variables and SPO. As
anticipated, positive correlations were observed among SPO and average use (r = .55, p =
.00), smartphone tenure (r = .21, p = .01), functionality (r = .18, p = .03), and satisfaction
(r = .24, p = .00). Thus, those who use their device more, have been a smartphone user
longer, report that they are more satisfied with their device, and that it functions well also
tended to report higher levels of SPO. No correlation was observed between average
SPO and months having owned one’s current device (r = -.09, p = .26). Interestingly,
average smartphone use only correlates with smartphone tenure (r = .23, p = .01) but
none of the other variables tested suggesting that the measure of SPO, while related to
use, is distinct from average use. Together the acceptable internal consistency reliability
and theoretically consistent correlations suggest that the measure of SPO is both reliable
and valid.
Smartphone use. Cronbach’s alpha obtained for the 13-item measure of
smartphone use was reliable (α = .74) and while it could be improved upon slightly by
removing items, in order to keep the measures used in Study 1 and Study 2 consistent,
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and because reliability obtained with all items was above the acceptable threshold of .70,
no items were removed. Thus, average smartphone usage (M = 3.77, SD = 0.57) was
created using all 13 items.
BIS/BAS. The BIS/BAS scale was originally created as a four-factor scale with a
BIS subscale and three BAS subscales (Drive, Reward Responsiveness, and Fun
Seeking). However, the scale also works well as a two-factor scale treating the BIS as
one factor and the three subscales of the BAS together as a factor (Jorm, Chirstensen,
Henderson, Jacomb, Korten, & Rodgers, 1999). After comparing the internal consistency
reliability, skewness, kurtosis, and correlations treating the scale as both a two-factor and
four-factor scale, I decided that with this sample, it appeared to function better as a twofactor scale. See reliability statistics for both options in Table 4 below.
Table 4. Comparison of two-factor and four-factor treatment of BIS/BAS scale.
BIS

Alphaa
.75
.78

Four-Factor
Skewb
-.32
-.12

Kurtosis
-.61
-.65

Alpha
.75

Two-Factor
Skew
-.32

Drive
Reward
.65
-.75
-.06
BAS
Resp.
.75
-.25
Fun
.63
-.28
-.63
Seeking
a. Cronbach’s Alpha
b. Values reflect skewness and kurtosis scores before any outliers were removed or variable
transformations were performed.

Kurtosis
-.61
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Treating the BIS/BAS scale as a two- rather than a four-factor scale corrects the
low internal consistency reliability observed on the Reward Responsiveness and Fun
Seeking subscales and also reduced the skewness observed on the Reward
Responsiveness subscale without greatly increasing the skewness observed on the other
two BAS subscales. It also produces correlations consistent with those observed by Jorm
et al. (1999). Specifically, average BAS is positively correlated with positive mood (r =
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.27, p = .001) and average BIS is positively correlated with negative mood (r = .23, p =
.004).
After reverse scoring items 5 and 7, Cronbach’s alpha for the seven item BIS
subscale was acceptable (α = .75) and could not be further improved by removing any
items. Thus, average BIS (M = 3.08, SD = .55) was calculated using all seven items.
Cronbach’s alpha for the 13 items from the 3 BAS subscales was .74. While it
could have been improved slightly, in order to keep the measures used in Study 1 and
Study 2 the same, and because initial reliability was above the .70 threshold for
acceptable, average BAS (M = 3.17, SD = 0.35) was calculated using all 13 items.
Mood measure. Participants were asked the extent to which “today’s experiment
caused you to feel each of the following emotions”. In general, on a five-point scale
where higher numbers indicate stronger feelings, participants did not report a strong
emotional reaction on any of the six emotions: happy (M = 2.11, SD = 1.53), excited (M =
1.86, SD = 1.51), peaceful (M = 1.93, SD = 1.59), angry (M = 0.13, SD = 0.47), sad (M =
0.17, SD = 0.55), or anxious (M = 1.19, SD = 1.51). The positive (happy, excited, and
peaceful) (M = 1.97, SD = 1.31) and negative emotions (angry, sad, and anxious) (M =
0.50, SD = 0.66) were averaged separately and then the average of the negative mood
items was subtracted from the average of the positive mood items to create an overall
mood index (M = 1.47, SD = 1.34) where high numbers indicate a more positive mood in
reaction to the experiment.
Check for normality and extreme cases. For each of the measures, statistics for
skewness and kurtosis were obtained and both histograms and P-P plots were visually
inspected to test for violations to assumptions of normality. Following the
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recommendation of Fields (2009), skewness and kurtosis scores were converted to zscores using the equations Zskewness = S – 0 / SEskewness and Zkurtosis = K – 0 / SEkurtosis
respectively. Also per Fields (2009), based on the sample size, a z-score with an absolute
value greater than 2.58 (significant at the p < .01 level) was considered to significantly
deviate from normal. Kolmogorov-Smirnov with a Lilliefors correction (K-S/Lilliefors)
was also performed to see whether the skewness was significant. However, because with
larger samples sizes (around 200) the K-S/Lilliefors often yields a significant p-value for
even small deviations from normality, the p-values alone were not used to determine
whether or not to transform a variable (Field, 2009). Rather, visual inspection was used
along with z-scores and K-S/Lilliefors in making individual judgments.
Average smartphone psychological ownership. Average SPO produced a
distribution with a skewness of -.31 (SE = .20, z-score = -1.57) and a kurtosis of -.41 (SE
= .39, z-score = -1.05), which did not significantly differ from normal [D(155) = .05, p =
.20]. No outliers were identified and no correction was performed for this variable.
Average smartphone use. Initial average smartphone use produced a negatively
skewed and leptokurtic distribution with a skewness of -.87 (SE = .19, z-score = -4.46)
and a kurtosis of 1.37 (SE = .39, z-score = 3.56). The K-S/Lilliefors test [D(156) = .09, p
= .003] indicated that the distribution was significantly negatively skewed (see Figure 3,
below).
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Figure 3. Histogram of average smartphone use before outlier was removed and variable
transformation was performed.

Visual inspection of the box-and-whisker plots revealed two participants that were
potential outliers, both low on average smartphone use, whose scores at least partially
accounted for the negative skewness. One was a fringelier (lying just at the +/- 3
standard deviation cut-off) at just -3.02 standard deviations below average. The other
was further from the mean at -4.04 standard deviations below average. This participant
was also 48 years old and reported not having gotten a smartphone until age 38. Because
she was an outlier on three variables (age, age at which she acquired a smartphone, and
smartphone use) this participant was removed from the data set. After removing the
outlier, skewness was improved to -.60 (SE = .20, z-score = -3.07) and kurtosis was
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improved to of .30 (SE = .39, z-score = 0.77), but the K-S/Lilliefors test [D(155) = .08, p
= .01] still indicated that the distribution was significantly negatively skewed.
Next a square root transformation was performed by reflecting the variable,
finding the square root, and re-reflecting the variable (so that positive values again
indicated higher levels of use). The newly created variable produced a skewness of -.24
(SE = .20, z-score = -1.25) with a kurtosis of -.03 (SE = .39, z-score = -0.09). The KS/Lilliefors test confirmed that this transformation successfully corrected the nonnormality of the variable [D(155) = .06, p = .20] [see Figure 4, below]. Thus, the
fringelier was retained and no further correction was made to the variable.
Figure 4. Histogram of average smartphone use after outlier was removed and variable
transformation was performed.
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BIS/BAS. The BIS subscale produced a distribution with a skewness of -.32 (SE
= .20, z-score = -1.62) and a kurtosis of -.59 (SE = .39, z-score = -1.52) neither of which
exceeded the 2.58 level of significant deviation from normal at the .01 level even though
the K-S/Lilliefors produced a significant p-value [D(155) = .09, p = .002]. Visual
inspection of the box-and-whisker plot revealed that there were no outliers. Standardized
scores ranged from -2.72 to 1.68. Based on the absence of outliers, the visual inspection
of the histogram (see Figure 5, below), and the z-scores, the decision was made not to
transform this variable in any way or to remove any participants.
Figure 5. Frequency distribution of average BIS scores.
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The BAS subscale produced a distribution with a skewness of -.18 (SE = .20, zscore = -0.91) and a kurtosis of -.45 (SE = .39, z-score = -1.17), which yielded a KS/Lilliefors that was significant at .03 [D(155) = .08, p = .03] but not significant at the .01
level. Based on the z-scores and visual inspection of the frequency distribution and boxand-whisker plots, no participants were removed and no correction was made to this
variable despite the significant p-value produced by the K-S/Lilliefors.
Moral orientation. The measure of moral orientation produced a strong bimodal
distribution with participants tending to favor either the rule-based or the outcome-based
reason supporting the decision rather than a less decisive middle point. The measure
produced a skewness of -.44 (SE = .20) yielding a z-score of -2.26, which does not
exceed the 2.58 level of significant deviation from normal at the .01 level. Because of
the bimodal distribution, the distribution was also platykurtotic with a kurtosis of -1.26
(SE = .39) yielding a z-score of -3.25, which does significantly deviate from normal.
While the distribution was significantly different from normal [D(155) = .24, p = .00],
because there were no outliers on this variable, no scores were removed and no correction
was performed for this variable.
Amount wagered. The amount wagered produced a distribution with a skewness
of -.26 (SE = .20) yielding a z-score of -1.35, which does not exceed the 2.58 level of
significant deviation from normal at the .01 level. The distribution produced a squareshaped distribution with a kurtosis of -1.50 (SE = .39) yielding a z-score of -3.87, which
was confirmed as significantly different from normal by the K-S/Lilliefors [D(155) = .25,
p = .00]. This appears to have resulted due to the fact that participants preferred to wager
in whole dollar amounts ($0.00, $1.00, $2.00, or $3.00) rather than in increments falling
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somewhere in between (e.g., $1.50 or $2.25) with the majority preferring to wager either
none of their compensation or all of their compensation (see Figure 6 below). No outliers
were identified and no correction was performed for this variable.
Figure 6. Frequency distribution of amount wagered.

Effect of moral outcome. First, a 2 (custody: access vs. deprivation) by 2
(object: smartphone vs. student ID) by 2 (moral outcome: accept vs. reject) by 2 (order:
moral-orientation first vs. risk-taking first) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was conducted on psychological power (BIS and BAS), risk-taking, and moral
orientation. The MANOVA revealed no main effect of moral outcome on moral
orientation [F(1, 154) = 0.18, p = .67, ɳ2p = .00], amount wagered [F(1, 154) = .29, p =
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.59, ɳ2p = .00], average BIS [F(1, 154) = 0.02, p = .88, ɳ2p = .00], or average BAS [F(1,
154) = 0.99, p = .32, ɳ2p = .01]. Thus, moral orientation was collapsed for all further
analysis leaving eight conditions.
Effect of order. The same MANOVA was used to test the effect of order and
revealed that there were no main effects of order on moral orientation [F(1, 154) = 0.12,
p = .74, ɳ2p = .00], average BIS [F(1, 154) = 0.02, p = .88, ɳ2p = .00], or average BAS
[F(1, 154) = 1.26, p = .26, ɳ2p = .01]; however, there was a significant main effect of
order on amount wagered [F(1, 154) = 6.05, p = .02, ɳ2p = .04] such that those who
wagered later (in the moral-orientation first condition), on average, wagered more (M =
$1.96) than those who wagered earlier (in the risk-taking first condition) (M = $1.50) (see
Figure 7, below).

Mean Amount Wagered (in Dollars)a

Figure 7. Unexpected significant main effect of order on amount wagered.
2.5
2
1.5
1

1.96
1.52

0.5
0
Moral First

Risk First
Order Condition

a. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE.17

17

SE = s/√W = 1.19/√155 = 1.19/12.45 = .10
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Because (a) this factor was nearly balanced with close to an equal number of
observations in the risk-taking first (n = 76) and moral orientation first (n = 79)
conditions, and (b) because the significant difference was not of theoretical interest18, this
factor was also collapsed for further analysis. Thus, the final design was a 2 (custody:
access vs. deprivation) by 2 (object: smartphone vs. student ID) mixed-model design with
four condition.
Test of mood effects. A 2 (custody: access vs. deprivation) by 2 (object:
smartphone vs. student ID) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was done to test for
mood effects using the overall mood index variable. No main effects of custody [F(1,
154) = 0.04, p = .84, ɳ2p = .00] or object [F(1, 154) = 1.01, p = .32, ɳ2p = .01] were
observed on mood, nor was there a significant two-way object-by-custody interaction on
mood [F(1, 154) = .03, p = .87, ɳ2p = .00]. Thus, the object and custody manipulations
appeared not to have significantly impacted participants’ mood. Of particular
importance, the smartphone deprivation condition did not lead to negative affective states
such as increased anxiety as was found by Kamenetz (2015).
Detection of covariates. Finally, correlational analyses were run to see whether
significant correlations existed between any of the outcome measures, and any of the
following possible extraneous factors: session size (i.e., number of participants in a given
data collection session), smartphone use, smartphone satisfaction, smartphone
functionality, length of smartphone ownership (both overall and for the current device),
age, and mood. Each possible covariate was tested to see whether it correlated with any

18

Although it is of practical interest and is discussed in more detail in the Discussion section of this
chapter.
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of the dependent variables (average BIS, average BAS, amount wagered, and moral
orientation) [see Table 5, below]. None of the variables tested significantly correlated
with average BIS, moral orientation, or amount wagered. Average BAS was significantly
correlated with participants’ responses on the mood check (r = .25, p = .002) such that
those that reported higher scores on the measure of BAS also reported a more positive
mood at the end of the experiment, which is consistent with the Approach/Inhibition
theory of psychological power (Keltner, et al. 2003). Based on these results, mood was
included as a covariate in the main analyses.
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Table 5. Correlational analyses to detect possible covariates in Study 1.
Session Size

Participant Age

Age First Got
Smartphone

Smartphone
Tenure

Months
Owned
Smartphone

Smartphone
Functionality

Smartphone
Satisfaction

Average Mood

Amount
Wagered

Moral
Orientation

Average
BAS

Average
BIS

Pearson
1
-.034
-.108
Correlation
Sig. (2.676
.183
tailed)
N
155
155
155
Pearson
-.034
1
.226**
Correlation
Sig. (2.676
.005
tailed)
N
155
155
155
Pearson
-.108
.226**
1
Correlation
Sig. (2.183
.005
tailed)
N
155
155
155
Pearson
-.199*
.065
-.029
Correlation
Sig. (2.013
.419
.718
tailed)
N
155
155
155
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Amount
Wagered

Moral
Orientation

Average BAS

Average BIS

Correlations

-.199*

-.061

-.056

-.137

.096

.011

.117

.036

-.086

.013

.452

.488

.088

.233

.891

.148

.658

.288

155

155

155

155

155

154

155

155

155

.065

-.043

-.104

-.099

.044

.078

.002

-.030

.246**

.419

.597

.199

.220

.587

.336

.983

.711

.002

155

155

155

155

155

154

155

155

155

-.029

-.070

.002

.098

-.090

.035

.062

-.035

.152

.718

.387

.983

.223

.267

.667

.447

.670

.058

155

155

155

155

155

154

155

155

155

1

.050

-.026

.005

-.017

.077

-.081

-.088

-.057

.541

.748

.950

.830

.342

.315

.274

.483

155

155

155

155

154

155

155

155

155
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Main Analysis
To test the predicted object-by-custody interactions on psychological power, risktaking, and moral orientation, a separate hierarchical simultaneous regression was
conducted for each dependent variable. Hierarchical simultaneous regression was used
rather than MANOVA so that the predicted moderation effect of smartphone
psychological ownership could be tested in the same analysis (since psychological
ownership is being treated as a continuous predictor). Categorical predictors (i.e.,
custody and object) were coded using effects coding [see Table 6, below].
Table 6. Effects coding for categorical predictors.
Factor
Custody
Object

Condition
Access
Deprivation
Smartphone
Student ID

Code
1
-1
1
-1

The continuous predictor (i.e., smartphone psychological ownership) was centered by
subtracting the scale mean from each participants’ score.
Mood was controlled for in Block 1 of the regression analyses. Block 2 of the
hierarchical simultaneous regression tested the main effect of custody and object. Block
3 tested the interaction between custody and object. This served as the test of Hypotheses
1, 2, and 3. Block 4 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression tested the moderating
effect of SPO. Centered SPO was entered as a continuous predictor. Interaction terms
were created between SPO and categorical predictors by multiplying the centered SPO
variable with each the object and custody effects coded variables. Also a three-way
interaction term was created for SPO, object, and custody. All of these predictors were
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entered into Block 4 of the regression model. The effect of the 3-way object-by-custody by-SPO interaction on psychological power served as the test of Hypothesis 6.
Psychological power. Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicted a significant object-bycustody interaction such that compared with those in the smartphone deprivation
condition, those in the smartphone access condition will exhibit more psychological
power as measured using the BIS/BAS scales. No such difference was predicted in the
student ID condition. Also, Hypothesis 6 predicted that SPO will moderate the effect of
smartphone custody on psychological power such that those with higher levels of SPO
would be more affected by the custody manipulation, and those with lower levels of SPO
will be less effected by the custody manipulation. Because there were two dependent
measures of psychological power (BIS and BAS). Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 6 were
split into Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 6a (for BIS) and Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis
6b (for BAS) respectively. Two separate hierarchical simultaneous regressions were
conducted, one for each dependent measure (BIS and BAS). Both were conducted
according to the procedures described above.
BIS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that mood only
accounted for 0.7% of variance [r2 = .01, F∆(1, 153) = 1.14, p = .29] and did not
significantly predict BIS scores [b = -.04, β = -.09, t(154) = -1.07, p = .29].
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, only accounted for
0.2% more variance in BIS scores [r2 = .01, F∆(2, 151) = 0.18, p = .84]. No main effects
had been predicted for either factor, and none was observed for either custody [b = .02, β
= .04, t(154) = 0.44, p = .66] or object [b = -.02, β = -.03, t(154) = -0.40, p = .69].
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Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, only accounted
for 0.1% more variance [r2 = .01, F∆(1, 150) = 0.16, p = .69]. A significant two-way
interaction had been predicted between object and custody (Hypothesis 1a), but was not
observed [b = -.02, β = -.03, t(154) = -0.40, p = .69]. Thus Hypothesis 1a was not
supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO accounted for an additional
8.9% of variance in BIS scores which is a significant change in the amount of variance
explained [r2 = .10, F∆(4, 146) = 3.63, p = .01]. There was an unexpected main effect of
SPO on BIS scores [b = .19, β = .28, t(154) = 3.44, p = .001] such that a one point
increase in SPO scores would predict a .19 increase in BIS scores. No significant twoway interactions had been predicted between SPO and object [b = -.05, β = -.07, t(154)
= -0.92, p = .36] or custody [b = -.42, β = -.06, t(154) = -0.81, p = .42] and none was
observed for either. A significant three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction had
been predicted (Hypothesis 6a), but was not observed [b = -.03, β = -.04, t(154) = -0.48, p
= .63]. Thus Hypothesis 6a was not supported (see the coefficients in Table 7 below).
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Table 7. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BIS.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
4
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.127
.066
-.035
.033
3.127
.066
-.034
.033
.020
.044
-.018
.045
3.127
.066
-.034
.033
.020
.045
-.018
.045
-.018
.045
3.167
.066
-.064
.034
.038
.043
-.015
.043
-.027
.043
.186
.054
-.048
.053
-.042
.052
-.025
.052

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.086
-.084
.036
-.033
-.084
.037
-.034
-.032
-.156
.069
-.027
-.049
.284
-.074
-.064
-.038

T
47.718
-1.065
47.376
-1.030
.443
-.401
47.246
-1.033
.449
-.412
-.399
48.343
-1.905
.877
-.346
-.617
3.438
-.920
-.811
-.479

Sig.
.000
.288
.000
.305
.658
.689
.000
.303
.654
.681
.690
.000
.059
.382
.730
.538
.001
.359
.419
.632

a. Dependent Variable: Average BIS
Legend: Average BIS = average BIS score, Average Mood = average for mood check items, Custody =
effects coded custody categorical predictor, Object = effects coded object categorical predictor, Objectby-Custody = object-by-custody interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Object-by-SPO =
object-by-SPO interaction, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custodyby-SPO three-way interaction.

BAS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that mood
accounted for 6.1% of variance [r2 = .06, F∆(1, 153) = 9.86, p = .002] which
significantly predicted BAS scores [b = .06, β = .25, t(154) = 3.14, p = .002]. An
increase of one point in mood would predict a .06 increase in BAS.
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, only accounted for
0.4% more variance in BAS scores [r2 = .07, F∆(2, 151) = 0.35, p = .71]. No main
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effects had been predicted for either factor, and none was observed for either custody [b
= -.02, β = -.04, t(154) = -0.56, p = .58] or object [b = .02, β = .05, t(154) = 0.62, p = .54].
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, only accounted
for 0.4% more variance [r2 = .07, F∆(1, 150) = 0.64, p = .43]. A significant two-way
interaction had been predicted between object and custody (Hypothesis 1b), but was not
observed [b = -.02, β = -.03, t(154) = -0.40, p = .65]. Thus Hypothesis 1b was not
supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO only accounted for an
additional 2.9% of variance in BAS scores [r2 = .10, F∆(4, 146) = 1.17, p = .33]. Again,
as was the case with BIS, here was an unexpected significant main effect of SPO on BAS
scores [b = .07, β = .17, t(154) = 2.02, p = .05] such that a one point increase in SPO
scores would be expected to result in a .07 increase in BAS scores. No significant twoway interactions had been predicted between SPO and object [b = .03, β = .08, t(154) =
1.02, p = .31] or custody [b = .01, β = .02, t(154) = 0.23, p = .82] and none was observed
for either. A significant three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction had been
predicted (Hypothesis 6b) but was not observed [b = .00, β = .00, t(154) = 0.06, p = .96].
Thus Hypothesis 6b was not supported (see the coefficients in Table 8 below).
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Table 8. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BAS.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
4
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.081
.040
.064
.020
3.082
.040
.063
.020
-.015
.027
.017
.027
3.081
.041
.063
.020
-.016
.027
.018
.027
.022
.027
3.099
.041
.051
.021
-.010
.027
.020
.027
.023
.027
.069
.034
.034
.033
.007
.033
.002
.033

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.246
.243
-.044
.049
.244
-.045
.051
.063
.199
-.028
.057
.068
.167
.082
.018
.004

T
76.596
3.140
76.151
3.074
-.557
.621
76.054
3.081
-.571
.645
.800
74.896
2.428
-.355
.716
.855
2.015
1.023
.226
.056

Sig.
.000
.002
.000
.003
.579
.535
.000
.002
.569
.520
.425
.000
.016
.723
.475
.394
.046
.308
.822
.955

a. Dependent Variable: Average BAS
Legend: Average BAS = average BAS score, Average Mood = average on mood check items, Custody =
effects coded custody categorical predictor, Object = Effects coded object categorical predictor, Objectby-Custody = object-by-custody interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Object-by-SPO =
object-by-SPO interaction, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custodyby-SPO three-way interaction.

Risk taking. Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicted a significant object-by-custody
interaction on risk-taking behavior such that compared with those in the smartphone
deprivation condition, those in the smartphone access condition would exhibit more risktaking behavior as measured by the gambling task. No such difference was expected in
the student ID condition. Recall also that risk-taking behavior was measured as the
amount of a participant’s compensation that he or she chose to wager.
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Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that mood only
accounted for 0.3% of variance [r2 = .00, F∆(1, 153) = 0.50, p = .48] and did not
significantly predict amount wagered [b = -.05, β = -.06, t(154) = -0.70, p = .48].
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, accounted for 2.4%
more variance in amount wagered [r2 = .03, F∆(2, 151) = 1.90, p = .15]. No main effects
had been predicted for custody [b = -.16, β = -.14, t(154) = -1.71, p = .09] or object [b =
.09, β = .08, t(154) = 0.93, p = .36] and none were observed for either.
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, only accounted
for 0.1% more variance [r2 = .03, F∆(1, 150) = 0.15, p = .70]. A significant two-way
object-by-custody interaction had been predicted (Hypothesis 2), but was not observed [b
= .04, β = .03, t(154) = 0.39, p = .70]. Thus Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO accounted for an additional
3.2% of variance in amount wagered [r2 = .06, F∆(4, 146) = 1.24, p = .30]. Hypothesis 4
predicted that power would mediate the effect of smartphone custody on risk taking.
This hypothesis is tested using a separate analysis and is discussed later in this chapter.
No main effect had been predicted for SPO on risk taking and none was observed [b
= -.11, β = -.08, t(154) = -0.94, p = .35]. No interactions had been predicted between
SPO and custody [b = -.22, β = -.15, t(154) = -1.85, p = .07] or object [b = .05, β = .03,
t(154) = 0.39, p = .70] and none were observed for either. No significant three-way
object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction had been predicted and none was observed [b
= -.09, β = -.06, t(154) = -0.76, p = .45] (see the coefficients in Table 9 below).
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Table 9. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on amount
wagered.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
4
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
1.821
.143
-.051
.072
1.819
.142
-.054
.072
-.163
.096
.089
.096
1.819
.142
-.054
.072
-.164
.096
.090
.096
.037
.096
1.785
.145
-.043
.074
-.177
.096
.084
.096
.041
.096
-.113
.120
.046
.117
-.215
.116
-.088
.116

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.057
-.061
-.137
.075
-.060
-.138
.076
.031
-.048
-.148
.071
.035
-.079
.032
-.150
-.062

T
12.766
-.704
12.806
-.754
-1.706
.927
12.767
-.746
-1.708
.936
.388
12.282
-.577
-1.834
.873
.430
-.939
.390
-1.851
-.755

Sig.
.000
.483
.000
.452
.090
.355
.000
.457
.090
.351
.699
.000
.565
.069
.384
.668
.349
.697
.066
.451

a. Dependent Variable: Amount Wagered
Legend: Average Mood = average on mood check items, Custody = effects coded custody categorical
predictor, Object = effects coded object categorical predictor, Object-by-Custody = object-by-custody
interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction, Custody-bySPO = custody-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO three-way interaction.

Moral orientation. Recall that Hypothesis 3 predicted a significant object-bycustody interaction such that compared with participants in the smartphone deprivation
condition, participants in the smartphone access condition would report a stronger
preference for moral decision making based on deontological/rule-based arguments. No
such difference was expected in the student ID condition.
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Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that emotion
accounted for 2.3% of variance [r2 = .02, F∆(1, 154) = 3.64, p = .06] which did not
significantly predict moral orientation [b = .31, β = .15, t(154) = 1.91, p = .06].
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, only accounted for
0.9% more variance in moral orientation [r2 = .03, F∆(2, 151) = 0.68, p = .51]. No main
effects had been predicted for either factor, and none was observed for either custody [b
= -.07, β = -.03, t(154) = -0.31, p = .76] or object [b = .24, β = .09, t(154) = 1.12, p = .26].
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, only accounted
for 0.1% more variance [r2 = .03, F∆(1, 150) = 0.13, p = .72]. A significant two-way
object-by-custody interaction had been predicted (Hypothesis 3), but was not observed [b
= .08, β = .03, t(154) = 0.36, p = .72]. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO only accounted for an
additional 3.2% of variance in moral orientation [r2 = .06, F∆(4, 146) = 1.23, p = .30].
Hypothesis 5 predicted that power would mediate the effect of smartphone custody on
moral orientation, which was tested using a separate analysis and is discussed later in this
chapter. No main effect of SPO on moral orientation had been predicted and none was
observed [b = -.16, β = -.05, t(154) = -0.58, p = .56]. No significant interactions was
predicted between SPO and object and none was observed [b = -.15, β = -.05, t(154)
= -0.58, p = .57]. Although no two-way custody-by-SPO interaction had been predicted
for moral orientation, one was observe [b = -.53, β = -.16, t(154) = -2.00, p = .0519]. For
those in the access condition, there was a negative but non-significant correlation

19

p = .048
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between SPO and moral orientation (r = -.17, p = .14) suggesting that those with higher
levels of SPO showed a slight preference for an outcome-based or consequentialist moral
orientation. However, for those in the deprivation condition, there as a positive but nonsignificant correlation between SPO and moral orientation (r = .16, p = .15) suggesting
that those with higher levels of SPO showed a slight preference for a rule-based or
deontological moral orientation. While neither of these correlations is significant, the
two-way interaction suggests that the lines are significantly non-parallel and the
scatterplot in Figure 8 (below) shows that there is a crossover interaction between SPO
and custody on moral orientation (see the coefficients in Table 10 below).
Figure 8. Scatterplot depicting the unexpected significant, two-way, custody-by-SPO,
crossover interaction.

Legend:
Moral Orientation = higher values indicate a rule-based moral reasoning style and lower values indicate an
outcome-based moral reasoning style, Access = access condition, Deprivation = deprivation condition.
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Table 10. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on moral
orientation.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
4
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
5.237
.322
.309
.162
5.251
.323
.295
.163
-.067
.217
.244
.218
5.250
.324
.296
.163
-.068
.218
.247
.219
.078
.218
5.163
.331
.320
.169
-.081
.219
.259
.219
.063
.219
-.159
.274
-.153
.265
-.528
.264
.074
.265

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.152
.145
-.025
.090
.146
-.025
.091
.029
.158
-.030
.095
.023
-.049
-.047
-.161
.023

t
16.276
1.908
16.257
1.810
-.306
1.121
16.207
1.810
-.312
1.128
.357
15.617
1.893
-.368
1.181
.287
-.581
-.576
-1.996
.280

Sig.
.000
.058
.000
.072
.760
.264
.000
.072
.755
.261
.722
.000
.060
.713
.239
.774
.562
.566
.048
.780

a. Dependent Variable: Moral Orientation
Legend: Average Mood = average of the mood-check items, Custody = effects coded custody categorical
predictor, Object = effects coded object categorical predictor, Object-by-Custody = object by custody
interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction, Custody-bySPO = custody-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO three-way interaction.

Moderated mediation. The newer PROCESS procedures by Hayes (2012)
allows moderated mediation to be tested in a single analysis and thus, for this analysis, is
preferable to the older Preacher and Hayes (2004) procedure. This procedure was used to
test all predictions involving mediation and/or moderation (and Hypotheses 4 and 5 in
particular that were not tested using the hierarchical simultaneous regression). Figure 9
(below) depicts the conceptual model tested in this section.
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Figure 9. Conceptual model tested using Hayes (2012) PROCESS procedure. Solid lines
indicated predicted significant relationships corresponding to hypotheses. The broken
Moderator

Mediator

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable

line was not specifically predicted to be significant.
Risk taking. Hypotheses 4 predicted that psychological power would partially
mediate the effect of smartphone custody on risk taking. Hypothesis 6 predicted that
SPO would moderate the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power such that
those with higher levels of SPO would be more affected by the custody manipulation, and
those with lower levels of SPO would be less affected by the custody manipulation. Thus
power was predicted to mediate the relationship between custody and risk taking while
SPO was predicted to moderate the relationships between custody and psychological
power (moderated mediation).
Because these predictions pertain only to smartphone custody (not to student ID
custody), this analysis was run only on participants in the smartphone condition (n = 79).
Also, because there were two measures of psychological power (BIS and BAS) two
separate analyses were run and Hypothesis 4 was split into Hypothesis 4a (BIS) and
Hypothesis 4b (BAS).
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First, the analysis of moderated mediation was done to assess the relationship
between smartphone custody and risk taking as mediated by BIS and moderated by SPO.
The model is depicted in Figure 10 below.
Figure 10. Test of Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 6. Values represent unstandardized
regression coefficients. Value in parentheses represents unstandardized regression
coefficient after controlling for the mediator. * > .05. ** > .01.
SPO

Custody

BIS

-2.53 (-.10)

Amount
Wagered

This analysis revealed that, paralleling the regression results previously reported,
smartphone custody did not significantly predict BIS (b = -.48, t(78) = -0.73, p = .47)20.
Also, that relationship was not significantly moderated by SPO (b = .12, t(78) = 0.71, p =
.48). Smartphone custody did not significantly predict the amount wagered (b = -2.53,
t(78) = -1.83, p = .07). Although not specifically predicted, SPO did significantly
moderate the effect of smartphone custody on amount wagered (b = .69, t(78) = 2.05, p =
.04). BIS significantly predicted amount wagered (b = -.83, t(78) = -3.47, p = .0021) such
that higher levels of BIS were associated with lower levels of risk taking. Of primary
interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and SPO on amount

20
21

All reported coefficients are unstandardized per the recommendation of Hayes (2012).
p = .0009
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wagered (risk-taking) is .12(-.83) = -.10. A 95% bootstrap confidence interval for this
indirect effect (-.35 to .14) contains zero thus the indirect effect of smartphone custody on
risk taking is not statistically different from zero and the mediation is not moderated.
Interestingly, the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals at the 90th (.11 to 1.88) percentile
do not contain zero indicating that for those with extremely high levels of SPO (5.11 and
above), the indirect effect of smartphone custody on risk taking is significantly different
from zero and thus the mediation is moderated at that level of SPO.
The second analysis used the exact same procedure described above. The only
change was that BAS (rather than BIS) was treated as the mediator. The model is
depicted in Figure 11 below.
Figure 11. Test of Hypothesis 4b and Hypothesis 6.
SPO

BAS

Custody

ns

Amount
Wagered

This analysis revealed that smartphone custody did not significantly predict BAS
(b = -.02, t(78) = -0.06, p = .95). Also, that relationship was not significantly moderated
by SPO (b = -.00, t(78) = -0.03, p = .97). Smartphone custody did not significantly
predict the amount wagered (b = -2.12, t(78) = -1.43, p = .16). SPO did not significantly
moderate the effect of smartphone custody on amount wagered (b = .59, t(78) = 1.65, p =
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.10). BAS did not significantly predicted amount wagered (b = .38, t(78) = 0.73, p = .47).
Of primary interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and SPO on
amount wagered (risk-taking) is -.00(.38) = -.00. A 95% bootstrap confidence interval for
this indirect effect (-.13 to .11) contains zero thus the indirect effect of smartphone
custody on risk taking is not statistically different from zero and the mediation is not
moderated. Unlike with BIS, this is true even at very high levels of SPO (90th percentile).
Moral orientation. The identical Hayes (2012) PROCESS procedure was used to
test the moderated mediation described in Hypotheses 5 and 6. Again psychological
power was expected to mediate the relationship between custody and moral orientation
while SPO was predicted to moderate the relationship between custody and psychological
power (moderated mediation). Also, again because psychological power was measured
two ways (BIS and BAS) Hypothesis 5 was split into Hypothesis 5a (BIS) and
Hypothesis 5b (BAS).
First, the analysis of moderated mediation was done to assess the relationship
between smartphone custody and moral orientation as mediated by BIS and moderated by
SPO. The model is depicted in Figure 12 below.
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Figure 12. Test of Hypothesis 5a and Hypothesis 6.
SPO

BIS

Custody

ns

Moral
Orientation

This analysis revealed that smartphone custody did not significantly predict BIS
(b = -.48, t(78) = -0.73, p = .47). Also, that relationship was not significantly moderated
by SPO (b = .12, t(78) = .71, p = .48). Smartphone custody did not significantly predict
moral orientation (b = -4.57, t(78) = -1.44, p = .16). SPO did not significantly moderate
the effect of smartphone custody on moral orientation (b = 1.13, t(78) = 1.46, p = .15).
BIS did not significantly predict moral orientation (b = -1.05, t(78) = -1.90, p = .06). Of
primary interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and SPO on moral
orientation is .12(-1.05) = -.12. A 95% bootstrap confidence interval for this indirect
effect (-.68 to .15) contains zero thus the indirect effect of smartphone custody on moral
orientation is not statistically different from zero and the mediation is not moderated.
This is true at all levels of the moderator (SPO).
Second, the analysis of moderated mediation was done to assess the relationship
between smartphone custody and moral orientation as mediated by BAS and moderated
by SPO. The model is depicted in Figure 13 below.
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Figure 13. Test of Hypothesis 5b and Hypothesis 6
SPO

BAS

Custody

ns

Moral
Orientation

This analysis revealed that smartphone custody did not significantly predict BAS
(b = -.02, t(78) = -0.06, p = .95). Also, that relationship was not significantly moderated
by SPO (b = -.00, t(78) = -0.03, p = .97). Smartphone custody did not significantly
predict moral orientation (b = -4.05, t(78) = -1.25, p = .21). SPO did not significantly
moderate the effect of smartphone custody on moral orientation (b = 1.01, t(78) = 1.28, p
= .20). BAS did not significantly predict moral orientation (b = 1.03, t(78) = 0.91, p =
.37). Of primary interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and SPO
on amount wagered (risk-taking) is -.00(1.03) = -.00. A 95% bootstrap confidence
interval for this indirect effect (-.30 to .24) contains zero thus the indirect effect of
smartphone custody on moral orientation is not statistically different from zero and the
mediation is not moderated. This was true at all levels of the moderator (SPO).
Discussion
Study 1 sought to test whether those allowed access to their smartphone had a
greater sense of psychological power than did those deprived of access to their
smartphone, and in turn whether smartphone-induced power increased risk-taking
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behavior and promoted a rule-based moral reasoning style. Further, it sought to test
whether the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power was moderated by a
user’s level of SPO. Results of the hierarchical simultaneous regression from Study 1
indicate that smartphone custody did not have the predicted effect on psychological
power, nor did SPO moderate the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power.
However, an unexpected main effect of SPO on both measures of power (BIS and BIS)
was observed such that higher levels of SPO predicted higher levels of both BIS and
BAS. This main effect of SPO was not observed on either risk taking or moral
orientation. It seems counterintuitive that SPO would be positively correlated with both
BIS (a measure of psychological power where higher scores indicate lower power) and
BAS (a measure of psychological power where higher scores indicate higher power).
Keltner et al. (2003) are clear that BIS and BAS are distinct, orthogonal constructs, but
that they are often negatively correlated. This apparent contraction will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 6 with the results of both studies taken together.
Moderated mediation analysis was consistent with the results of the regression
analysis and further revealed that while BIS predicted risk taking in the direction
predicted (higher BIS scores predicted less gambling), BIS did not predict moral
orientation nor did BAS predict either risk taking or moral orientation.
One possibility for the lack of support for the hypotheses is that the measures of
psychological power (BIS and BAS) were not successful in that they did not actually
measure participants level of psychological power. However, theoretically and
empirically consistent correlations were observed that suggest that they are valid
measures of psychological power. While the moderated mediation analysis did not
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indicate that BAS significantly predicted moral orientation, a positive correlation was
observed between BAS and moral orientation (r = .23, p = .01) meaning that those who
scored higher on the BAS also showed a preference for a deontological/rule-based moral
orientation, which is consistent with Lammers and Stapel (2009). The inconsistency
between the moderated mediation and the correlational analysis is explained by the fact
that while the positive correlation exists for the whole sample, when the data are split by
object, the positive correlation is only observed for those in the Student ID condition (r =
.32, p = .00) but not for those in the smartphone condition (r = .08, p = .48).
A significant negative correlation was also observed between BIS and amount
wagered (r = -.20, p = .01). This is theoretically consistent with the BAS/BIS theory of
psychological power (Keltner, et al., 2003). Thus, the results are somewhat mixed as to
how valid and sensitive the Carver and White (1994) BIS/BAS scales were as a measures
of psychological power in Study 1. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
While it was unexpected, and of little theoretical relevance to the current project,
the significant main effect of order on risk taking is interesting. Specifically, participants
that wagered slightly later during the experimental session (in the moral orientation first
condition) wagered significantly more than those that wagered approximately one minute
earlier (in the risk-taking first condition). Because the double-or-nothing game was held
just after participant material packets were collected, those in the moral orientation first
condition wagered temporally closer to the double-or-nothing game (i.e., the opportunity
to earn additional compensation). It is possible that the closer temporal proximity of the
actual opportunity to win cash activated the BAS in the moral orientation first condition
where wagers were placed at the very end of the session thus causing people to be more
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reward oriented and thus more willing to take risks. While not of central importance to
the current hypotheses, this finding is certainly important to keep in mind in replication
attempts when deciding on the order of procedures. In the current study, the effect of
smartphone custody on BAS may have been nullified or in some cases even reversed by
this influence of temporal proximity to the gambling activity thereby attenuating the
ability to observe the impact of smartphone-induced power on risk taking.
As the same research question posed along with the predictions in this study is
also posed for Study 2, both will be dealt with together in Chapter 6. The findings of this
study will be discussed again along with those of Study 2 and supplementary analysis in
Chapter 7, the General Discussion.

CHAPTER V
STUDY 2
Study 2 was intended to test the same basic thesis as was tested in Study 1; that
access one one’s smartphone increases feelings of psychological power, and that this
effect is moderated by one’s level of smartphone psychological ownership (SPO). Study
2 specifically investigated whether the presence of a person’s smartphone increased the
likelihood that he or she would commit an immoral act. In this study, the immoral act in
question was the decision to cheat in order to obtain more raffle entries.
High levels of psychological power activate the BAS and so increase the focus on
gains and rewards, while low levels of psychological power activate the BIS and increase
the focus on loss and punishment (Keltner, et al., 2003). Accordingly, previous research
has found that high power is associated with increased likelihood to steal (Yap et al.,
2013) and cheat (Lammers et al, 2010). Thus, it was predicted that if access to one’s
smartphone increased feelings of psychological power, participants in the smartphone
access condition would cheat more than participants in the smartphone deprivation
condition. The following specific predictions were made:
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Hypothesis 722: A significant object-by-custody interaction is predicted such that
compared with those in the smartphone deprivation condition, those in the
smartphone access condition will exhibit more psychological power as measured
using the BIS/BAS Scales. No such difference is expected in the student ID
condition.



Hypothesis 8: A significant object-by-custody interaction is predicted such that
compared with those in the smartphone deprivation condition, those in the
smartphone access condition will exhibit more cheating behavior as measured by
the number of reported raffle entries won. No such difference is expected in the
student ID condition.



Hypothesis 9: Psychological power will mediate the effect of smartphone custody
on cheating.



Hypothesis 1023: Smartphone psychological ownership will moderate the effect of
smartphone custody on psychological power such that those with higher levels of
smartphone psychological ownership will be more affected by the custody
manipulation, and those with lower levels of smartphone psychological ownership
will be less affected by the custody manipulation.



Research Question: Does the relationship between smartphone psychological
ownership and psychological power differ depending on the route by which those
feelings developed or the motives served by those feelings?24

22

Same prediction as is made in Hypothesis 1.
Same prediction as is made in Hypothesis 6 of Study 1.
24
This question will not be addressed in the current chapter, but will be given detailed attention in Chapter
6.
23
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Method
Design and Participants
This study employed a 2 (custody: access vs. deprivation) by 2 (object:
smartphone vs. student ID) between-subjects design. The primary dependent measure of
interest was cheating. Cheating was operationally defined as the decision to over-report
the number of raffle entries earned by rolling a pair of dice. Again the Carver and White
(1994) BIS/BAS Scales were used to measure psychological power.
Data were collected from 7525 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course (e.g., PSYC100 or PSYC101) at Loyola University Chicago. They
were recruited using the Sona-System, and received partial course credit toward a course
requirement for their participation. Recruitment text indicated that participants must be
fluent English speakers who currently owned and used a smartphone. In addition to their
experimental credits, they were given the opportunity to enter a raffle for a chance to win
one of two $150.00 gift card prizes.
Procedure
As in Study 1, participants were run simultaneously in small groups. However,
the nature of the dependent measure of cheating also required privacy. Thus, desktop
privacy boards were used to separate participants’ workspaces (see Appendix E for an
image of the privacy boards used).
Depending on the session date, participants blindly self-selected into either the
smartphone or student ID condition. Random assignment to a custody condition was

Originally there were 76 participants but again one participant that had been run alone due to a “new
show” was excluded from the sample.
25
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accomplished by randomly distributing the two versions of a paper-and-pencil data
collection material packet, as was done in Study 1. Data collection proceeded as depicted
in Figure 14 (below).
Figure 14. Order of data collection procedures for Study 2.
1. Informed
Consent

2. Smartphone
Scale of
Psychological
Ownership

3. Smartphone Use
Questionnaire

4. Demographic
Information

5. Custody
Manipulation

6. Psychological
Power

7. Raffle Entry
Game (i.e.
cheating)

8. Exit Survey (i.e.
mood, privacy,
suspicion)

As with Study 1, order of procedures was determined by the paper-and-pencil
participant material packet. Experimenters followed a script to walk participants through
the session section-by-section at the same pace. Verbal and written instructions
accompanied each section.
Written, informed consent was collected from each participant. Next, participants
completed the measure of SPO followed by the smartphone use questionnaire and
demographic information (both basic and smartphone). Then, the custody manipulation
was accomplished exactly as it was described in Study 1. Participants read, “During the
next part of the experiment, you will be asked for a piece of information that you will be
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[required to obtain (access condition)]/[tempted to obtain, but not permitted to obtain
(deprivation condition)] from your [smartphone]/[student ID].” Based on condition
assignment, they were asked either to put their smartphone/student ID on the desk in
front of them (access condition), or to place it in a clear container, which was then placed
on the experimenter’s desk (deprivation condition).
Immediately following the custody manipulation, participants completed the
measure of psychological power. Next, they completed the raffle ticket entry game by
rolling a pair of dice and recording the number of entries won. Finally, participants
completed an exit survey wherein they reported how much privacy they felt they had,
completed a mood measure, and were probed for suspicion. Finally, they were thanked
and dismissed. Partial debriefing26 was accomplished via email after all data had been
collected.
Materials
A complete set of materials used in Study 2 can be found in Appendix
F. It is a full copy of the paper-and-pencil participant material packet used.
Manipulated predictors. There were two manipulated predictors, object
(smartphone vs. student ID) and custody (access vs. deprivation). Both were manipulated
exactly as was described for Study 1.
Measured predictor. There was one measured predictor, SPO, which was
measured using the same scale described in detail for Study 1.

26

The decision to only partially debrief subjects is explained below.
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Psychological power. There were two primary dependent measures of interest.
The first is psychological power, which was measured using the Carver and White (1994)
BIS/BAS Scales described in detail for Study 1.
Cheating behavior. The second dependent measure was cheating behavior.
Cheating was operationalized as the average number of raffle entries reportedly won.
Participants were informed that a raffle would be held where they would have the chance
to win one of two $150.00 gift cards and told that they would earn raffle entries by rolling
a pair of dice. In reality, each participant received only one raffle entry. This minimal
deception was necessary so as not to disadvantage participants who did not over-report
the number of entries that they won.
During the raffle entry game, participants were instructed to roll a pair of 10-sided
dice. One die was black and one was white. A form was included in the participant
material packet that included step-by-step instructions for completing the raffle entry
game. Two blank spaces were provided on the form in which participants were to record
the numbers rolled. The first spaced was labeled “tens” and was located on the left. The
second space was labeled “ones” and was located on the right. Together they were used
to record the two-digit number of the participant’s number of raffle entries. Participants
were told to roll the white die and to record the number rolled in the “ones” place on the
right and then to roll the black die and record the number rolled using that die in the
“tens” place on the left.
Each die was labeled with the numbers zero through nine. Thus participants
could earn anywhere from 0 raffle entry (if 2 zeros were rolled) up to 99 raffle entries (if
2 nines were rolled). The average number of entries earned by rolling the pair of dice
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should be 49.527. Participants in the smartphone access condition were expected to be
more likely to cheat in which case the average number of reported raffle entries won was
expected to be higher than 49.5 entries in that condition. These procedures are consistent
with those used by Lammers et al. (2010) in Study 1.
Demographics. The same basic and smartphone demographic questions were
used for Study 2 as were for Study 1.
Exit survey. Study 2 employed the same exit survey as was used in Study 1 with
one exception. Both the mood measure and hypothesis guess items were the same as in
Study 1. However, because the measure of cheating behavior required privacy, there was
a single privacy item embedded in a series of questions in the exit survey. This was
included to check whether the privacy boards successfully provided sufficient privacy to
allow participants to cheat. Participants read the following: “Data collection sessions are
run in various rooms. To assess the suitability of different rooms for data collection,
please provide some feedback regarding the room that you completed your experiment in
today by indicating how strongly you agree with each of the statements below.” In
addition to the privacy item, they were asked about how quiet the room was, how well-lit
it was, and whether they experienced many distractions during the experiment. The
privacy item specifically asked participants how strongly they agreed with the following
statement: “I had complete privacy during the experiment.” Participants responded on a
scale of one to four where higher values represent stronger agreement with the statement.

27

0 + 99 / 2 = 49.5
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The same criteria for determining whether a hypothesis guess was “not close”,
“close”, or “accurate” was used in Study 2 as was described for Study 1. Again, the
majority of hypothesis guesses were not close (73%). Only 17 guesses were coded as
“close” (23%) and only 3 were coded as “accurate” (4%) (see Table 11 below). In
general, guesses tended to be vague and in line with the cover store.
Table 11. Accuracy of hypothesis guesses by condition.
Object
Custody
Access

Deprivation

Guess Accuracy
Not Close
Close
Accurate
Not Close
Close
Accurate

Smartphone
15
9
1
12
3
0

Student ID
17
3
1
11
2
1

The same question asking participant to report either the number of apps installed
on their smartphone (smartphone condition) or the clothing that they were wearing in
their student ID (student ID condition) that was used in Study 1 was included for the
same reason in Study 2.
Debriefing. Partial debriefing was accomplished via an email sent to all
participants at the end of data collection. Participants were made aware of the general
hypothesis that smartphone access increases psychological power. However, they were
not made aware that the raffle entry task served as a dependent measure of cheating
behavior. This decision was made based on a recommendation made by a member of the
Loyola Institutional Review Board (IRB) who suggested that the only harm that may
come to participants as a result of this study is the knowledge that their immoral behavior
may have been known to the experimenter. In other words, if a participant did choose to
cheat by over-reporting the number of raffle entries won, and they were made aware
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through the debriefing that the experimenter likely knew of their cheating, they may
experience distress that they would not have had that information not been provided. The
text used in the debriefing email can be found in Appendix G.
Results
All data was collected during the Spring 2016 semester. A total of 75
undergraduates (Male = 29, Female = 46) took part in Study 2. Participants were typical
college age (M = 19.35, SD = 1.39) that reported having gotten their first smartphone
around the age of 15 (M = 14.79, SD = 2.13) meaning that on average participants had
owned/used a smartphone for about 4.5 years (M = 4.54, SD = 1.90). The majority
reported having an Apple iPhone (85.3%). Participants reported having had their current
device on average for a little less than a year (M = 10.76, SD = 9.75). They also reported
that their current device worked well (M = 8.27, SD = 1.45) and that they were satisfied
with it (M = 8.61, SD = 1.71)28.
Sessions ranged in size from 2 to 7 participants (M = 5.11, SD = 1.65). The most
common session size was seven participants (26.7%). At the close of data collection, it
appeared that cell sizes had been kept fairly balanced; however, upon closer inspection, it
was discovered that one session in which student ID custody was supposed to have been
manipulated, due to experimenter error, smartphone custody was actually manipulated.
This resulted in more smartphone observations than student ID observations. Table 12
below depicts the number of observations made per condition.

28

Both on a 10-point scale where higher numbers indicate greater functionality/satisfaction.
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Table 12. Number of observations per condition in Study 2.
Custody
Access
Deprivation

Object
Student ID
15
14

Smartphone
25
21

Preliminary Analysis
Missing data. For each scale or variable, the percent of missing data is reported
and then the method for dealing with the missing data points is explained.
For the scale of SPO, there were 75 participants and 18 items on the scale
resulting in 1,350 data points. Of those, only 3 were missing (0.22%). Each missing
value was from a different participant and each was from a different scale item. Thus,
missing values appeared to be completely at random rather than systematic. Missing
values were replaced with the mean of the item average and the participant’s average for
the rest of the items on the scale of SPO.
There were no missing values on the measure of smartphone use, smartphone
make/model, or for the remainder of the smartphone demographics (age at which
participant first got a smartphone, how many months they had owned their current
device, how well their current device functioned and how satisfied they are with it). All
participants also reported their age and gender.
As was described above for Study 1, the measure of BAS is divided into three
subscales (Drive, Reward Responsiveness and Fun Seeking). For the Drive subscale,
there were 4 items resulting in 300 data points. Two values were missing (0.66%). As
was the case in Study 1, both of the missing values were on the fourth Drive subscale
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item29 that appeared as the first item on the BIS/BAS questionnaire. Thus, the missing
values may not be completely at random; however, due to the very low percentage of
missing values it was decided that it was appropriate to replace the values. Thus, the
same imputation was used to replace these missing values as was described above (using
the mean of the item mean and participant’s subscale mean).
There was only one missing value (0.26%) for the five-item Reward
Responsiveness subscale of the BAS. The same imputation described above was used to
replace this missing data point. No missing values were observed on either the Fun
Seeking subscale of the BAS or on the BIS subscale. No missing values were observed
on the raffle entry game (i.e., DV of cheating behavior), on any of the items associated
with the mood check, or on any of the items associated with the privacy check.
Thus of the 5,320 data points checked, only 6 were missing (0.11%) and all were
replaced using the imputation described above.
Reliability, validity, and variable creation. For each of the scales or variables
discussed below, where applicable, missing values were replaced before internal
consistency reliability was obtained.
Smartphone psychological ownership. After reverse scoring items 5 and 9,
Cronbach’s alpha for all 18 items measuring SPO was acceptable (α = .87). By removing
reverse scored item number 5, alpha could be increase to .88, but as this was a very small
improvement to an already reliable scale, and to be consistent in the items included on the

This item asked participants the extent to which they agreed with the statement, “When I go after
something, I use a ‘no holds barred’ approach.” It is possible that some participants were not familiar with
this figure of speech, especially if they were not native English speakers, and did not respond for that
reason.
29
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scales used in Studies 1 and 2, all 18 items were included in the average of SPO (M =
4.09, SD = 0.77).
Theoretically, this measure may be expected to correlate with average use,
smartphone tenure (how long an individual has been a smartphone owner/use), how many
months a participant had owned the current device, how well the device functions and
how satisfied they are with their current device. To estimate the validity of this measure,
correlations were checked between the abovementioned variables and SPO. As
anticipated, positive correlations were observed among SPO and average use (r = .47, p =
.00) and how many months they had owned their current device (r = .26, p = .02).
However, unlike Study 1, the anticipated positive correlations were not observed between
SPO and smartphone tenure (r = .03, p = .81), functionality (r = .08, p = .50), and
satisfaction (r = .05, p = .68). Average smartphone use does not correlate with any of the
other variables included in the analysis suggesting that the measure of SPO, while related
to use, is distinct from average use.
Smartphone use. The original Cronbach’s alpha obtained for the 13 item
measure of smartphone use was reliable (α = .74). While reliability could be improved
slightly by removing some items, in order to keep measures the same across both studies,
and because original reliability was above the acceptable threshold of .70, average
smartphone usage (M = 3.66, SD = 0.57) was created using all 13 of the items.
BIS/BAS. For the same reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the BIS/BAS scale was
treated as a two-factor scale with all three BAS subscales treated as a single factor (see
Table 13, below).
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Table 13. Comparison of two-factor to four-factor treatment of BIS/BAS scale.
BIS

Αlphaa
.75
.76

Four-Factor
Skewb
-.59
-.21

Kurtosis
.18
-.27

Αlpha
.75

Two-Factor
Skew
-.59

Kurtosis
.18

Drive
Reward
.75
-.98
.34
BAS
Resp.
.78
-.25
Fun
.58
-.28
-.22
Seeking
a
Chronbach’s alpha.
b
Skewness and kurtosis scores reflect values produced before any outliers were removed or
transformations were performed.

-.58

Again in Study 2, as in Study 1, treating the BIS/BAS scale as a two- rather than a
four-factor scale corrects the low internal consistency reliability observed on the Fun
Seeking subscales and also reduced the skewness observed on the Reward
Responsiveness subscale without greatly increasing the skewness observed on the other
two BAS subscales. Average BIS and average BAS were not correlated. Unlike in Study
1, average BAS was not significantly correlated with positive emotion (r = .15, p = .20),
and BIS was not significantly correlated with negative emotion (r = -.11, p = .37).
Regardless, the two-factor treatment appears superior to the four and will be adopted
again for Study 2.
After reverse scoring items 5 and 7, Cronbach’s alpha for the 7 item BIS subscale
was acceptable (α = .75) and could not be further improved by removing any items.
Thus, average BIS (M = 3.02, SD = 0.52) was calculated using all seven items.
Cronbach’s alpha for the 13 items of three combined BAS subscales produced an alpha of
.77 and could be improved slightly by removing some items however because initial
reliability was above the .70 acceptable threshold and to keep measures the same in
Studies 1 and 2, no items were removed. Thus average BAS (M = 3.17, SD = 0.34) was
calculated using all 13 items.
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Privacy check. Responses to the privacy check item indicate that indeed,
participants felt that they had privacy (M = 3.69, SD = 0.62) with the vast majority
(94.7%) reporting either a 3 (18.70%) or a 4 (76.00%) out of a four-point response scale
on this item.
Mood measure. Participants were asked the extent to which “today’s experiment
caused you to feel each of the following emotions”. In general, on a five-point scale
where higher numbers indicate stronger feelings, participants did not report a strong
emotional reaction on any of the six emotions: happy (M = 2.45, SD = 1.57), excited (M =
2.31, SD = 1.67), peaceful (M = 2.44, SD = 1.72), angry (M = 0.29, SD = 0.79), sad (M =
0.33, SD = 0.89), or anxious (M = 0.79, SD = 1.14). The positive (happy, excited, and
peaceful) (M = 2.40, SD = 1.42) and negative (angry, sad, and anxious) emotions (M =
0.47, SD = 0.76) were separately averaged and then the average of the negative items was
subtracted from the average of the positive items to create an overall mood index (M =
1.93, SD = 1.54) where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood in response to the
experiment.
Check for normality and extreme cases. For each of the measures discussed
below statistics for skewness and kurtosis were obtained and both histograms and P-P
plots were visually inspected to test for violations to assumptions of normality. As in
Study 1, and following the recommendation of Fields (2009), skewness and kurtosis
scores were converted to z-scores using the equations Zskewness = S – 0 / SEskewness and
Zkurtosis = K – 0 / SEkurtosis respectively. Based on sample size, Field (2009) suggests
different z-score cut-off values. Thus, based on the sample sizes in Study 2, a z-score
with an absolute value greater than 1.96 (significant at the p < .05 level) was considered
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to significantly deviate from normal (also based on the recommendation of Field, 2009)30.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov with a Lilliefors correction (K-S/Lilliefors) was also performed to
see whether levels of skewness were significant. Again, as in Study 1, visual inspection
was used along with z-scores and K-S/Lilliefors in making judgments regarding whether
or not to transform variables.
Average smartphone psychological ownership. Average SPO produced a normal
distribution with a skewness of .02 (SE = .28, z-score = 0.07) and a kurtosis of -.72 (SE =
.55, z-score = -1.31). The K-S/Lilliefors test [D(75) = .06, p = .20] indicated that the
distribution is not significantly different from normal. Visual inspection of the box-andwhisker plot revealed no potential outliers. No correction was performed for this
variable.
Average smartphone use. Average smartphone use produced a distribution with
a skewness of -.27 (SE = .28, z-score = -0.96) and a kurtosis of -.77 (SE = .55, z-score =
1.40). The K-S/Lilliefors test [D(75) = .10, p = .09] indicated that the distribution is not
significantly different from normal. Visual inspection of a box-and-whisker plot revealed
no potential outliers. No correction was performed for this variable.
BIS/BAS. Average BIS produced a negatively skewed distribution with a
skewness of -.57 (SE = .28, z-score = -2.04) and a kurtosis of .19 (SE = .55, z-score =
0.35). The K-S/Lilliefors test [D(75) = .13, p = .003] indicated that the distribution was
significantly negatively skewed (see Figure 15, below). Visual inspection of the boxand-whisker plot revealed one fringelier that was -3.04 standard deviations below the

30

This different, lower z-score cut off reflects the smaller sample used in Study 2 compared with Study 1
and is the cut-off recommended by Field (2009).

99

mean. Looking at that participant’s responses on other items, he did not appear to be an
outlier on any other variables. Thus, the decision was made to retain the fringelier and no
correction was made to this variable. This decision was also made in part to ensure that
the measure of BIS used in Studies 1 and 2 was the same.
Figure 15. Frequency distribution of average BIS scores.

Average BAS produced a distribution with a skewness of -.17 (SE = .28, z-score =
0.61) and a kurtosis of -.45 (SE = .55, z-score = -0.82). The K-S/Lilliefors test [D(75) =
.10, p = .06] indicated that the distribution was not significantly different from normal.
Visual inspection of the box-and-whisker plot revealed no potential outliers. No
correction was made to this variable.
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Raffle entries. The number of raffle entries reportedly won produced a
negatively skewed distribution with a skewness of -.52 (SE = .28, z-score = -1.86) and a
kurtosis of -.95 (SE = .55, z-score = -1.74). Neither z-score exceeded the 1.96 threshold
suggesting significant deviation from normality. However, the K-S/Lilliefors test [D(75)
= .11, p = .03] indicated that the distribution was significantly negatively skewed. This
was anticipated given that this is a measure of cheating behavior. The absence of
cheating would have yielded a perfectly normal distribution. The fact that the
distribution is significantly negatively skewed may suggests that participants tended to
over-report the number of raffle entries won by rolling the dice. Visual inspection of a
box-and-whisker plot revealed no potential outliers, and no correction was performed for
this variable.
Effects on mood and privacy. A 2 (custody: access vs. deprivation) by 2
(object: smartphone vs. student ID) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
done to test for effects on amount of perceived privacy and mood effects of the
experiment (using the overall mood index). No effects were expected and none were
observed. There was no main effect of custody on perceived privacy [F(1, 74) = 0.16, p
= .69, ɳ2p = .00] or on mood [F(1, 74) = 0.01, p = .92, ɳ2p = .00]. There was no main
effect of object on perceived privacy [F(1, 74) = 0.13, p = .72, ɳ2p = .00] or on mood
[F(1, 74) = 0.01, p = .91, ɳ2p = .00]. There were no two-way object-by-custody
interactions on either perceived privacy [F(1, 74) = 0.08, p = .78, ɳ2p = .00] or mood [F(1,
74) = 1.39, p = .24, ɳ2p = .02].
Detection of covariates. Correlational analyses were run to see whether
significant correlations existed between any of the outcome measures (entries reportedly
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won, average BIS, average BAS), and any of the following possible extraneous factors:
session size (i.e., number of participants in a given data collection session), participant
age, age at which participant got a smartphone, smartphone tenure (how many years a
participant has been a smartphone owner/user), number of months current device has
been owned, smartphone functionality, smartphone satisfaction, and mood [see Table 14,
below]. The following significant correlations were detected. Average BAS was
negatively correlated with participant age (r = -.23, p = .05) such that younger
participants reported higher levels of BAS. Also, average BAS was positively correlated
with smartphone satisfaction (r = .27, p = .02) such that those who reported being more
satisfied with their current smartphone also reported higher levels of BAS. Number of
entries claimed was positively correlated with session size (r = .23, p = .05) such that
those in larger sessions tended to report having earned more raffle entries. Number of
entries claimed was also positively correlated with mood (r = .41, p = .00). Those that
reported having earned more raffle entries, likely for that reason, also reported being in a
more positive mood as a result of the experiment. Thus, age, smartphone satisfaction,
session size, and mood were included as covariates in the regression analysis.
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Table 14. Correlational analyses to detect possible covariates in Study 2.

Pearson
1
-.063
.181
Correlation
Average
Sig. (2.592
.120
BAS
tailed)
N
75
75
75
Pearson
-.063
1
-.016
Correlation
Average
Sig. (2.592
.891
BIS
tailed)
N
75
75
75
Pearson
.181
-.016
1
Correlation
Raffle
Sig. (2.120
.891
Entries
tailed)
N
75
75
75
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Average Mood

Smartphone
Satisfaction

Smartphone
Functionality

Months
Owned
Smartphone

Smartphone
Tenure

Age First Got
Smartphone

Participant Age

Session Size

Raffle Entries

Average BIS

Average BAS

Correlations

.059

-.230*

-.046

-.108

-.028

.218

.270*

.178

.613

.047

.694

.356

.810

.060

.019

.127

75

75

75

75

75

75

75

75

.052

-.090

-.110

.077

-.038

-.056

.052

.152

.659

.444

.349

.511

.745

.633

.657

.193

75

75

75

75

75

75

75

75

.232*

-.093

-.071

.030

.055

-.065

.083

.406**

.045

.426

.542

.800

.640

.580

.479

.000

75

75

75

75

75

75

75

75
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Main Analysis
To test the predicted object-by-custody interactions on power and cheating
behavior a separate hierarchical simultaneous regression was conducted for each
dependent variable. Hierarchical simultaneous regression was used rather than
MANOVA so that the predicted moderation effect of SPO could be tested in the same
analysis (since psychological ownership is being treated as a continuous predictor).
Categorical predictors (i.e., custody, and object) were coded using effects coding [see
Table 15, below]. The continuous predictor (SPO) was centered by subtracting the scale
mean from each participants’ score.
Table 15. Effects coding for categorical predictors.
Factor
Custody
Object

Condition
Access
Deprivation
Smartphone
Student ID

Code
1
-1
1
-1

Mood, participant age, smartphone satisfaction, and session size were all
controlled for in Block 1 of the regression analyses based on the significant correlations
observed. Block 2 tested the main effect of custody and object. Block 3 tested the
interaction between custody and object. This served as the test of Hypotheses 7 and 8.
Block 4 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression tested the moderating effect of SPO.
Centered SPO was entered as a continuous predictor. Interaction terms were created
between SPO and categorical predictors by multiplying the centered SPO variable with
each the object and custody effects coded variables. Also a three-way interaction term
was created for SPO, object, and custody. All of these predictors were entered into Block
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4 of the regression model. The 3-way object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction term serves
as the test of Hypothesis 10.
Psychological power. Recall that Hypothesis 7 predicted a significant object-bycustody interaction such that compared with those in the smartphone deprivation
condition, those in the smartphone access condition would exhibit more psychological
power as measured using the BIS/BAS Scales. No such difference was predicted in the
student ID condition. Also, Hypothesis 10 predicted that SPO will moderate the effect of
smartphone custody on psychological power, such that those with higher levels of SPO
will be more affected by the custody manipulation, and those with lower levels of SPO
will be less affected by the custody manipulation. Because there were two dependent
measures of psychological power (BIS and BAS) two separate hierarchical simultaneous
regressions were conducted, one for each dependent measure. Predictions regarding BIS
(low power) will be labeled Hypothesis 7a and Hypothesis 10a while predictions
regarding BAS (high power) will be labeled Hypothesis 7b and Hypothesis 10b. Both
were conducted according to the procedures described above.
BIS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that the
covariates accounted for 3.2% of variance [r2 = .03, F∆(4, 70) = .59, p = .68] and none of
the covariates significantly predicted BIS scores.
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object accounted for 12.7%
more variance in BIS scores [r2 = .16, F∆(2, 68) = 5.15, p = .01]. No main effects had
been predicted for custody and none was observed [b = -.11, β = -.22, t(74) = -1.91, p =
.06] but an unexpected main effect of object was observed on BIS [b = .18, β = .33, t(74)
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= 2.75, p = .01] indicating that those in the smartphone condition reported higher BIS
scores than those in the student ID condition (see Figure 16, below).
Figure 16. Unexpected main effect of object on average BIS.
3.3

Average BIS Scoresa

3.2
3.1
3
2.9
3.13

2.8
2.7

2.83

2.6
2.5

Student ID

Smartphone
Object Condition

a. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE.31

Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, only accounted
for 0.7% more variance [r2 = .17, F∆(1, 67) = 0.57, p = .45]. A significant two-way
interaction had been predicted between object and custody (Hypothesis 7a), but was not
observed [b = .05, β = .09, t(74) = 0.76, p = .45]. Thus Hypothesis 7a was not supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO accounted for an additional
6.8% of variance in BIS scores [r2 = .24, F∆(4, 63) = 1.41, p = .24]. No main effect of
SPO on BIS scores was either predicted or observed [b = .08, β = .11, t(74) = 0.88, p =
.38]. No significant two-way interactions had been predicted between SPO and object [b
= .07, β = .10, t(74) = 0.77, p = .44] or custody [b = .14, β = .20, t(74) = 1.64, p = .11]
and none was observed for either. A significant three-way interaction had been predicted

31SE

= s/√W = .52335/√75 = .52335/8.66 = .06

106

between SPO, object, and custody (Hypothesis 10a), but no such interaction was
observed [b = -.13, β = -.19, t(74) = -1.46, p = .15]. Thus Hypothesis 10a was not
supported (see the coefficients in Table 16 below).
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Table 16. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BIS.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
4
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
Average SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Object-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.416
1.124
-.032
.049
.017
.038
.003
.039
.048
.040
2.367
1.112
.011
.048
-.015
.037
.045
.040
.047
.038
-.114
.060
.177
.064
2.434
1.120
.009
.049
-.014
.037
.041
.040
.051
.039
-.123
.061
.172
.065
.046
.061
2.680
1.132
-.005
.050
.009
.039
.035
.041
.027
.040
-.103
.061
.161
.066
.057
.061
.075
.086
.138
.084
.066
.085
-.131
.090

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.084
.054
.011
.141
.029
-.047
.147
.137
-.218
.332
.023
-.043
.133
.149
-.235
.322
.088
-.014
.029
.116
.078
-.198
.302
.110
.111
.201
.097
-.191

T
3.039
-.642
.452
.082
1.195
2.128
.228
-.401
1.141
1.223
-1.910
2.753
2.174
.180
-.368
1.016
1.315
-2.015
2.653
.756
2.367
-.104
.234
.871
.667
-1.689
2.458
.937
.881
1.638
.771
-1.462

Sig.
.003
.523
.653
.935
.236
.037
.820
.690
.258
.226
.060
.008
.033
.858
.714
.313
.193
.048
.010
.452
.021
.918
.816
.387
.507
.096
.017
.352
.382
.106
.443
.149

a. Dependent Variable: Average BIS
Legend: Average BIS = average BIS score, Participant Age = participant’s biological age, Session Size =
number of participants in the session, SP Satisfaction = participant’s level of satisfaction with his/her
current device, Average Mood = average of all mood check items, Custody = Effects coded custody
categorical predictor, Object = Effects coded object categorical predictor, Custody-by-Object = object-bycustody interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction,
Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO three-way interaction.
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BAS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that
collectively the covariates accounted for 12.00% of variance [r2 = .12, F∆(4, 70) = 2.38,
p = .06], however, individually none significantly predicted BAS scores.
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, only accounted for
0.1% more variance in BAS scores [r2 = .12, F∆(2, 68) = 0.03, p = .97]. No main effects
had been predicted for either and none was observed for custody [b = -.00, β = -.01, t(74)
= -0.89, p = .93] or object [b = -.01, β = -.03, t(74) = -0.22, p = .83].
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object accounted for
8% more variance [r2 = .20, F∆(1, 67) = 6.68, p = .01]. A significant two-way object-bycustody interaction had been predicted (Hypothesis 7b) and was observed [b = -.10, β
= -.30, t(74) = -2.58, p = .01]. While this significant interaction would seem to lend
support for Hypothesis 7b, the direction was actually opposite that which was predicted.
Specifically, in the smartphone condition, those in the deprivation condition reported
higher levels of BAS than those in the access condition. However, in the student ID
condition, those in the deprivation condition reported lower levels of BAS than those in
the access condition (see Figure 17, below).
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Average BAS Scoresa

Figure 17. Significant object-by-custody two-way interaction on BAS.
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3.08

Access
3.08
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a. Error bars represent +/1 SE.32

Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO accounted for an additional
13.7% of variance in BAS scores [r2 = .34, F∆(4, 63) = 3.25, p = .02]. There was an
unexpected significant main effect of SPO on BAS scores [b = .19, β = .42, t(74) = 3.57,
p = .001] indicating that those who reported higher levels of SPO also scored higher on
the BAS scale (see Figure 18, below).

32

SE = s/√W = .344/√75 = .344/8.66 = .04

110

Figure 18. Scatterplot depicting unexpected main effect of smartphone psychological
ownership on BAS.

No significant two-way interaction had been predicted between SPO and object [b = -.06,
β = -.12, t(74) = -1.06, p = .30] or custody [b = -.05, β = -.11, t(74) = -0.92, p = .36] and
none was observed for either. A significant three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO
interaction had been predicted on BAS (Hypothesis 10b), but no such interaction was
observed [b = .03, β = .06, t(74) = 0.47, p = .64]. Thus, Hypothesis 10b was not
supported (see the coefficients in Table 17 below).
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Table 17. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BAS.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
4
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
Average SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Object-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.390
.705
-.037
.031
.016
.024
.041
.025
.033
.025
3.416
.748
-.038
.032
.017
.025
.039
.027
.033
.026
-.003
.040
-.010
.043
3.267
.721
-.033
.031
.014
.024
.049
.026
.024
.025
.016
.039
.001
.042
-.101
.039
3.043
.693
-.023
.030
.021
.024
.051
.025
.009
.024
.027
.037
-.003
.040
-.090
.037
.187
.052
-.048
.052
-.055
.052
.026
.055

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.149
.075
.202
.149
-.152
.081
.195
.149
-.010
-.027
-.132
.069
.243
.108
.048
.004
-.296
-.091
.102
.253
.041
.079
-.009
-.263
.419
-.105
-.123
.058

T
4.807
-1.198
.661
1.649
1.322
4.565
-1.162
.674
1.475
1.299
-.085
-.221
4.530
-1.048
.596
1.894
.969
.418
.035
-2.584
4.390
-.742
.898
2.052
.378
.723
-.075
-2.416
3.568
-.919
-1.055
.474

Sig.
.000
.235
.511
.104
.190
.000
.249
.503
.145
.198
.933
.825
.000
.298
.553
.063
.336
.678
.972
.012
.000
.461
.372
.044
.707
.472
.940
.019
.001
.362
.296
.637

a. Dependent Variable: Average BAS
Legend: Average BAS = average BAS score, Participant Age = participant’s biological age, Session Size =
number of participants in the session, SP Satisfaction = participant’s level of satisfaction with his/her
current device, Average Mood = average of all mood check items, Custody = Effects coded custody
categorical predictor, Object = Effects coded object categorical predictor, Custody-by-Object = object-bycustody interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction,
Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO three-way interaction.
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Cheating. Recall that Hypothesis 8 predicted a significant object-by-custody
interaction on cheating behavior such that compared with those in the smartphone
deprivation condition, those in the smartphone access condition would exhibit more
cheating behavior as measured by the number of raffle entries reportedly won. No such
difference was expected in the student ID condition.
First, to determine whether any cheating had taken place in the study (by overreporting the number of raffle entries reportedly won), the average number of entries
reportedly won was compared to the anticipated mean of 49.5 entries (if no cheating had
taken place) using a one-sample sample t-test. This test confirmed that the observed
mean of entries reportedly won (M = 60.76, SD = 29.48) was significantly higher than the
mean anticipated by chance if no cheating had occurred (M = 49.50) [t(74) = 3.31, p =
.001].
Next, a series of one-sample t-tests was done comparing each group mean to the
expected mean of 49.5. This series of tests revealed that the mean in the smartphone
access condition (M = 58.76, SD = 28.33) did not significantly differ from 49.50 [t(24) =
1.64, p = .12] providing no evidence that those in smartphone access condition cheated.
The mean in the smartphone deprivation condition (M = 59.29, SD = 27.38) did not
significantly differ from 49.50 [t(20) = 1.64, p = .12] providing no evidence that those in
the smartphone deprivation condition cheated. The mean in the student ID access
condition (M = 75.87, SD = 29.18) did significantly differ in an upward direction from
49.50 [t(14) = 3.50, p = .004] providing evidence that those in the student ID access
condition did cheat. Finally, the mean in the student ID deprivation condition (M =
50.36, SD = 31.70) did not significantly differ from 49.50 [t(13) = 0.10, p = .92]
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providing no evidence that hose in the student ID deprivation condition cheated. Thus
evidence of cheating was only observed among those in the student ID access condition
(see Figure 19, below).
Figure 19. Average of raffle entries reportedly won in the four conditions.
Mean Number of Raffle Entries
Reportedly Earneda

85
80
75
70
65
60

76

55
50

59

59

45

50

40
Smartphone Access

Smartphone
Deprivation

Student ID Access

Student ID
Deprivation

a. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE33.

An ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of custody and
object on cheating. This test revealed no main effect of custody [F(1, 74) = 3.32, p = .07,
ɳ2p = .05], no main effect of object [F(1, 74) = 0.36, p = .55, ɳ2p = .01], and no significant
object-by-custody interaction [F(1, 74) = 3.60, p = .06, ɳ2p = .05]. The only significant
difference observed was between the student ID access and Student ID deprivation
conditions (p = .02). Together, these results fail to provide support for Hypothesis 8.
The only condition in which evidence of cheating was observed was in the student ID
access condition, and the cheating was not significantly influenced by either the object or
custody manipulations.

33

SE = s/√W = 29.48/√75 = 29.480/8.66 = 3.40
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While the above analysis serves as a valid test of Hypothesis 8, it does not test the
possible moderating role of SPO. To determine what role SPO may have played in
cheating behavior, the same hierarchical simultaneous regression used for BIS and BAS
was also used for number of raffle entries reportedly won.
Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression revealed that the covariates
accounted for 21.6% of variance [r2 = .22, F∆(4, 70) = 4.82, p = .002]. Of the covariates
tested, both session size [b = 3.90, β = .22, t(74) = 2.03, p = .05] and mood [b = 7.33, β =
.38, t(74) = 3.58, p = .001] significantly predicted cheating behavior. Specifically, those
in larger sessions tended to report having earned more entries (r = .23, p = .02) and those
that reported being in a more positive mood (r = .41, p = .00) also reported having earned
more raffle entries. It is possible that participating in a larger session indicated to
participants that there was more competition for the prize, thus promoting greater
cheating behavior.
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, accounted for 6.7%
more variance in number of raffle entries reportedly won [r2 = .28, F∆(2, 68) = 3.15, p =
.05]. No main effects was predicted or observed for object [b = -4.96, β = -.17, t(74)
= -1.48, p = .14]. However, an unexpected main effect of custody [b = 6.70, β = .23,
t(74) = 2.16, p = .03] was observed suggesting that those in the access condition reported
having earned more raffle entries than those in the deprivation condition (see Figure 20,
below). This is consistent with the results of the t-tests reported above, and would appear
to be driven specifically by the high number of raffle entries reported by those in the
student ID access condition, although no significant object-by-custody interaction was
observed.
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Figure 20. Unexpected main effect of custody on cheating.
Mean Number of Raffle Entries
Reportedly Earneda
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a. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE.34

Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object accounted for
2.3% more variance [r2 = .31, F∆(1, 67) = 2.17, p = .15]. A significant two-way objectby-custody interaction had been predicted (Hypothesis 8b) but was not observed [b
= -4.62, β = -.16, t(74) = -1.47, p = .15]. Thus, Hypothesis 8b was not supported.
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO only accounted for an
additional 3% of variance in cheating [r2 = .34, F∆(4, 63) = 0.70, p = .60]. No main
effect of SPO on cheating had been predicted nor was one observed [b = 4.22, β = .11,
t(74) = 0.94, p = .35]. No significant two-way object-by-SPO [b = -3.02, β = -.08, t(74)
= -0.67, p = .50] or custody-by-SPO [b = 2.97, β = .08, t(74) = 0.67, p = .51] interactions
had been predicted and none were observed. No significant three-way object-by-custodyby-SPO interaction was observed [b = -5.55, β = -.14, t(74) = -1.18, p = .24] (see the
coefficients in Table 18 below).

34

SE = s/√W = 29.48/√75 = 29.480/8.66 = 3.40
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Table 18. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on number
of raffle entries reportedly won (i.e., cheating).
Coefficientsa

Model
(Constant)
1

2

3

4

Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
(Constant)
Participant Age
Session Size
SP Satisfaction
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Custody-by-Object
Average SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Object-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
58.642
-1.867
3.896
.490
7.325
99.164
-3.580
4.996
-.968
7.440
6.695
-4.957
92.391
-3.353
4.881
-.528
7.022
7.596
-4.454
-4.616
96.834
-3.908
5.805
-.210
6.284
7.888
-4.912
-4.617
4.221
2.965
-3.017
-5.554

57.010
2.487
1.922
2.000
2.045
57.905
2.513
1.939
2.060
1.986
3.098
3.346
57.595
2.496
1.925
2.065
1.990
3.131
3.335
3.131
59.496
2.612
2.044
2.135
2.094
3.217
3.450
3.201
4.500
4.438
4.488
4.716

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.088
.218
.028
.382
-.169
.279
-.056
.388
.228
-.165
-.158
.273
-.031
.366
.259
-.148
-.158
-.184
.325
-.012
.327
.269
-.163
-.158
.110
.077
-.079
-.143

T
1.029
-.751
2.027
.245
3.582
1.713
-1.424
2.576
-.470
3.746
2.161
-1.481
1.604
-1.343
2.536
-.256
3.529
2.426
-1.335
-1.474
1.628
-1.496
2.841
-.098
3.001
2.452
-1.424
-1.442
.938
.668
-.672
-1.178

Sig.
.307
.455
.046
.807
.001
.091
.159
.012
.640
.000
.034
.143
.113
.184
.014
.799
.001
.018
.186
.145
.109
.140
.006
.922
.004
.017
.159
.154
.352
.507
.504
.243

a. Dependent Variable: Raffle Entries
Legend: Raffle Entries = number of raffle entries reportedly won, Participant Age = participant’s biological
age, Session Size = number of participants in the session, SP Satisfaction = participant’s level of
satisfaction with his/her current device, Average Mood = average of all mood check items, Custody =
Effects coded custody categorical predictor, Object = Effects coded object categorical predictor, Custodyby-Object = object by custody interaction, Average SPO = centered average SPO, Custody-by-SPO =
custody-by-SPO interaction, Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction, Three Way = object-by-custodyby-SPO three-way interaction.
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Moderated mediation. Recall that Hypothesis 9 predicts that psychological
power will mediate the effect of smartphone custody on cheating. Hypothesis 10
predicted that SPO would moderate the effect of smartphone custody on psychological
power such that those with higher levels of SPO would be more affected by the custody
manipulation and those with lower levels of SPO would be less affected by the custody
manipulation. In order to test both the mediation and moderation in a single analysis, the
Hayes (2012) PROCESS procedure rather than simple mediational analysis (e.g.,
Preacher & Hayes, 2004) was used. The procedure, conceptual, and statistical models
were the same described in Chapter 4. Also as before, because psychological power was
measured two ways (BIS and BAS), two analyses were run and Hypothesis 9 was split
into Hypothesis 9a (BIS) and Hypothesis 9b (BAS). Again, because these predictions
apply only to smartphone custody (not student ID custody), analyses were run on only
those in the smartphone condition (n = 46).
The first analysis assessed the effect of smartphone custody on cheating mediated
by BIS and moderated by SPO. The model is depicted in Figure 21 below.
Figure 21. Test of Hypothesis 9a and Hypothesis 10.
SPO

BIS

Custody

ns

Cheating
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This analysis revealed that smartphone custody did not significantly predict BIS
[b = -.17, t(45) = -0.23, p = .82]. Also, the relationship between custody and BIS was not
significantly moderated by SPO [b = .02, t(45) = 0.13, p = .90]. Smartphone custody did
not significantly predict cheating [b = 5.35, t(45) = 0.12, p = .91]. SPO did not
significantly moderate the effect of smartphone custody on cheating [b = -.98, t(45)
= -0.09, p = .93]. BIS did not significantly predicted cheating [b = 3.09, t(45) = 0.33, p =
.74]. Of primary interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and SPO
on cheating is -.02(3.09) = -.06. A 95% bootstrap confidence interval for this indirect
effect (-2.17 to 4.49) contains zero thus the indirect effect of smartphone custody on
moral orientation is not statistically different from zero and the mediation is not
moderated. This is true at all levels of the moderator (SPO). Thus, neither Hypothesis 9a
nor Hypothesis 10 were supported.
The second analysis assessed the effect of smartphone custody on cheating
mediated by BAS and moderated by SPO. The model is depicted in Figure 22 below.
Figure 22. Test of Hypothesis 9b and Hypothesis 10.
SPO

BAS

Custody

ns

Cheating
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This analysis revealed that smartphone custody did not significantly predict BAS
[b = -.06, t(45) = -0.14, p = .89]. Also, the relationship between custody and BAS was
not significantly moderated by SPO [b = -.01, t(45) = -0.10, p = .92]. Smartphone
custody did not significantly predict cheating [b = 5.03, t(45) = 0.11, p = .82]. SPO did
not significantly moderate the effect of smartphone custody on cheating [b = -.87, t(45)
= -0.08, p = .94]. BAS did not significantly predicted cheating [b = 3.49, t(45) = 0.22, p
= .82]. Of primary interest, the indirect effect of the interaction between custody and
SPO on cheating is -.01(3.49) = -.04. A 95% bootstrap confidence interval for this
indirect effect (-4.36 to 4.09) contains zero thus the indirect effect of smartphone custody
on moral orientation is not statistically different from zero and the mediation is not
moderated35. This was true at all levels of the moderator (SPO). Thus, neither
Hypothesis 9b nor Hypothesis 10 was supported.
Discussion
Study 2 sought to test whether access to one’s smartphone resulted in an increase
in psychological power and in turn increased cheating behavior. Further, it sought to test
whether the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power was moderated by a
user’s level of SPO. Results of the hierarchical simultaneous regression from Study 2
indicate that smartphone custody did not have the predicted effect on psychological
ownership, nor did SPO moderate the effect of smartphone custody on psychological
power.

35

Because there was some uncertainty concerning seven participants that may have either been run in the
smartphone or the student ID condition, both sets of moderated mediation analysis (for BIS and BAS) were
run with and without those seven participants in the smartphone condition. The data provided is from the
analysis with them run in the smartphone condition, as that seems to be the most likely scenario. However,
the results are not altered by removing them either.
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However, several unexpected effects were observed that warrant consideration.
First, a significant main effect of object was observed on BIS such that those in the
smartphone condition scores higher on BIS than did those in the student ID condition.
The theories upon which hypotheses were based do not appear to offer a logical reason
for this unexpected effect.
Second, there was an unexpected main effect of custody on cheating such that
those in the access condition cheated more than those in the deprivation condition.
Specifically, evidence of cheating was only observed in the student ID access condition.
Again, it is difficult to imagine a theoretically defensible explanation for this finding.
One conceivable explanation based on the Approach/Inhibition theory of psychology
power would be that the presence of one’s own student ID made salient one’s own goals
or activated the BAS. If true, this would be a very novel finding.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the significant object-by-custody
interaction observed on BAS was in the opposite direction from that which was predicted.
Those in the smartphone deprivation condition scored higher on the BAS (measure of
high power) than those in the smartphone access condition and this pattern was reversed
for those in the student ID conditions. It would appear that, contrary to previous research
(Egan & Larson, 2015), smartphone deprivation (rather than smartphone access) resulted
in an increase in psychological power. Possible reasons for this unexpected direction will
be discussed in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER VI
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Studies 1 and 2 are largely identical up and through the measure of psychological
power. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 14, the procedures for both studies are identical
until after the measure of psychological power, at which point they differ. As a result,
many common variables exist between the two datasets. In order to allow for a couple of
additional analyses, common variables from the datasets resulting from Study 1 and
Study 2 were combined into one larger data set. Specifically, the measures of smartphone
use, smartphone psychological ownership (SPO), psychological power (BIS and BAS)
and the demographics (both basic and smartphone) were combined. Using this newly
created, larger data set two specific additional tests were run. First, the possibility that
insufficient statistical power existed as a result of an insufficient number of observations
was explored. Second, as factor analysis benefits from larger data sets, a final factor
analysis investigating the possible underlying factors of the scale of SPO was conducted
in order to address the research question posed in Studies 1 and 2. The results of these
analyses are discussed in this chapter.
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Smartphone Custody and Psychological Power
One possible explanation for the lack of support for the main prediction that
custody of one’s smartphone would influence levels of psychological power is that there
was insufficient power due to an insufficient sample size to observe significant effects.
In order to explore this possibility, the predictions made regarding the effect of
smartphone custody on power and the moderating role of SPO were retested using this
new, larger dataset.
Combining the datasets yielded a sample of 231 participants (Study 1 = 156,
Study 2 = 75; Males = 77, Females = 154). The number of observations per condition is
provided in Table 19 (below).
Table 19. Number of observations per condition in the combined dataset.
Custody x Object Crosstabulation
Count
Object
Student ID
Custody

Access
Deprivation

Total

Smartphone
52
53
105

Total

64
62
126

116
115
231

Preliminary Analysis
After combining these datasets, internal consistency reliability of the various
subscales was checked using Cronbach’s alpha. Each produced an acceptable alpha level
(see Table 20, below) with all of the original items. No items were removed. This was
done in order to ensure that the measures used here were the same as those used in
Studies 1 and 2 separately.
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Table 20. Cronbach’s alpha levels for subscales from combined dataset.
Scale
Scale of Smartphone Psychological Ownership
Smartphone Use
BIS
BAS

Alpha
.89
.76
.75
.74

The mood check items were treated the same as they were in Studies 1 and 2.
Specifically, the three positively valenced items were averaged together to create an
average positive mood score. The three negatively valenced items were averaged
together to create an average negative mood score. Finally, an overall mood score was
obtained by subtracting the average negative mood score from the average positive mood
score. Therefore, on the overall mood index, higher number indicate a more positive
mood.
Check for study effects. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
done to see whether the study during which the data were collected had a significant
effect on any of the outcome variables (BIS, BAS, or SPO), whether there were any
significant mean differences on the basic or smartphone demographics, or any significant
effects of Study on mood. This analysis indicated that there was no main effect of Study
on any of the outcomes of interest: BIS [F(1, 230) = 0.62, p = .43, ɳ2p = .00], BAS [F(1,
230) = 0.00, p = .99, ɳ2p = .00], or SPO [F(1, 230) = 0.23, p = .64, ɳ2p = .00]; nor did any
of these effects approach significance. Nor did the samples significantly differ on any of
the basic or smartphone demographics (see Table 21 below). There was however a
significant effect of study on mood [F(1, 230) = 4.89, p = .03, ɳ2p = .02] such that those in
Study 2 (M = 1.93, SE = 0.16) reported being in a slightly more positive mood than those
in Study 1 (M = 1.49; SE = 0.11). As will be discussed below, mood also significantly
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correlates with BAS, and for these reasons will be treated as a covariate in the main
analysis.

125

Table 21. Test of between-subjects effects produced by the MANOVA looking for
effects of Study.

Source

Dependent
Variable

Error

Study

Intercept

Corrected Model

Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood
Continued on next page

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Type III Sum
Mean
of Squares
df
Square
.178a
5.533E-8b
.135c
.001d
.075e
23.951f
1.496g
.054h
.145i
9.817j
1874.495
2034.869
3337.966
75653.879
44129.231
24928.673
14105.148
14942.315
4216.423
590.161
.178
5.533E-8
.135
.001
.075
23.951
1.496
.054
.145
9.817
66.853
27.321
155.062
1131.864
1441.231
20542.767
500.834
587.529
924.274
457.460

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228

.178
5.533E-8
.135
.001
.075
23.951
1.496
.054
.145
9.817
1874.495
2034.869
3337.966
75653.879
44129.231
24928.673
14105.148
14942.315
4216.423
590.161
.178
5.533E-8
.135
.001
.075
23.951
1.496
.054
.145
9.817
.293
.120
.680
4.964
6.321
90.100
2.197
2.577
4.054
2.006

F
.609
.000
.198
.000
.012
.266
.681
.021
.036
4.893
6392.866
16981.174
4908.091
15239.537
6981.163
276.678
6421.232
5798.608
1040.108
294.139
.609
.000
.198
.000
.012
.266
.681
.021
.036
4.893

Sig.
.436
.999
.657
.988
.913
.607
.410
.885
.850
.028
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.436
.999
.657
.988
.913
.607
.410
.885
.850
.028

Partial Eta
Squared
.003
.000
.001
.000
.000
.001
.003
.000
.000
.021
.966
.987
.956
.985
.968
.548
.966
.962
.820
.563
.003
.000
.001
.000
.000
.001
.003
.000
.000
.021
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Corrected Total

Total

Source

Dependent Variable
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average SPO
Participant Age
SP Age
SP Months
SP Functionality
SP Satisfaction
SP Tenure
Average Mood

Type III Sum of
Squares
2214.020
2342.267
3935.826
87191.000
51598.750
49541.250
16664.000
17564.000
5740.750
1079.778
67.032
27.321
155.196
1131.865
1441.305
20566.718
502.330
587.583
924.418
467.277

df
Mean Square
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
229
229
229
229
229
229
229
229
229
229

F

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

a. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002), b. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), c. R
Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), d. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), e. R
Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), f. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.003), g. R
Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001), h. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), i. R
Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.004), j. R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = .017).
Legend: Participant Age = participants chronological age, SP Age = age at which participant first got a
smartphone, SP Months = number of months that participant has owned current device, SP Functionality =
how well current device functions, SP Satisfaction = how satisfied participant is with current device, SP
Tenure = number of years that participant has been a smartphone owner/user, Average Mood = average
on overall mood index.

Chi-Square analyses were also performed to determine whether approximately the
same proportion of males and females as well as smartphone users that use an iPhone
versus another make/model took part in each study. Again, this analysis revealed no
significant differences in either the gender of participants [2(232) = 1.42, p = .24] and/or
the make/model of smartphone [2(232) = 0.08, p = .85]. Thus, it would seem that the
data collected in the two studies and the type of participants that took part in each are
comparable enough in important ways to justify combining the datasets for this purpose.
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Detection of covariates. Next, correlational analysis was used to detect possible
covariates. The following possible covariates were checked: mood, session size,
participant age, age at which participant first got a smartphone, length the participant has
owned his or her current smartphone, smartphone functionality, smartphone satisfaction,
and total length that participant has been a smartphone owner/use (smartphone tenure)
[see Table 22, below]. None were found to significantly correlate with BIS, and only
mood was found to positively correlate with BAS (r = .21, p = .00) such that those who
reported being in a more positive mood also scored higher on the measure of BAS. Thus
mood will be included as a covariate in the main regression analysis below.
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Table 22. Correlational analysis done to detect possible covariates in combined dataset.
Correlations
Average
BIS

SP Age

Participant Session
Age
Size

Average
Mood

Average
BAS

Average
BIS

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Continued on next page

Average
BAS

Average
Mood

Session
Size

Participant
Age

SP Age

SP Months

SP
Function

SP
Satisfaction

SP
Tenure

1

-.042

-.013

-.021

-.043

-.107

-.002

.065

.040

.088

231

.521
231

.847
231

.749
231

.514
231

.106
231

.970
230

.324
231

.545
231

.183
231

-.042

1

.213**

-.021

-.107

-.084

.045

.068

.071

-.009

.521
231

231

.001
231

.753
231

.105
231

.203
231

.501
230

.305
231

.282
231

.893
231

-.013

.213**

1

-.102

.070

.105

.068

.048

.073

-.048

.847
231

.001
231

231

.122
231

.288
231

.111
231

.308
230

.471
231

.269
231

.467
231

-.021

-.021

-.102

1

.003

-.040

.106

-.013

-.056

.053

.749
231

.753
231

.122
231

231

.961
231

.547
231

.108
230

.846
231

.393
231

.419
231

-.043

-.107

.070

.003

1

.644**

.050

-.070

-.080

.295**

.514
231

.105
231

.288
231

.961
231

231

.000
231

.450
230

.292
231

.224
231

.000
231

-.107

-.084

.105

-.040

.644**

1

.059

.012

-.044

-.538**

.106
231

.203
231

.111
231

.547
231

.000
231

231

.371
230

.858
231

.507
231

.000
231
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SP Tenure

SP Satisfaction

SP
Function

SP Months

Average
BIS

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Average
BAS

Average
Mood

Session
Size

Participant
Age

SP Age

SP Months

SP
Function

SP
Satisfaction

SP
Tenure

-.002

.045

.068

.106

.050

.059

1

-.371**

-.325**

-.016

.970
230

.501
230

.308
230

.108
230

.450
230

.371
230

230

.000
230

.000
230

.811
230

.065

.068

.048

-.013

-.070

.012

-.371**

1

.666**

-.090

.324
231

.305
231

.471
231

.846
231

.292
231

.858
231

.000
230

231

.000
231

.172
231

.040

.071

.073

-.056

-.080

-.044

-.325**

.666**

1

-.031

.545
231

.282
231

.269
231

.393
231

.224
231

.507
231

.000
230

.000
231

231

.638
231

.088

-.009

-.048

.053

.295**

-.538**

-.016

-.090

-.031

1

.183
231

.893
231

.467
231

.419
231

.000
231

.000
231

.811
230

.172
231

.638
231

231

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Legend: Average BIS = average BIS, Average BAS = average BAS, Average Mood = average on overall mood index, Session Size = session size, Participant Age =
participants chronological age, SP Age = age at which participant first got a smartphone, SP Months = number of months a participant has owned current device,
SP Function = how well current device functions, SP Satisfaction = how satisfied participant is with current device, SP Tenure = number of years a participant has
been a smartphone owner/user.
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Main Analysis
The same two hierarchical simultaneous regressions (on BIS and BAS) were
performed on the combined dataset as were done on the individual datasets in Studies 1
and 2. Specifically, the covariate (mood) was controlled for in Block 1. Block 2 tested
the main effects of custody and objects (using the same effects coding as described in
Studies 1 and 2). Block 3 tested the interaction between object and custody. Block 4
tested the moderating effects of SPO. Again SPO was centered and multiplied with the
effects coded categorical predictors (custody and objects) to create interactions terms for
each categorical predictor as well as a three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction
term that tested the prediction that SPO moderates the effect of smartphone custody on
psychological power.
The predictions are identical to those tested in Studies 1 and 2 independently.
Smartphone access is expected to result in an increase in BAS and a decrease in BIS
compared both with smartphone deprivation as well as either of the student ID
conditions. By contrast, smartphone deprivation is expected to result in an increase in
BIS and a decrease in BAS compared with smartphone access as well as either of the
Student ID conditions. Again, SPO is expected to moderate the effect of smartphone
custody on psychological power such that those with higher levels of SPO will be more
affected by the custody manipulation than those with lower levels of SPO.
BIS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression did not account for a
significant amount of variance in BIS scores [r2 = .00, F∆(1, 229) = 0.04, p = .85] as
mood did not predict BIS scores [b = -.01, β = -.01, t(229) = -0.19, p = .85].
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Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, accounted for only
0.5% more variance in BIS scores [r2 = .01, F∆(2, 227) = 0.54, p = .59]. No main effect
was expected or observed for either custody [b = -.02, β = -.04, t(229) = -0.64, p = .52] or
object [b = -.03, β = .06, t(229) = 0.82, p = .41].
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, accounted for
no more variance [r2 = .01, F∆(1, 226) = 0.00, p = .96]. A significant two-way objectby-custody interaction was expected but not observed [b = -.00, β = -.00, t(229) = -0.05, p
= .96].
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO, accounted for 6% more
variance [r2 = .07, F∆(4, 222) = 3.57, p = .01] which was a statistically significant
amount. No main effect of SPO was expected but one was observed [b = 0.17, β = 0.25,
t(229) = 3.72, p = .00] such that for every one point increase in SPO a 0.17 point increase
would be expected in BIS scores. No interactions were expected between either SPO and
custody [b = -.01, β = -.02, t(229) = -0.30, p = .74] or object [b = -.02, β = -.03, t(229)
= -0.40, p = .69] and none were observed. A three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO
interaction was expected but not observed [b = -.03, β = -.05, t(229) = -0.71, p = .48] [see
Table 23, below].
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Table 23. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BIS
using the combined dataset.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
2

3

4

(Constant)
Average Mood
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.064
.054
-.005
.025
3.063
.054
-.006
.025
-.023
.036
.030
.036
3.063
.054
-.006
.025
-.023
.036
.030
.036
-.002
.036
3.097
.054
-.029
.025
-.006
.035
.030
.035
-.001
.035
.165
.044
-.017
.043
-.013
.043
-.031
.043

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.013
-.016
-.042
.055
-.017
-.042
.055
-.003
-.076
-.011
.056
-.001
.251
-.026
-.020
-.047

t
56.660
-.193
56.538
-.248
-.639
.822
56.356
-.249
-.631
.820
-.047
57.144
-1.134
-.168
.852
-.021
3.721
-.397
-.301
-.705

Sig.
.000
.847
.000
.805
.523
.412
.000
.803
.529
.413
.963
.000
.258
.866
.395
.983
.000
.692
.764
.482

a. Dependent Variable: Average BIS
Legend: Average Mood = average on mood items, Custody = effects coded custody, Object = effects coded
object, Object-by-Custody = object-by-custody interaction term, Average SPO = centered average SPO,
Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction term, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction term,
Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction term.

BAS. Block 1 of the hierarchical simultaneous regression accounted for 4.6% of
variance in BAS scores [r2 = .05, F∆(1, 229) = 10.92, p = .001] as mood significantly
predicted BAS scores [b = .05, β = .21, t(229) = 3.31, p = .001]. Specifically, an increase
of one point in mood would be expected to correspond with a .05 increase in BAS scores.
Block 2, which tested the main effects of custody and object, accounted for only
0.2% more variance in BAS scores [r2 = .05, F∆(2, 227) = 0.23, p = .79]. No main
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effects were expected or observed for either custody [b = -.02, β = -.04, t(229) = -0.65, p
= .52] or object [b = .01, β = .01, t(229) = 0.20, p = .84].
Block 3, which tested the interaction between custody and object, accounted for
only 0.2% more variance in BAS scores [r2 = .05, F∆(1, 226) = 0.38, p = .54]. A
significant two-way object-by-custody interaction was expected but not observed [b
= -.01, β = -.04, t(229) = -0.62, p = .54].
Block 4, which tested the moderating effects of SPO, accounted for 5.6% more
variance in BAS scores [r2 = .11, F∆(4, 222) = 3.48, p = .01] which was statistically
significant. No main effect of SPO was expected but one was observed [b = 0.10, β =
0.23, t(229) = 3.53, p = .001] such that for every one point increase in SPO a 0.10 point
increase would be expected in BAS scores. No interactions were expected between either
SPO and custody [b = -.00, β = -.01, t(229) = -0.14, p = .89] or object [b =.03, β =.06,
t(229) = 0.99, p = .33] and none were observed. A three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO
interaction was expected but not observed [b = .01, β = .02, t(229) = 0.35, p = .73] (see
Table 24, below).
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Table 24. Coefficients produced by the hierarchical simultaneous regression on BAS
combined dataset.
Coefficientsa

Model
1
(Constant)
Average Mood
2
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
3
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
4
(Constant)
Average Mood
Custody
Object
Object-by-Custody
Average SPO
Object-by-SPO
Custody-by-SPO
Three Way

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.089
.034
.052
.016
3.089
.034
.051
.016
-.015
.022
.005
.022
3.090
.034
.051
.016
-.013
.022
.005
.022
-.014
.022
3.111
.034
.038
.016
-.002
.022
.008
.022
-.009
.022
.098
.028
.027
.027
-.004
.027
.009
.027

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.213
.213
-.042
.013
.211
-.039
.013
-.040
.157
-.006
.023
-.028
.233
.063
-.009
.022

t
91.570
3.305
91.257
3.275
-.651
.201
91.063
3.235
-.591
.205
-.617
91.873
2.376
-.095
.354
-.428
3.529
.985
-.138
.348

Sig.
.000
.001
.000
.001
.515
.841
.000
.001
.555
.838
.538
.000
.018
.924
.723
.669
.001
.325
.891
.728

a. Dependent Variable: Average BAS
Legend: Average Mood = average on mood items, Custody = effects coded custody, Object = effects coded
object, Object-by-Custody = object-by-custody interaction term, Average SPO = centered average SPO,
Object-by-SPO = object-by-SPO interaction term, Custody-by-SPO = custody-by-SPO interaction term,
Three Way = object-by-custody-by-SPO interaction term.

Statistical Power
One final test was done in order to assess the size of the effects and the observed
power to detect significant results. SPO, which has thus far been treated as a continuous
predictor, was transformed into a categorical predictor at three levels (low, medium, and
high). This allowed the predicted two- and three-way interactions to be tested using a
MANOVA (with BIS and BAS as the dependent variables). Consistent with the results
of the regression, results of the MANOVA revealed that neither the predicted two-way
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object-by-custody nor the predicted three-way object-by-custody-by-SPO interactions
were significant for either BIS or BAS. Also consistent with the regression, there was a
significant main effect of SPO on both BIS [F(2, 230) = 8.07, p = .00, ɳ2p = .07, power =
.96] and BAS [F(2, 230) = 8.99, p = .00, ɳ2p = .08, power = .97]. In both cases, pairwise
comparison reveals the differences to be between the high group compared with the
medium and low groups. Those with high (M = 3.22, SE = .06) SPO scored higher on
BIS than both those with medium (M = 3.00, SE = .06, p = .01) and low (M = 2.89, SE =
.06, p = .00) levels of SPO, whereas the difference between those with medium and low
levels was not significantly different (p = .21). Likewise, those with high (M = 3.29, SE
= .04) SPO scored higher on BAS than both those with medium (M = 3.15, SE = .04, p =
.01) and low (M = 3.06, SE = .04, p = .00) levels of SPO, whereas the difference between
those with medium and low levels was not significantly different (p = .11).
Importantly, this analysis also revealed that the effects sizes for each of the
predicted (two- and three-way) interactions are so small (see Table 25, below) that
neither approached Cohen’s (1992) standard of .8 for observed power. The following
equation was used to estimate the needed sample size based on the observed effects sizes:
n = 2(Za + Z1-β)2σ2, / ∆2 (Kadam & Bhalerao, 2010). Assuming an alpha of .05, 80%
power (per Cohen, 1992), and given the observed effects size for the predicted two- and
three-way interactions (about .001), a sample of 7,598 participants would be needed36.
This may be due either to the fact that the actual effect is very small, or it may be due to
the fact that methodological flaws introduced too much unexplained variance (i.e., noise)

36

n = 2(1.96+.8416)2(.022)2 / (.001)2 = 2(2.8016)2(.000484) / .000001 = 2(7.84896256)(.000484) / .000001
= 15.69792512(.000484) / .000001 = .00759779575808 / .000001 = 7597.79575808
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into the data making the effect seem very small. This will be discussed in greater detail
in the next chapter.
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Table 25. Test of between-subjects effects produced by the MANOVA performed on the combined dataset.
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Custody
Object
SPO Hi/Med/Low
Custody * Object
Custody * SPO
Hi/Med/Low
Object * SPO
Hi/Med/Low
Custody * Object *
SPO Hi/Med/Low
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Dependent
Variable
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS
Average BAS
Average BIS

Type III Sum of
Squares
6.406a
2.520b
2056.449
2240.057
.034
.004
.293
.025
4.471
2.038
.010
.030
1.179
.015
.858
.136
.026
.016
60.634
24.820
2223.898
2353.207
67.039

Average BAS

27.340

df
11
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
219
219
231
231
230

Mean
Square
.582
.229
2056.449
2240.057
.034
.004
.293
.025
2.235
1.019
.010
.030
.590
.007
.429
.068
.013
.008
.277
.113

F
2.103
2.021
7427.563
19765.111
.122
.034
1.058
.216
8.074
8.991
.035
.263
2.130
.065
1.549
.599
.047
.069

Sig.
.021
.028
.000
.000
.727
.854
.305
.642
.000
.000
.852
.609
.121
.937
.215
.550
.954
.934

Partial Eta
Squared
.096
.092
.971
.989
.001
.000
.005
.001
.069
.076
.000
.001
.019
.001
.014
.005
.000
.001

230

a. R Squared = .096 (Adjusted R Squared = .050), b. R Squared = .092 (Adjusted R Squared = .047), c. Computed using alpha = .05.
Legend: Average BIS = average BIS, Average BAS = average BAS, SPO Hi/Med/Low = categorical SPO variable

Noncent.
Observed
Parameter
Powerc
23.136
.915
22.231
.901
7427.563
1.000
19765.111
1.000
.122
.064
.034
.054
1.058
.176
.216
.075
16.147
.956
17.983
.973
.035
.054
.263
.080
4.260
.434
.130
.060
3.099
.327
1.198
.149
.093
.057
.138
.060
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Smartphone Psychological Ownership Factor Analysis
Rather than addressing the research question, “Does the relationship between SPO
and psychological power differ depending on the route by which those feelings developed
or the motives served by those feelings?”, individually using the datasets from Studies 1
and 2, because factor analysis benefits from larger datasets, and because the same
questions is posed for each study, the question as to whether SPO is comprised of
subscales is best addressed by using the combined dataset.
Remember that the scale was based on the theory of psychological ownership and
the three routes and motives proposed by Pierce et al. (2003). Table 26 (below) lists the
18 items, shows the route or motive to which the item was written to correspond, and lists
the variable name as it appears on the tables below.
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Table 26. Scale development for measure of smartphone psychological ownership.

Motives
driving the development of feelings of
psychological ownership toward an
object

Routes
by which feelings of psychological
ownership develop toward an object

Theory of Psychological
Ownership (Pierce, Kostova, and
Dirks, 2003)
Controlling the
target object

Intimate
knowledge of
the target
object
Investing the
self in the
target object

Efficacy &
Effectance

Self-Identity

Having a Place

SPO Items (Egan & Larson, 2015)

Variable
Name

I am very possessive of my smartphone.
Other people often use my smartphone. (reverse
scored)
I would be willing to let a friend borrow my
smartphone for the day (reverse scored).
I feel like I’ve gotten to “know” my smartphone like
one does a friend.
I know how to use all of the features of my
smartphone.
I am very familiar with my smartphone.
I have taken a lot of time to personalize my
smartphone.
I always have my smartphone with me.
I spend a lot of time using my smartphone.
My smartphone makes me feel more capable.
I am able to accomplish a lot more as a result of
having my smartphone.
My smartphone is extremely useful in helping me
achieve my goals.
My smartphone is an extension of myself.
My smartphone reflects my personality.
I have a lot of personal information stored on my
smartphone.
My smartphone is a kind of “home-away-fromhome.”
My smartphone makes me feel connected to home
wherever I am.
I would feel lost without my smartphone.

SPO7
SPO5_Re
SPO9_Re
SPO4
SPO11
SPO14
SPO12
SPO8
SPO6
SPO13
SPO18
SPO10
SPO15
SPO2
SPO1
SPO17
SPO3
SPO16

As there is some overlap and redundancy between the routes and motives, there is
also some overlap between items where it appears that an item could correspond with
more than one route or motive. Specifically, the “Investing the self in the target object”
(a route) and the “Self-Identity” (a motive) items seem to overlap because to the extent
that one invests themselves into an object, that object is likely to become more involved
in his or her self-identity.
The theory of psychological ownership would seem to suggest either a two- or
six-factor solution. A two-factor solution may be expected if the items corresponding to
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the routes all load onto one factor and the items corresponding to the motives all load
onto a second factor. However, as mentioned above, there seems to be conceptual
overlap between certain routes and motives making this solution unlikely to provide a
good fit. Alternately, a six-factor solution may be expected if each of the three routes and
each of the three motives are distinct subcomponents.
First, principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted to see the number of
subscales that naturally emerged from the items. Then, confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) was done to test the fit of the proposed two- and six-factor solutions. Each
analysis is discussed separately below.
Principal Components Analysis
PCA yielded five Eigenvalues greater than one suggesting a five-factor solution.
Table 27 (below) shows which items load onto each of the five factors while Table 28
(below) shows specifically which items and their corresponding routes or motives appear
to load onto each of the factors and seeks to identify themes among the emerging factors.
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Table 27. Rotated component matrix for the five-factor solution produced by the
principal components analysis.
Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1
2
3
.744
.730
.288
.669
.315
.661
.274
.652
.258
.787
.716
.273
.620
.469
.593
.308
.437
.416
.826
.770
.483
.601

SPO3
SPO17
SPO4
SPO2
SPO15
SPO6
SPO8
SPO7
SPO16
SPO1
SPO11
SPO14
SPO12
SPO18
SPO10
.287
SPO13
.432
.258
SPO5_Re
SPO9_Re
.330
.290
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

4

5

.319

.801
.757
.560
.840
.601

Looking at Table 28 (below), it does appear that certain themes do emerge for
some of the factors. For instance, efficacy and effectance motives clearly map onto the
fourth factor. However, factors one and two in particular, do not seem to exhibit a clear
theme. The five-factor PCA solution does not map onto the theoretically predicted
categories well, and does not appear to have produced clean factors given that multiple
items load onto multiple factors.
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Table 28. Routes and motives represented in each of the factors of the five-factor
solution.
Factor
1

2

3

4

5

Items
3
17
4
2
15
6
8
7
16
1
11
14
12
18
10
13
5
9

Scale Route/Motive
Motive: Having a Place
Motive: Having a Place
Route: Intimate Knowledge of Target
Motive: Self-Identity
Motive: Self-Identity
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Route: Control over Target
Motive: Having a Place
Motive: Self-Identity
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Route: Control over Target
Route: Control over Target

Theme
Not Clear / Motive: Having a
Place (40%) & Motive: SelfIdentity (40%)

Route: Investing the Self in
the Target (40%)

Route: Intimate Knowledge
of the Target (67%)
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
(100%)
Route: Control over Target
(100%)

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
First, the proposed two-factor solution was tested using CFA. Eleven items map
onto the first factor, and 7 map onto the second factor. Again, the factor loadings are
depicted in a pair of tables below. The first table (Table 29) shows which items load onto
each of the two factors. The second table (Table 30) shows specifically which items and
their corresponding routes or motives load onto each of the two factors and seeks to
identify themes among the factors.
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Table 29. Rotated component matrix for the two-factor solution produced by the principal
components analysis.
Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1
2
SPO10
.702
SPO12
.675
.321
SPO14
.671
SPO2
.642
SPO13
.636
.320
SPO11
.585
SPO3
.581
SPO15
.575
.512
SPO4
.564
.403
SPO18
.516
SPO1
.442
.285
SPO16
.720
SPO9_Re
.692
SPO7
.334
.649
SPO8
.533
SPO17
.476
.531
SPO6
.373
.492
SPO5_Re
-.311
.425
Extraction Method: Principal
Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
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Table 30. Routes and motives represented in each of the factors of the two-factor
solution.
Factor
1

2

Items
2
10
14
12
13
11
3
15
4
18
1
16
9
7
8
17
6
5

Scale Route/Motive
Motive: Self-Identity
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Motive: Having a Place
Motive: Self-Identity
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Self-Identity
Motive: Having a Place
Route: Control over the Target
Route: Control over the Target
Route: Investing the Self into the Target
Motive: Having a Place
Route: Investing the Self into the Target
Route: Control over the Target

Theme
Motives (64% of the
items):

Routes (71% of the
items)

The two-factor solution was tested to see whether the routes and motives mapped
onto two underlying constructs; however, this does not appear to be the case. While 64%
of the items on factor one are motives and 71% of the items on factor two are motives,
there is a considerable amount of the overlap. On the scale, there were nine items each
for routes and motives. Seven of the nine items written for motives (78%) do map onto
factor one leaving only two that map onto factor two. However, only five of the nine
items written for routes (56%) map onto factor two leaving four that map onto factor one.
Thus, the two factors do not neatly break into routes and motives.
Next, the proposed six-factor solution was tested. Again the solution has been
represented in a pair of tables below. Table 31 shows which items load onto each of the
six factors. The second table, Table 32, shows again which items and their corresponding
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routes or motives load onto each of the six factors and seeks to identify themes among the
six factors.
Table 31. Rotated component matrix for the six-factor solution produced by the
confirmatory factor analysis.

1

Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
2
3
4
.289

SPO17
.815
SPO3
.702
SPO4
.642
.318
SPO15
.628
.259
SPO8
.729
.269
SPO6
.726
SPO7
.270
.608
SPO16
.550
.595
SPO11
.871
SPO14
.786
SPO12
.384
.538
SPO10
SPO18
SPO13
.318
SPO1
.318
SPO2
.446
SPO5_Re
SPO9_Re
.320
.267
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

5

6
.263

.251
.424
.318

.375
.787
.773
.614
.270

.342
.721
.659
.879
.617

Two of the three “having a place” motive items map onto the first factor, two of
the three “investing the self” route items map onto the second factor, two of the three
“intimate knowledge” route items map onto the third factor, all of the efficacy and
effectance motive items map onto the fourth factor, two of the three self-identity motive
items map onto the fifth factor, and two of the three control route items map onto the
sixth factor. So the six-factor solution does appear to offer a better fit than the five-factor
solution and is relatively consistent with the theoretical foundation on which the items
were written.
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Table 32. Routes and motives represented in each of the factors of the six-factor solution.
Factor
1

2

3

4

5
6

Items
17
3
4
15
8
6
7
16
11
14
12
10
18
13
1
2
5
9

Scale Route/Motive
Motive: Having a Place
Motive: Having a Place
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Motive: Self-Identity
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Route: Control of the Target
Motive: Having a Place
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Route: Intimate Knowledge of the Target
Route: Investing the Self in the Target
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Efficacy & Effectance
Motive: Self-Identity
Motive: Self-Identity
Route: Control over the Target
Route: Control over the Target

Theme
Motive: Having a Place
(50%)

Route: Investing the
Self in the Target (50%)

Route: Intimate
Knowledge of the
Target (67%)
Motive: Efficacy &
Effectance (100%)
Motive: Self-Identity
(100%)
Route: Control over the
Target (100%)

It appears, that of the two-, five-, and six-factor solutions tested, the six-factor
solution provides the best fit in that it results in subscales that most neatly correspond
with those predicted by the theory of psychological ownership (Pierce, et al., 2003).
Thus far, I have used a top-down, or a theory drive approach to assign construct
labels to the factors. It is also beneficial, having identified what appear to be the correct
factors, to look at the individual items that load onto the various factors and to determine
whether they are best represented by the a priori routes and motives suggested by the
theory or whether together they suggest somewhat different constructs. Table 33 (below)
shows the exact wording of the items that map onto each factor and an assigned post hoc
theme informed by the individual items. In other words, I now apply a bottom-up
approach to identifying a theme for each of the six factors.
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Table 33. Post hoc analysis of themes emerging from the six-factor solution.
Factor
1

Items
My smartphone is a kind of “home-away-from-home”.
My smartphone makes me feel connected to home wherever I am.
I feel that I’ve gotten to “know” my smartphone like one does a
friend.
My smartphone is an extension of myself.
2
I always have my smartphone with me.
I spend a lot of time using my smartphone.
I am very possessive of my smartphone.
I would feel lost without my smartphone.
3
I know how to use all of the features of my smartphone.
I am very familiar with my smartphone.
I have taken a lot of time to personalize my smartphone.
4
My smartphone is extremely useful in helping me achieve my
goals.
I am able to accomplish a lot more as a result of having my
smartphone.
My smartphone makes me feel more capable.
5
I have a lot of personal information stored on my smartphone.
My smartphone reflects my personality.
6
Other people often use my smartphone*
I would be willing to let a friend borrow my smartphone for the
day*
*Reverse scored items.

Theme
Intimacy / Personal
Connection

Use / Dependence

Familiarity / Expertise

Efficacy / Effectance

Self-Identity
Control

Factor 1 seems to contain the items that indicate the most intimate relationship
with the smartphone – that the device represents themselves, a friend, or their home. This
is similar to the theoretically derived theme – the motive of having a place – but also
somewhat different. Together, these four items seem to suggest a strong theme of
intimacy or personal connection.
Factor 2 appears to reflect how much a person uses and relies on their device.
The theoretically derived theme was the route of investing the self into the target object.
Together however, these items seem to better indicate a dependence on the device
evidenced by very frequent use. This factor would be expected to correlate most strongly
with self-reported level of smartphone usage; a possibility that will be explored shortly.
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Factor 3 seems to suggest that these users are experts at using their device and can
best be described as “familiarity or expertise.” This is conceptually similar to the a priori
theoretical theme “intimate knowledge of the target object”. Users high on this
dimension likely know how to maximize the features of their device because they have
taken the time to get to know how to use it and to customize it to their preferences.
Factor 4 clearly contains items pertaining to efficacy and effectance; which is
perfectly aligned with the theoretically derived theme as all three of the items written to
correspond to the efficacy/effectance motive mapped onto this factor. It would seem
reasonable to expect that Factor 3 and Factor 4 would strongly correlate with one another.
In other words, those that indicate the most familiarity and expertise with their device
likely derive the most useful from it. Again, this possible relationship will be explored
shortly.
Factor 5 is made up of two items originally written based on the self-identity
motive and appear to best reflect the smartphone as a means of expressing or building
one’s sense of self.
Factor 6 is made up of two items originally written based on the control route. It
is worth noting that these two are also the only items written to be reverse scored. It is
not uncommon for reversed items to fit poorly with other items, and this may account for
these two items loading onto a factor together. It is possible that had these items been
written in the same direction as the rest of the scale, they would have mapped onto a
different factor, making the five-factor solution a better fit. If so, they would read:
“Other people rarely use my smartphone.” and “I would be unwilling to let a friend
borrow my smartphone for the day.” If written as such, it seems plausible that they may
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map onto Factor 2, the “Use / Dependence” scale. If so, a very strong positive correlation
would be expected between factors two and six.
Subscale Supplementary Analysis
To further explore the six subscales suggested by the CFA, reliability analysis
was performed for each of the subscales, subscales scores were created by averaging
together their corresponding items, and correlations were tested to see whether subscales
correlated with other theoretically predicted constructs.
Reliability testing. With all 18 items, using the combined dataset, Cronbach’s
alpha for the SPO was .89. It could be improved to .90 by removing reverse-scored item
number five, but could not be improved beyond that. However, this step was not taken
because the scale already exhibited sufficient internal consistency reliability and
including all 18 items made the scale average based on the same items as in Studies 1 and
2.
Cronbach’s alpha for each of the subscales are provided in Table 34 below.
“CFA Alphas” are those with the items indicated by the CFA included in the subscale.
“Original Alphas” are those obtained if the three items that were originally written to
correspond to the route or motive are tested as a subscale. This was done to assess the
increase in internal consistency reliability by basing subscales on the items indicated by
the CFA rather than those items originally written to go together. As is evident by the
table, only the self-identity motive subscale reaches a higher internal consistency
reliability by using the original three items rather than the items identified using CFA.
Otherwise, the subscales created based on the CFA loadings yield higher internal
consistency reliability.
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Table 34. Reliability analysis for the six factors suggested by the CFA.
Theme
CFA Alphasa
Original Alphasb
Intimacy / Personal Connection (Motive: Having
.81
.74
1
a Place)
Use / Dependence (Route: Investing the Self in
.75
.58(.61)
2
the Target)
Familiarity / Expertise (Route: Intimate
.78
.70(.75)
3
Knowledge of the Target)
Efficacy / Effectance (Motive: Efficacy &
.72
.72
4
Effectance)
5
Self-Identity (Motive: Self-Identity)
.56
.67
6
Control (Route: Control over the Target)
.44
.51(.52)
a. None of the alphas could be improved by removing poorly fitting items.
b. Vales in parentheses represent the highest alpha that could be achieved by removing poorly fitting
items.
Factor

Correlations. Table 35 (below) shows the correlations among the factor
averages, the smartphone demographics, and psychological power. All of the factors
significantly positively correlate with one another with the exception that Factor 4
(Efficacy/Effectance) does not correlate with Factor 6 (Control).
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Table 35. Correlations among smartphone psychological ownership factors, smartphone use, smartphone demographics, and
psychological power.

Factor
6

Factor
5

Factor
4

Factor
3

Factor
2

Factor 1

Correlations

Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Factor
1

Factor
2

Factor
3

Factor
4

Factor
5

Factor
6
SP Use

Pos.
Mood

Neg.
Mood

1

.593**

.542**

.529**

.554**

.234**

.367**

.274**

.000
231
1

.000
231
.426**
.000
231
1

.000
231
.465**
.000
231
.473**
.000
231
1

.000
231
.463**
.000
231
.499**
.000
231
.414**
.000
231
1

.000
231
.296**
.000
231
.218**
.001
231
.105
.112
231
.133*
.043
231
1

.000
231
.526**
.000
231
.473**
.000
231
.399**
.000
231
.408**
.000
231
.085
.196
231

.000
231
.218**
.001
231
.187**
.004
231
.222**
.001
231
.124
.059
231
.006
.924
231

231
.593**
.000
231
.542**
.000
231
.529**
.000
231
.554**
.000
231
.234**
.000
231

231
.426**
.000
231
.465**
.000
231
.463**
.000
231
.296**
.000
231

231
.473**
.000
231
.499**
.000
231
.218**
.001
231

231
.414**
.000
231
.105
.112
231

231
.133*
.043
231

231

SP
SP Age Month

SP
Funct

SP
Satis

SP
Ten.

BIS

BAS

.072

.167*

.239** -.172**

.019

.115

.165*

.109

.278
231
.070
.289
231
.001
.985
231
.103
.117
231
-.043
.515
231
-.019
.773
231

.011
231
.281**
.000
231
.112
.089
231
.125
.058
231
.148*
.024
231
.149*
.024
231

.000
.009
231
231
.187** -.246**
.004
.000
231
231
.246** -.286**
.000
.000
231
231
.271**
-.069
.000
.293
231
231
.236** -.207**
.000
.002
231
231
-.071
-.060
.282
.363
231
231

.775
230
-.007
.911
230
.040
.541
230
.056
.394
230
.053
.426
230
-.045
.500
230

.080
231
.053
.420
231
.102
.123
231
.173**
.008
231
.083
.207
231
.021
.752
231

.012
231
.074
.265
231
.150*
.022
231
.171**
.009
231
.145*
.028
231
-.018
.787
231

.099
231
.088
.180
231
.109
.099
231
.062
.349
231
.055
.402
231
.099
.134
231

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Legend: Pearson Corr. = Pearson correlation coefficient, Factor 1 = average intimacy / personal connection, Factor 2 = average use/dependence, Factor 3 =
average familiarity/expertise, Factor 4 = average efficacy/effectance, Factor 5 = average self-identity, Factor 6 = average control, SP Use = average smartphone
use, Pos. Mood = average positive mood check items, Neg. Mood = average negative mood check items, BIS = average BIS, BAS = average BAS, SP Age = age
when participant got a smartphone, SP Months = number of months participant has owned current device, SP Funct = smartphone functionality, SP Sastis =
smartphone satisfaction, SP Ten. = years participant has been a smartphone user.
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All of the factors except for Factor 6 (Control) positively correlate with selfreported level of smartphone use (Factor 1: r = .37, p = .00; Factor 2: r = .53, = p = .00;
Factor 3: r = .47, p = .00; Factor 4: r = .40, p = .00; Factor 5: r = .41, p = .00) indicating
that those who report using their smartphone more have higher levels of SPO on all of the
factors except for Factor 6 (Control). This is counterintuitive in that it seems likely that
those who report using their smartphone the most would be the least willing to let others
use their device, especially for an entire day. This may lend support for the idea that the
reverse scored items were perhaps misinterpreted by some participants or performed
poorly for some other reason.
Factors 1 (r = -.17, p = .01), 2 (r = -.25, p = .00), 3 (r = -.29, p = .00), and 5 (r = .21, p = .00) all negatively correlate with age at which a user first got a smartphone
indicating that those who got a smartphone at a younger age now have higher levels of
SPO on those four factors. Surprisingly, however, none of the factors significantly
correlate with smartphone tenure (the number of years that a person has been a
smartphone owner/user). This is surprising since smartphone tenure is partly a function
of the age at which a person first became a smartphone user.
I had anticipated that Factor 3 (Familiarity/Expertise) would be positively
correlated with the number of months that a person had owned their current device, but
these two were not significantly correlated. Also somewhat surprising, Factor 3 did not
positively correlate with functionality. Factor 3 did however correlate with smartphone
satisfaction (r = .15, p = .02) indicating that those who scored higher on the
familiarity/expertise items also reported being more satisfied with their smartphone.
Interestingly, smartphone functionality only correlated with Factor 4

153

(Efficacy/Effectance) (r = .17, p = .01), which is to be expected. Those who reported
being able to accomplish a lot as a result of using their smartphone also tended to report
that their smartphone functions well. Satisfaction on the other hand, in addition to
correlating with Factor 3, also correlated with Factors 1 (r = .17, p = .01), Factor 4 (r =
.17, p = .01), and Factor 5 (r = .15, p = .03). Thus, those who scored higher in
intimacy/personal connection, familiarity/expertise, efficiency/effectance, and selfidentity all also reported higher levels of smartphone satisfaction. In other words, neither
use/dependence nor control positively correlated with smartphone satisfaction, which
may lend further support for the idea that had the reverse scored items been worded in a
direction consistent with the rest of the scale, items that loaded on to Factor 6 may have
loaded instead onto Factor 2.
Factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 all significantly correlate with positive mood (r = .27, p =
.00; r = .22, p = .00; r = .19, p = .00; r = .22, p = .00 respectively) but none of the factors
correlate with negative mood. It is difficult to say whether higher levels of SPO tend to
lead to an overall more positive mood, whether those with higher levels of SPO enjoyed
the experiment more, or whether those predisposed to more positive moods also tend to
develop stronger feelings of SPO.
Average BIS is significantly positively correlated with four of the six factors: 1 (r
= 17, p = .01), 2 (r = .28, p = .00), 5 (r = .15, p = .02), and 6 (r = .15, p = .02). Average
BIS is significantly positively correlated with five of the six factors: 1 (r = .24, p = .00), 2
(r = .19, p = .00), 3 (r = .25, p = .00), 4 (r = .27, p = .00), and 5 (r = .24, p = .00). Thus,
Factor 6 (control) correlates with BIS but not BAS and Factor 3 (familiarity/expertise)
correlates with BAS but not BIS. Given the complex pattern of correlations and the
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unexpected main effect of SPO on BIS and BAS observed in both Studies 1 and 2, two
additional regression analyses were performed to see specifically which of the
dimensions of SPO had the strongest influence on psychological power and therefore
may have been driving these unexpected main effects.
A forward step-wise regression was done on both BIS and BAS where each of the
six factors were tested as possible predictors and were allowed to enter the model based
on the order in which they best predicted the dependent measure (BIS or BAS).
BIS forward step-wise regression. Factor 2 (Use/Dependence) was the first to
enter the model. It predicted 7.9% of variance in BIS scores [r2 = .08, F∆(1, 229) =
19.62, p = .00] and significantly predicted BIS scores [b = .15, β = .82, t(229) = 4.43, p =
.00] such that a one unit increase on the Factor 2 subscale would predict a .15 increase in
BIS scores. No other factors entered the model as significant predictors of BIS. Thus the
effect of SPO on BIS appears to be driven exclusively by SPO related to the
use/dependence route.
Table 36. Model summary produced by the forward regression on BIS.

R
Adjusted
Model
R
Square R Square
1
.281a
.079
.075
a. Predictors (Constant), AVE_Factor2

Model Summary
Std.
Error of
R
the
Square
Estimate Change
.51927
.079

Change Statistics
F
Change
19.623

df1
1

df2
229

Sig. F
Change
.000

Table 37. Coefficients produced by the forward regression on BIS.

Model
1

(Constant)
AVE_Factor2
a. Dependent Variable: AVE_BIS

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
2.373
.158
.154
.035
.281

t
15.034
4.4301

Sig.
.000
.000
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BAS forward step-wise regression. Factor 4 (Efficacy/Effectance) was the first
to enter the model. It predicted 7.3% of variance in BAS scores [r2 = .07, F∆(1, 229) =
18.14, p = .00] and significantly predicted BAS scores [b = .08, β = .27, t(229) = 4.26, p
= .00] such that a one unit increase on the Factor 4 subscale would predict a .08 increase
in BAS scores. Factor 5 (Self-Identity) entered the model next. It predicted and
additional 1.8% of variance in BAS scores [r2 = .09, F∆(1, 228) = 4.62, p = .03] and
significantly predicted BAS scores [b = .05, β = .15, t(229) = 2.15, p = .03] such that a
one unit increase on the Factor 5 subscale would predict a .05 increase in BAS scores.
No other factors entered the model as significant predictors of BIS. Thus the effect of
SPO on BAS appears to be driven by SPO relating to efficacy/effectance and self-identity
motives.
Table 38. Model summary produced by the forward regression on BAS.
Model Summary
Std.
Error of
R
the
Square
Estimate Change
.33260
.073
.33000
.018

R
Adjusted
Model
R
Square R Square
1
.271a
.073
.069
2
.303b
.092
.084
a. Predictors (Constant), AVE_Factor4
b. Predictors (Constant, AVE_Factor4, AVE_Factor5

Change Statistics
F
Change
18.144
4.624

df1
1
1

df2
229
228

Sig. F
Change
.000
.033

Table 39. Coefficients produced by the forward regression on BAS.

Model
1

(Constant)
AVE_Factor2
2
(Constant)
AVE_Factor4
AVE_Factor5
a. Dependent Variable: AVE_BAS

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
2.849
.079
.082
.019
.271
2.734
.095
.064
.021
.209
.046
.021
.149

t
35.980
4.260
28.765
3.017
2.150

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.003
.033
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Discussion
Taken together, the results obtained both by the regression and MANOVA using
the combined dataset are very consistent with those obtained in Studies 1 and 2
individually and seem to indicate that even with a larger sample size, statistically
significant support for the main hypotheses were unlikely to be observed using the
current design. Both tests indicate a strong relationship between SPO and psychological
power, but neither lend support for the predicted two- and three-way interactions based
on smartphone custody. Possible reasons for this are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
The results of the PCA indicate that a six-factor solution is best but that in reality
the sixth factor (Control) may not represent a distinct subscale as much as it does the fact
that the two items that make up the factor are both reverse scored. It is possible that if
they were worded in the direction consistent with the rest of the scale that they may map
onto another factor. This would result in a five-factor solution, which is the number of
factors initially indicated by the PCA.
The pattern of correlations observed among the factors indicate that they do likely
represent distinct underlying constructs that can be captured by subscales. This is also
reflected in the various factors found to be predictors of BIS and BAS revealed by the
forward regression. Specifically, use and dependence seem to influence levels of BIS
while efficacy/effectance and self-identity seem to influence levels of BAS. This is
consistent with the more nuanced relationship that people seem to have with their
smartphone where some users feel deeply connected to it in a personal sense where others
may use and rely on it heavily but as a useful tool for accomplishing tasks. While much
work exists to be done on the scale, this analysis has provided a useful first step in
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creating a measure to capture the varieties in the type of psychological ownership that
users feel toward their smartphones. A good next step would be to construct more items
based on the factors revealed by the CFA and do further reliability and validity testing
with a larger, more diverse sample of users. Specifically, it is important to include a
wider age of smartphone users in follow-up testing as it is likely that college students use
and rely on their devices for very different functions than do older users and those who
rely on their device for professional purposes.

CHAPTER VII
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary
The two studies conducted in this dissertation sought to test whether access to an
individual’s smartphone influenced that person’s level of psychological power, and if, in
turn, that person’s level of psychological power had behavioral implications. Study 1
tested the prediction that those allowed access to their smartphone would exhibit higher
levels of psychological power than those denied access to their smartphone, and that the
effect of smartphone access on psychological power would influence risk-taking behavior
and moral orientation such that those in the smartphone access condition would take
more risks and show a relative preference for a rule-based moral decision making schema
while those in the smartphone deprivation condition would take fewer risks and show a
relative preference for an outcome-based moral decision making schema. Study 1 also
tested the prediction that the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power would
be moderated by an individual’s level of smartphone psychological ownership (SPO).
Results of Study 1 fail to provide compelling support for any of these predictions.
Study 2 tested the similar predication that those allowed access to their
smartphone would exhibit higher levels of psychological power than those denied access
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to their smartphone, and that the effect of smartphone access on psychological power
would influence cheating behavior such that those in the smartphone access condition
would cheat more than those in the smartphone deprivation condition. Likewise, Study 2
also tested the prediction that the effect of smartphone custody on psychological power
would be moderated by an individual’s level of SPO. Results of Study 2 fail to provide
compelling support for any of these predictions.
Initially, it would seem natural to conclude that the predictions were incorrect and
that smartphone access does not influence a user’s level of psychological power.
However, this would stand in complete contradiction to the earlier findings by Egan and
Larson (2015) that did find that smartphone access increased psychological power. In
that study, a behavioral, and arguably superior measure of psychological power was used.
Also in that study, a considerably longer period of time (approximately 5 to 10 minutes)
passed between the smartphone custody manipulation and the measure of psychological
power (as opposed to 30 to 90 seconds in the current study). These two important
differences likely account for the differences in findings. These are discussed in more
detail below as limitations.
Another possibility that bears consideration is that embodiment effects resulting
from actual smartphone use resulted in lowered level of psychological power among
those in the smartphone access condition. Bos and Cuddy (2013) found that while using
a smartphone, users tend to assume a small, closed posture that results in a decreased in
psychological power. As those in the smartphone deprivation condition were prevented
from using their device while those in the smartphone access condition were not, and
indeed many were observed to use their device during the experiment, it is possible that
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those in the smartphone access condition may have experienced lower levels of
psychological power resulting from an embodiment effect. If so, levels of power
observed in all but the smartphone deprivation condition would be expected to look very
similar, because all participants except those in the smartphone deprivation condition had
access to and likely used their devices. In reality, Study 2 found that levels of BAS were
the same in both the smartphone access and student ID deprivation conditions, and that
while BAS was lower among smartphone access participants than smartphone
deprivation participants, it was also lower among student ID deprivation participants
compared with student ID access participants. Thus, no coherent, theoretically-based,
rationale appears to explain the unexpected direction of the significant object-by-custody
interaction on BAS observed in Study 2. And again, this explanation too would stand in
contradiction to the earlier findings by Egan and Larson (2015) as the same possibility
would have existed in that study but was not observed.
Thus, it seems more likely that limitations common to both Studies 1 and 2
account for the lack of support for any of the predictions.
Limitations
The two most significant limitations of the current dissertation pertained to the
measure of psychological power used and the order of procedures. Unfortunately, both
limitations were present in both Study 1 and Study 2. Each will be discussed in more
detail below.
Measure of Psychological Power
Measures of psychological power vary widely including both self-report and
behavioral measures. While behavioral measures are generally preferable in
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psychological research and specifically for measuring psychological power, I decided to
use a self-report measure in the current study. I made this decision because behavioral
measures were already being employed in both Study 1 (risk taking) and Study 2
(cheating) and both involved financial decisions. The earlier study by Egan and Larson
(2015) used a behavioral measure with financial implications. Specifically, in that study,
participants were asked to participate in a shared-resource game wherein they took points
for themselves. Those points were said to determine the number of raffle entries that a
participant would receive. Because that measure was so similar to especially the
dependent measure of cheating behavior (used in Study 2), it seemed likely that using it
might either 1) interfere with the similar and subsequent dependent measure, and/or 2)
raise suspicion among participants. Using that same measure would also produce
uncertainty as to whether psychological power or another psychological mechanism were
truly driving the effect.
Another behavioral measure that could have been used was a participant’s
decision to act to reduce or remove some unpleasant condition in the environment.
For instance, Galinsky et al. (2003) measured power by whether or not participants acted
to turn off or redirect an irritating fan blowing in the participant’s direction. Bos and
Cuddy (2013) operationalized power as the amount of time that a participant spent
waiting for an ostensibly tardy research assistant to return. However, both of these
measures of power require that participants take part in the study one at a time. For
instance, witnessing another participant get up to move or turn off the fan or to retrieve
the research assistant will influence the behavior of other participants present, introducing
another source of variance (i.e., conformity). Yet, psychological power is a socially
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dependent construct so the real or imagined presence of others is needed to make salient
differences in one’s level of psychological power. Specifically, in this study, the idea of
losing and thus being without the resources afforded by the smartphone and the relative
power differential between those with and without their smartphone was believed to be
necessary in order to observe the anticipated effects.
There are means of priming thoughts of a social context when running
participants individually, but it is unlikely that any such prime would have been as strong
as collecting data in a group setting with the actual presence of others. Thus, a self-report
measure of psychological power seemed preferable for three reasons. First, in the current
studies it was less likely to interfere with subsequent dependent measures. Second, it was
anticipated to be a more direct measure of psychological power in that it did not depend
on as many inferences being made regarding the cause (psychological mechanism) of the
behavior being used as a proxy of one’s level of psychological power. Third, it allowed
data to be collected while participants were in the presence of others thus fulfilling the
need to measure psychological power in a social context.
When choosing a self-repot measure of psychological power for the current
dissertation, several options were considered. For instance, I considered using
Anderson’s et al. (2012) Personal Sense of Power Scale or a “ladder” scale similar to the
one used by Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, and Ickovics (2000) (each discussed in more detail
below). Ultimately, Carver and White’s (1994) BIS/BAS Scales seemed to have received
the most reliability and validity testing (e.g., Cooper, Gomez, & Aucote, 2007; Heubeck,
et al., 1998; Jorm, et al., 1999), and to be the measure that most closely aligned with the
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theoretical framework for psychological power (Approach/Inhibition theory of
psychological power) being used as a basis for the predictions of the current study.
In retrospect, using this measure for the current study appears to have presented at
least two limitations. The most significant is that it often did not reliably relate in
predictable ways with the dependent measures. Specifically, research has routinely found
that heightened levels of psychological power are associated with greater amounts of
risk-taking (Keltner, et al., 2003) and cheating (e.g., Lammers, et al. 2011). While in a
few instances, BIS and BAS scores were found to predict outcomes consistent with
previous research (e.g., BIS predicted amount wagered in Study 1), more often the typical
effects of power on risk taking and cheating were either inconsistent or lacking. This
seems to suggest that, rather than an entire body of literature being wrong, the BIS/BAS
Scales of psychological power were not entirely effective in the current studies.
One of the other self-report scales considered might have been preferable –
although both are more transparent. The Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson, et
al., 2012) is an eight-item measure that asks relatively straightforward questions such as
“If I want to, I get to make the decision” and “I think I have a great deal of power”. The
“ladder” scale (Adler, et al., 2000) is a simple one-item measure wherein participants are
provided a drawing of a ladder with 10 rungs and asked to “place an ‘X’ on the run that
best represents where they think they stand on the ladder.” (p. 587) The rungs are said to
represent a person’s place in society with higher status members at the top and lower
status members at the bottom. Both the simplicity and high face validity of these
measures make it likely that either would have been a superior measure of psychological
power. However, the high face validity also may have increased the likelihood that
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participants would be able to guess the true nature of the study and the predictions, which
may have introduced a new set of limitations.
Order of Procedures
In the earlier work by Egan and Larson (2015) that initially made the connection
between smartphone custody and psychological power, custody of one’s smartphone was
manipulated relatively early in the session (just after informed consent and just before the
measure of smartphone use and SPO). Thus, participants experienced the custody
manipulation for approximately 10 minutes prior to participating in the measure of
psychological power. In the current study, smartphone custody was manipulated
immediately preceding the measure of psychological power. Thus, participants only
experienced the custody manipulation for approximately 30 to 90 seconds prior to
completing the measure of psychological power.
It is possible then that the studies in this dissertation have identified an important
boundary condition; namely, that the effects of smartphone custody on psychological
power are not immediate but rather require a minimum amount of time to emerge or that
they grow stronger with time. If this were the case, effects on the later dependent
measures (risk taking, moral orientation, and cheating) should have revealed the effect in
that more time had passed before these measures were completed. Because this was not
consistently the case, it is difficult to speculate with confidence as to whether a longer
time between the smartphone custody manipulation and the measures of psychological
power would have made a difference. It is possible that the entire duration of the studies
was not long enough to observe the effect. Because each study only lasted on average 25
to 45 minutes (for Study 2 and Study 1 respectively) and because the custody
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manipulation did not occur until half-way through the session, all of the dependent
measures were collected relatively shortly after the custody manipulation.
At the least, both limitations should have been minimized by the use of multiple
dependent measures. If risk taking, cheating, and moral orientation are valid behavioral
proxies for psychological power, and because these measures were taken at multiple
temporal points following the custody manipulation, it is difficult to say why the earlier
findings by Egan and Larson (2015) were not replicated in either of the current studies.
Thus, the most likely scenario is that the overall length of the experimental sessions was
too short and that custody should have either been manipulated earlier in the session, or a
filler-task should have been included to allow sufficient time for the effect to develop.
Statistical Power
Lastly, there is always the possibility that the study lacked statistical power. One
common cause of low statistical power is an insufficient number of observations. This
possibility was discussed and largely ruled out in Chapter 6. Specifically, two steps were
performed to evaluate the potential impact of this limitation. First, data in common from
Studies 1 and 2 were combined resulting in a much larger data set. Even with this larger
data set, no differences on psychological power (either BAS or BIS) were observed based
on smartphone custody. Second, a post hoc power analysis was conducted based on the
observed effects sizes. This analysis revealed that 7,598 participants would have been
needed in order to observe the effect. As this is an unrealistically large number for a
laboratory study, power needs to be increased by making modifications to the
experimental design for instance either to increase the strength of the manipulation, or to
increase the sensitivity or validity of the measures use. Together, these additional
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analyses suggest that, while statistical power was low, it was not likely due to an
insufficient sample size but rather to methodological flaws in the design.
Ecological Validity
This study was interested in the difference in psychological power between those
in the smartphone access and the smartphone deprivation condition; however, both of
these scenarios are a departure from the normal. While users do often have access to
their device, they are not often in a situation where they witness others having their
device taken from them. Similarly, while certain social norms limit one’s access to their
smartphone in certain situations (e.g., classrooms, board rooms, movie theatres), users do
not often have their device physically taken from them for any length of time. Thus, both
conditions lack a degree of ecological validity in that they do not perfectly reflect real-life
usage scenarios.
Scope
This design does not shed light onto the fundamental question as to whether
smartphone access actually increases psychological power or whether smartphone
deprivation actually decreases psychological power – only whether there is a difference
in the level of psychological power between the two conditions. In other words, the
current design does not allow for a true comparison between a neutral or baseline
condition. People adapt to their normal frame of reference (e.g., Helson, 1948). When a
user first acquires a smartphone, he or she may experience a shift, presumably an
increase, in psychological power resulting from having acquired access to so many
valuable resources through a single device. Similarly, when a user first loses his or her
smartphone (either because they choose to give it up, or it is lost or stolen) he or she may
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experience a shift, presumably a decrease, in psychological power resulting from having
lost access to so many valuable resources simultaneously. Both of these are novel states
compared with the everyday experience of owning a smartphone wherein a user takes for
granted the resources afforded by the device. It makes sense that upon initial acquisition
or loss of a smartphone, this new access or lack thereof would result in an increase or
decrease in a user’s sense of psychological power. But, it is less apparent how temporary
access to or deprivation from one’s smartphone may result in an increases or decreases in
psychological power. This question largely depends on the reference point to which the
comparison is made. If the user’s baseline level of psychological power (trait
psychological power) is influenced by long-term use, as is indicated by the results of the
current dissertation, then access to the device may not result in an actual increase in
power as much as being deprived access to the device results in a decrease in power as
that is the more novel situation. The question as to whether smartphone access increases
and/or smartphone deprivation decreases psychological power would best be addressed
using a longitudinal study. At a minimum, it would require a pre- and post-custodymanipulation measure of psychological power. An ideal design would allow for
comparison to one’s level of psychological power before he or she first acquired a
smartphone so that both the long-term and short-term effects of smartphone custody
could be investigated.
Implication
Theoretical Implications
Psychological power. While no support was found for the prediction that
immediate smartphone custody influences psychological power, a consistent pattern
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emerged wherein SPO influenced levels of both BIS and BAS. Supplementary analysis
identified various dimensions of SPO that were specifically related to feelings of BIS as
opposed to BAS. As SPO is related to long-term or chronic levels of smartphone use and
ownership, this does provide some evidence for the overall proposed relationship
between smartphone use/ownership and psychological power. Specifically, it would
seem that prolonged and habitual use of one’s smartphone may be associated with higher
levels of trait psychological power. However, it is equally likely that those higher in trait
levels of psychological power are more inclined to use their device more and develop
stronger feelings of psychological ownership toward it. Much more research is needed to
fully understand this relationship, but the current studies provide compelling evidence
that some positive relationship does exist between SPO and psychological power;
however, does not provide sufficient information to indicate a causal relationship
between the two.
Psychological ownership. In addition to indicating that SPO plays an important
role in psychological power, these studies also yielded a better understanding of the
subscales and dimensions that underlie SPO. The identified subscales map well onto the
theoretically proposed routes and motives of psychological ownership (Pierce, et al.,
2003), but also reflect some aspects that appear to be unique to smartphones as a target of
psychological ownership. While it is likely that the routes and motives implicated in
feelings of psychological ownership toward other target objects vary slightly from the
dimensions identified here, this study has made several important contributions. First, it
has revealed the routes and motives that are likely important in developing feelings of
psychological ownership toward smartphones. Second, it has provided a model for
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developing scales to measures feelings of psychological ownership toward other target
objects. Third, it suggests that Pierce’s et al. (2003) theory of psychological ownership
possesses construct validity and has predictive value.
Empirical Implications
Risk taking. The current study sought to replicate earlier findings regarding the
behavioral implications of higher and lower levels of psychological power on risk taking
(e.g., Carney, et al., 2010). The effects of psychological power on risk taking are robust
(e.g., Keltner, et la., 2003; Carney, et al., 2010) however the current study provided
mixed results on this dependent measure. While the expected relationship between BIS
scores and risk taking were observed in Study 1, the same was not true of BAS and risk
taking. However, as was mentioned above in the Limitations section, failing to replicate
this robust effect is far more likely due to limitations regarding the BIS/BAS Scales or
methodological flaws in the design as opposed to indicating that the previous findings are
invalid.
However, the significant main effect of order on risk taking does have empirical
implications for this literature. Knowing that the proximal distance between risky
decisions and the event deciding their outcome influences risk-taking behavior has many
interesting applications. Sometimes, risky decisions are made immediately before the
potential pay-off; for instance, while gambling in a casino. Other times, risky decision
are made far in advance of the potential positive or negative outcome. In fact, this is
likely the more common scenario. Consumers decide whether and how much life, health,
or homeowner’s insurance to purchase far in advance of any anticipated need. College
students make decisions regarding the use of contraceptives and condoms weeks or
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months before the time at which they will learn whether there were negative outcomes
associated with their risky sexual behavior. Investors buy stocks sometimes anticipating
waiting months or years to know whether theirs was a good investment.
Study 1 found that those who engaged in risky behavior closer to the time of the
potential pay-off were more willing to take risks. McElroy and Mascari (2007) found
that when risky decisions were made closer to the time at which the outcome of the
behavior was to be made known, participants used a more analytic decision-making
approach. However, when risky decisions were made further from the time at which the
outcome of the behaviors was to be made known, participants used a more holistic or
heuristic decision-making approach. In light of their findings, these results are somewhat
surprising. It seems more likely that those who wagered earlier (in the moral orientation
first condition) would use a heuristic approach, perhaps leading them to be more
optimistic and to wager more, while those who wagered later (in the risk taking first
condition) would use a systematic approach, perhaps leading them to correctly assess the
odds of winning as 50% and to wager less. This is the opposite of what was found.
However, processing style would be expected to interact with psychological power such
that those using a heuristic processing style would be more influenced by their level of
psychological power meaning that those who wagered earlier and who felt a higher level
of psychological power would be especially optimistic about their odds of winning (as
high-power individuals tend not to attend to possible negative outcomes). On the other
hand, those who wagered earlier but felt lower levels of psychological power would be
more risk-adverse and less likely to wager as much. Admittedly, the potential gains and
losses in the current study were fairly small, but the apparent inconsistency between the
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findings of McElroy and Mascari (2007) and the results of this study are interesting and
would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Moral orientation. In particular, I was interested in whether the findings by
Lammers and Stapel (2009) would replicate. Lammers and Stapel (2009) found that
elevated levels of psychological power were associated with a deontological (rule-based)
moral orientation whereas lowered levels of psychological power were associated with a
consequentialist (outcome-based) moral orientation. Given the novelty of their finding,
the fact that it appears to be as-of-yet un-replicated, and because of the large number of
studies authored by Diedrik Stapel that were eventually retracted, replicating their finding
was of special interest (compared with the other relatively well-replicated findings
regarding the effects of power on cheating and risk taking).
The results of Study 1 provide mixed support for the findings of Lammers and
Stapel (2009). The moderated mediation analysis did not find that either BIS or BAS
predicted moral orientation; however, a significant correlation was observed between
BAS and moral orientation indicating that higher power participants favored a rule-based
or deontological moral orientation, which is consistent with Lammers and Stapel (2009).
Thus, weak support for their findings was observed, but the results remain inconclusive
and additional research is still needed to confidently replicate their findings regarding the
effect of power on moral orientation.
Societal Implications
Limitations of the current dissertation that likely led to a lack of support for the
predictions makes it difficult to confidently draw societal implications. If the lack of
support actually indicates a lack of an effect of smartphone custody on psychological
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power, then smartphone users need not worry about how access to one’s device may
influence their level of psychological power. This does not however indicate that access
to one’s device may not influence other important psychological experiences such as selfefficacy and emotion regulation. Additional research is needed to further investigate the
possibility that smartphone access influences other psychological mechanisms such as
those.
If the lack of support is, as suspected, the result of significant limitations then
users are cautioned to think carefully about how smartphone access may influence his or
her level of psychological power. Compelling theoretical evidence was provided in
Chapter 2 suggesting that because of the access to valuable resources afforded by this
device, access to one’s smartphone may increase a user’s level of psychological power.
Increased levels of psychological power often lead to undesirable behaviors such as
cheating and behaving antisocially. Additional research is needed to investigate these
predictions, but results by Egan and Larson (2015) suggest that the relationship between
smartphone access and power does exist making this the more likely of the two scenarios.
Thus, users are cautioned to be mindful of when and where they permit themselves
access to their device. At times, smartphone-induced power may be highly desirable.
For instance, when trying to attain a desired goal like exercising or achieving work goals,
smartphone-induced power may be beneficial (so long as the device does not serve as a
distraction). At other times however, specifically when the opportunity to engage in
undesirable behaviors exists (e.g., texting while driving, failing to attend to one’s partner
or children), a user may choose to deprive him or herself custody of their device.
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Also, while immediate effects of smartphone custody on psychological power
were not observed, evidence was observed that indicates a strong relationship between
SPO and psychological power. As users become accustomed to having access to the
tools and resources afforded by their smartphone, they may experience a gradual and
cumulative increase in their sense of psychological power. Similarly, as smartphone
users “sharpen their tool” by becoming more competent and efficient users and by adding
useful mobile applications they may experience an increase in their trait level of
psychological power resulting from the knowledge that (a) they have access to these
valuable resources and (b) they feel a sense of mastery in using this tool. As such, users
should be vigilant to changes in their behavior over time reflected in the type and amount
of smartphone usage. As it can be especially difficult to notice gradual changes in
oneself, I urge users to occasionally take an intentional break from using their device as
an opportunity to observe intra- and interpersonal differences between periods of use and
non-use. Several researchers are working on valid and reliable scales to assess
smartphone addiction and dependence (e.g. Roberts, Yaya, & Manolis, 2014; Pavia,
Cavani, Di Blasi, & Giordano, 2016). Scales like these may help users objectively assess
their smartphone use and dependence and hopefully to make informed decisions about
how best to benefit from this useful tool while minimizing the possible negative side
effects resulting from overuse.
As discussed earlier, psychological power does not necessarily corrupt (Chen, et
al., 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2001) and, depending on the person and the situation, can
often lead to action taking in the form of prosocial behavior. If then, resulting from
certain types of smartphone use, users are developing high levels of SPO which is leading
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to higher trait levels of psychological power, we, as a society may be poised not only to
behave more antisocially, but also more prosocially. If these tools can be used to
coordinate the efforts of users worldwide, and can serve to individually empower users to
take action, then they could play a critical role in addressing national and global problems
in a way that other technologies, like television and social media, may not. The ability to
realize this possibility rests with researchers and developers. Researchers need to
understand how smartphone use influences users at a basic, psychological level, the
features of the user and technology that are critical to influencing behavior, and how the
individual and environmental factors work together to produce behavior. Developers,
armed with this knowledge, need to heed the call of those like Gleason (2009) to design
technologies that will increase users’ autonomy, empower them, and ultimately allow
people to be the best version of themselves instead of the chronically-distracted, overtaxed versions of themselves that many report feeling that they have become as a result of
their smartphones.
In summary, despite a lack of support for the current predictions, the observation
that smartphone use often coincides with bad behavior is still valid and bears
investigation. Either psychological power is impacted and is at least in part the
psychological mechanism causing these bad behaviors, in which an alternate design is
needed to detect the effect, or some other psychological mechanism is at work, in which
an alternate theoretical framework is needed to understand these effects. Either way,
additional research is needed.
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Future Directions
As a first step, I would like to follow up the current study with a close replication
of this dissertation that corrects the two main limitations by using a different measure of
psychological power and by allowing longer between the smartphone custody
manipulation and the collection of the dependent measures. Procedurally, this replication
may look more similar to the initial study conducted by Egan and Larson (2015).
Also, I would like to investigate the potential for smartphone-induced power to
influence behavior, and specifically moral behavior, in a positive way. Because
increased levels of psychological power promote action taking in general, rather than
promoting bad behavior in particular (Keltner, et al., 2003) it should be equally likely that
smartphone-induced power can promote good behavior. Previous research has
demonstrated that high power is more likely to be associated with bad behavior only
because as a default people tend to focus on their own outcomes, which are often at odds
with the outcomes of others. For instance, in the previous study by Egan and Larson
(2015), action taking meant taking more of a shared resource for oneself, necessarily
leaving less of that fixed commodity for others. However, when the possibility of
behaving prosocially is made salient or thoughts of responsibility and/or the needs of
others are primed along with power, high power individuals are equally likely to engage
in prosocial behavior (Overbeck & Park, 2001). A near replication of Study 1 with a
minor modification to the dependent measure of risk-taking would be well suited to
testing this prediction. Rather than giving participants the opportunity to wager some of
their compensation to potentially increase their earnings, I would give participants the
opportunity to donate some of their compensation to a charity. If smartphones do
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increase psychological power, high power individuals would be expected to be more
likely to act on the opportunity to make a charitable contribution.
Another useful modification to the current design would be to strengthen the
custody manipulation. For instance, dyads could be used wherein participants actually
hand over either their smartphone or student ID to the other member of the dyad so that
one participant holds both smartphones and one holds both IDs. The power differential
resulting from access to different resources would be much more pronounced using such
a manipulation. Similarly, using a task wherein the smartphone would actually be a
useful tool towards its completion would make the lack of (or access to) resources
resulting from smartphone deprivation (access) more salient.
As a next step toward further validating the scale of SPO I would like to see
whether the scale corresponds with actual smartphone use and checking behaviors. To do
so, I would conduct a field study relying on behavioral observation. Unobtrusive
observations would be made of potential participants in settings such as a coffee shop or
library. Observers would record smartphone use and checking behavior for a fixed length
of time. For instance, behaviors may include touches of the device, total time spent using
the device, and distance between user and device. The theory of psychological
ownership (Pierce, et al., 2003) would predict that each of these behaviors would be
positively associated with higher levels of psychological ownership of the device. After
the observation period, I would approach potential participants and ask them if they
would be willing to complete the scale of SPO. Theoretically, those who engage in more
use and checking behavior would be expected to score higher on the scale. This would
make two important contributions toward validating the measure. First, current studies
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wherein the measure has been used have involved only college-age samples of
participants. By making observations in coffee shops and libraries, a more representative
community sample with a more diverse age range could be accessed. Second, thus far,
the measure has been compared with other self-report measures (e.g., smartphone use,
length of ownership, smartphone functionality and satisfaction). This would allow the
scale to be compared with actual user behavior.
In the same or a conceptually similar study, it would also be of value to include a
measure of phubbing behavior (snubbing physically-present others as a result of one’s
smartphone use). Those who check and/or use their smartphone more would be expected
to engage in higher levels of phubbing behavior for two reasons. First, keeping the
device nearer and checking and/or using it more often would be expected to serve as a
frequent reminder of access to the valuable resources afforded through the device. Thus,
those individuals would be expected to experience higher levels of psychological power
causing a greater focus on his or her own needs and desires rather than on those of his or
her companion. Presumably, this would result in more frequent instances of phubbing.
Second, greater levels of psychological attachment to one’s device would be expected to
promote more frequent and prolonged use of the device which should also lead to more
incidental phubbing behavior. Thus, in addition to administering the scale of SPO after
the observation period, it would be beneficial to administer a measure of phubbing
behavior to those participants who are observed as a part of a dyad or small group. While
the field study described would not directly replicate the predictions tested in the current
dissertation, it would complement the earlier findings by Egan and Larson (2015) as well
as providing additional validation of the measure of SPO.
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Finally, to address the conceptual question raised earlier regarding whether
differences in psychological power between those with access to or those deprived of
access to their smartphone results from an increase associated with access or a decrease
associated with deprivation, a longitudinal study would be of value. Ideally, trait levels
of psychological power would be obtained from all participants in advance. Then, during
a laboratory study, custody of one’s device would be manipulated and state levels of
psychological power would be taken at various temporal points following the custody
manipulation. This would allow immediate and cumulative effects of custody to be
compared to, or controlling for, trait levels of psychological power. If I were to also use
a within-subjects design, levels of psychological power following access or deprivation
could be compared for the same individual which would also for the observation of
changes in psychological power among those who had previously been deprived of their
device but were later allowed access to their device again.
Conclusion
The current study remains inconclusive regarding the potential impact of
smartphone access on users’ level of psychological power. Earlier work suggested that
access to an individual’s smartphone does increase that person’s level of psychological
power (Egan & Larson, 2015), but limitations of the current study prevented me from
successfully replicating those earlier findings. These studies did however reveal that
SPO appears to play a significant role in levels of BIS and BAS. While the results of the
current study do not provide much insight into the short-term effects of smartphone
custody on psychological power, they do appear to indicate an effect of long-term or
chronic smartphone use on psychological power.
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Finally, this study did make a significant contribution in replicating and further
demonstrating the potential usefulness of the measure of SPO. As smartphone use
continues to be a prevalent behavior and other wearable smart technologies (e.g., smart
watches, smart glasses, and smart jewelry) enter the social landscape, the demand and
importance for valid and reliable measures to assess users’ relationships with these
devices will only grow. Hopefully, this scale will continue to develop into one that will
be useful in many related veins of research in the future.

APPENDIX A
DATA COLLECTION MATERIAL PACKET USED IN STUDY 1.
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The next 10 pages are the paper-and-pencil participant material packet used in Study 1.
The version included is the smartphone deprivation, moral orientation first, moral
outcome accept condition.
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Loyola University Chicago

STUDY OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS’
SMARTPHONE USE
Experiment: 2773

Spring, 2016
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Part 1: Instructions
You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires. At the bottom of each page will
be instructions indicating either to stop and wait for further instruction before proceeding or to
proceed to the next page. Please look for these instructions at the bottom of each page and
follow them carefully.
Also, as a part of your compensation for participating today, in addition to the two
experimental credits you will earn, you will be monetarily compensated. Later during the
experiment, you will be given the opportunity to participate in a Double-or-Northing game in
order to determine how much money you will receive for your participation.
Please wait. The Experimenter will instruct you when it is time to turn the page.
Thank you!

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Smartphone User Attitudes Scale
Please indicate how true each of these statements is for you. Place a mark inside one circle per
row indicating the choice that is most applicable.
1=
Definitely
Not True

I have a lot of personal information stored
on my smartphone.
My smartphone reflects my personality.
My smartphone makes me feel connected
to home wherever I am.
I feel like I’ve gotten to “know” my
smartphone like one does a friend.
Other people often use my smartphone.
I spend a lot of time using my
smartphone.
I am very possessive of my smartphone.
I always have my smartphone with me.
I would be willing to let a friend borrow
my smartphone for the day.
My smartphone is extremely useful in
helping me achieve my goals.
I know how to use all of the features of
my smartphone.
I have taken a lot of time to personalize
my smartphone.
My smartphone makes me feel more
capable.
I am very familiar with my smartphone.
My smartphone is an extension of myself.
I would feel lost without my smartphone.
My smartphone is a kind of “home-awayfrom-home.”
I am able to accomplish a lot more as a
result of having my smartphone.

PROCEED.
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4
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Go ahead and proceed to the next page. Thank you!

6=
Definitely
True
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Smartphone Use Questionnaire
We are interested in learning more about how college students user their smartphones. Please
provide some information about your smartphone and how you use it.
1. To what extent do you rely on your phone for each of the following? Indicate your choice by
placing a mark in one circle per row.
0 = Not
at All

Accessing the Web
Sending/Receiving Emails
Social Media
Making/Receiving Phone
Calls
Listening to Music
Sending/Receiving Text
Messages
Maps/Location Services
Shopping
Playing Games
Calendar/Reminders
Watching Videos
Taking Photos/Videos
Other Applications (Finance
Apps, Fitness Apps, etc.)















5 = To a
1

2

3

4

Great
Extent







































































2. What make (iPhone, Android, etc.) and model (5s, Galaxy s5, Droid Turbo, etc.) of
smartphone do you have? ______________________________________________
3. At what age did you first get a smartphone? ____________ years old.
4. How many months have you owned your current smartphone? ___________ months.

PROCEED.

Go ahead and proceed to the next page. Thank you!
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5. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being that your phone does not work at all and 10 being that your
phone works perfectly, how well does your current phone function?

1 = Not
At All

10 =
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Perfectly

         
6. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being completely dissatisfied and 10 being completely satisfied, how
satisfied are you with your current phone?
1=

10 =

Completely
Dissatisfied

Completely
Satisfied



2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

       

7. What is your biological sex?





Female
Male
Other / Prefer Not to Reply

8. What is your age? _________________

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Part 2: Instructions
Before we continue, please be sure to silence your mobile phone, and place it in the clear
container provided by the experimenter. Later in the experiment, you will be asked for some
information which you may be tempted to obtain from your mobile phone. For this reason, we
are asking you to place your phone in the clear container on the table at the front of the room
where you will not be able to access it.
Once you have completed this step, please wait until the experimenter instructs you to
proceed.

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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BIS/BAS
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. Place a mark inside
one circle per row indicating the choice that is most applicable.
1=
4=
Strongly
2
3
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
When I go after something, I use a “no holds barred” approach.
I worry about making mistakes.
When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.
When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it.
When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited
right away.
I’m always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.
I have very few fears compared to my friends.
I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something.
I go out of my way to get things I want.
When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it.
I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is
angry at me.
If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right
away.
Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely
experience fear or nervousness.
When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.
I often act on the spur of the moment.
Criticism or scolding hurt me quite a bit.
It would excite me to win a contest.
I crave excitement and new sensations.
If I think something unpleasant is going to happen, I usually get
pretty “worked up.”
I will often do things for no other reason than they might be fun.

STOP!
































































Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Social Decision-Making
Please read the following story carefully and answer the question that follows.

Carol, a high school girl, has promised to help her friend Corinne with a personal
problem, when she is asked by Tina, a new girl in her class, to go to the theater with her, at the
same time. Carol has to decide between being loyal to her old friend and being nice to the new
girl. Ultimately, Carol decided to accept Tina’s offer and to break her promise to Corinne.
Suppose you had advised her to do so (i.e., to accept Tina’s offer to visit the theater and to break
her promise to her friend Corinne). Of the two reasons provided below, which would be the
better reason for that decision? Read the two reasons provided and indicate your choice by
placing a mark in one of the circles below.

The reason,
“Tina needs
new friends at
her new
school;
otherwise she
will feel
lonely and
left out” is
better

STOP!

        

The reason,
“It is
generally a
good rule to
welcome in
and be
friendly to
new people.”
is better

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Double-or-Nothing Game Entry Form
1. Please indicate whether or not you would like to enter the Double-or-Nothing Game by
circling either “Yes” (to enter) or “No” (to opt out) below:
Yes

No

2. Only if you chose to enter the Double-or-Nothing Game, please indicate how much you would
like to wager by placing a check mark in one of the boxes below:
 $0.25
 $0.50
 $0.75
 $1.00

 $1.25
 $1.50
 $1.75
 $2.00

 $2.25
 $2.50
 $2.75
 $3.00

Potential Compensation Outcomes
Amount
Wagered

Winning
Outcome

Losing
Outcome

$0.25

$3.25

$2.75

$0.50

$3.50

$2.50

$0.75

$3.75

$2.25

$1.00

$4.00

$2.00

$1.25

$4.25

$1.75

$1.50

$4.50

$1.50

$1.75

$4.75

$1.25

$2.00

$5.00

$1.00

$2.25

$5.25

$0.75

$2.50

$5.50

$0.50

$2.75

$5.75

$0.25

$3.00

$6.00

$0.00

3. Only if you chose to enter the Double-or-Nothing Game, please circle the outcome that you
would like to be the winning outcome when you roll the dice:
Evens

Odds

Thank you. Please remove this page from the Participant Material Packet, fold it in half
(with the blank side facing out) and pass it to the Experimenter.



When you are finished, please remove this page, fold it in half, and pass it to the Experimenter.
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Exit Survey
1. Please try and recall how many apps you currently have installed on your smartphone:
____________ Apps
2. To what extent did today’s experiment cause you to feel each of the following emotions?

Happy
Angry
Excited
Sad
Anxious
Peaceful

Not at
All
0

1

2

3

4

Very
Strongly
5











































3. If you had to guess, what would you say that the purpose of this study was?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Thank you! Please wait for one moment to allow all other participants to finish, and
for the Experimenter to collect your packet.

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!

APPENDIX B
ORIGINAL LAMMERS AND STAPEL (2009) MEASURE OF MORAL
ORIENTATION
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Moral dilemma vignette:
“A high school girl called Carol has promised to help her girlfriend Corinne with a
personal problem, when she is asked by Tina, a new girl in her class, to go to the theater
with her, at the same time. Carol then has to decide between being loyal to her old friend
and being nice to a new girl.”
Outcomes:
 Reject Tina’s offer: “Carol decided to reject Tina’s offer and kept her promise to
Corinne.”
o “Suppose you would advise Carol to reject Tina’s offer to visit the theater
and keep her promise to visit her friend Corinne, what would in that case
be the best argument?”
 1 = Corinne needs someone to help her with her problems
(outcome-based)
 9 = A promise is a debt (rule-based)
 Accept Tina’s offer: “Carol rescheduled her appointment with Corinne to visit the
theater with Tina.”
o “Suppose you would advise Carol to accept Tina’s invitation to the theater
and reschedule her appointment with Corinne, what would in that case be
the best argument?”
 1 = Tina needs new friends on her new school, because else she
will feel lonely. (outcome-based)
 9 = It is generally a good rule to welcome in and be friendly to new
people (rule-based)
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Experimenter: “As you know from the Sona-System, in addition to the two
experimental credits that you are earning for your participation today, you are also being
compensated monetarily. We offered this additional compensation to increase sign-ups
for the experiment. We can’t afford to pay each participant a lot, so what we decided to
do was to offer $3.00, but then also give participants the chance to participate in a
‘Double or Nothing’ game for the chance to double your compensation. So, you could
earn up to $6.00 for your participation today instead of $3.00. However, if you wager all
$3.00 and lose the ‘Double or Nothing’ game, you’ll lose the $3.00 and will only earn
experimental credits, no money, for your participation.
In just a moment, you’ll indicate whether or not you want to participate in the
‘Double or Nothing’ game by circling ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the page in front of you. If you
choose not to participate, you will receive $3.00, at the end of the session for your
participation.
If you choose to participate, you will indicate how much of your compensation
you would like to wager. That portion can be anywhere from twenty-five cents to the full
$3.00. You must also circle ‘odds’ or ‘evens’ on the page in front of you to indicate the
winning outcome of the ‘Double or Nothing’ game. At the end of the session, you’ll roll a
fair, six-sided dice. Depending on your roll and the winning outcome you selected you’ll
either win or lose. For instance, if you circle odds, and roll an odd number (1, 3, or 5)
you will win. However, if you circle odds and roll an even number (2, 4, or 6) you will
lose. Then, depending on the amount that you wagered, and whether you won or lost,
your compensation will be calculated.
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For your convenience, a table has been provided at the bottom of the page
showing the total compensation associated with each wager amount for either a winning
or losing outcome. This will help clarify how much you will be compensated depending
on A) the amount that you wager, and B) whether or not you win or lose the dice roll.
Does anyone have any questions about the ‘Double or Nothing’ game?”
[Experimenter pauses for questions and clarifies as needed.]
Experimenter: “Okay, first, please write your name at the top of the page titled
‘Double or Nothing Game.’ Next, please indicate whether you want to participate in the
‘Double or Nothing’ game for a chance to double your compensation, or not participate
and receive $3.00. Circle ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If you choose not to participate, stop, and do not
complete questions two and three. If you choose to participate, continue on to questions
to and three to indicate how much you would like to wager, and to select either ‘odds’ or
‘evens’ as the winning outcome. When you’ve made all of your selections, remove this
page from the rest of the packet, fold it in half with the blank side facing out, and pass it
to me.
When you’ve done so, you can complete the next page of the participant material
packet and wait until I provide additional instructions.” [Experimenter collects
completed and folded “Double or Nothing” Game Entry Forms]

APPENDIX D
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“Dear Participant,
You are receiving this email today because you participated in a study entitled ‘A Study
of College Students’ Smartphone Use / A Study of Decision Making’ during the Spring 2016
semester at Loyola University Chicago. This email is intended to provide you with more
information about hat study now that data collection has been completed. During the study you
were asked either to keep or give to the experimenter either your smartphone or your student ID
depending on your condition. The purpose of the study was to better understand how access to
one’s smartphone influenced an individual’s behavior. Previous research has found that access to
an individual’s smartphone increased his or her psychological power (Egan & Larson, 2015).
The study in which you participated was intended to replicate that study and to see whether
smartphone-induced power influenced risk-taking and moral orientation. The Double-or-Nothing
Game, wherein you decided whether or not to wager some of your compensation, served as the
measure of risk-taking. The Social Decision-Making Task wherein you made a choice about a
girl named Carol faced with a dilemma involving an old friend and a new acquaintance served as
the dependent measure of moral orientation. Previous research has found that high-power
individuals take more risks (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010) and show a relative preference for
rule-based decision making (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). The prediction of the study in which you
predicted was that participants who were allowed access to their smartphone would 1) take more
risks, and 2) show a relative preference for rule-based arguments for Carol’s decision.
I’d like to thank you again for your participation. The results of this study will make an
important contribution to the fields of psychological power, human-computer interactions, and
moral decision making and behavior. If you are interested in learning more about these fields,
some references to related articles have been provided below. If you have further questions
regarding this study, please direct all communication to the primary experimenter, Amanda Egan
(adye4@luc.ed).
References:
- Carney, D. R., Cuddy, A. J., & Yap, A. J. (2010). Power posing brief nonverbal displays
affect neuroendocrine levels and risk tolerance. Psychological Science, 21(10), 13631368.
- Egan, A. C. & Larson, J. R. (2015). The empowering effect of smartphones: The influence
of smartphones on psychological power and self-efficacy. Manuscript in preparation. 11
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition.
Psychological review, 110(2), 265.
- Lammers, J., & Stapel, D. A. (2009). How power influences moral thinking. Journal of
personality and social psychology, 97(2), 279.
Thank you,
Amanda Egan
Doctoral Candidate
Applied Social Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
Adye4@luc.edu”
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Image 1. Black privacy board measuring 48” long by 16” tall. These were used to divide
larger tables into individual workspaces providing the participants with privacy. Image
from amazon.com where privacy boards were purchased.

Image 2. Black and white ten-sided dice. Images from amazon.com where die were
purchased.

APPENDIX F
DATA COLLECTION MATERIAL PACKET USED IN STUDY 2.
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The next 10 pages are the paper-and-pencil participant material packet used in Study 2.
The version included is the smartphone deprivation condition.
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Loyola University Chicago

STUDY OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS’
SMARTPHONE USE
Experiment: 2773

Spring, 2016
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Part 1: Instructions
You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires. At the bottom of each
page will be instructions indicating whether or not to stop and wait for further instruction
before proceeding, or whether to proceed to the next page. Please look for these
instructions at the bottom of each page and follow them carefully.
Also, as a part of your compensation for participating today, in addition to the two
experimental credits you will earn, you will be given the opportunity to enter a raffle for
a chance to win one of two $150.00 Amazon gift cards. Later during the experiment, you
will use the provided dice and calculator to determine how many raffle entries you will
receive.
Please wait. The Experimenter will instruct you when it is time to turn the
page. Thank you!

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Smartphone User Attitudes Scale
Please indicate how true each of these statements is for you. Place a mark inside one
circle per row indicating the choice that is most applicable.
1=
Definitely
Not True

I have a lot of personal information stored
on my smartphone.
My smartphone reflects my personality.
My smartphone makes me feel connected
to home wherever I am.
I feel like I’ve gotten to “know” my
smartphone like one does a friend.
Other people often use my smartphone.
I spend a lot of time using my
smartphone.
I am very possessive of my smartphone.
I always have my smartphone with me.
I would be willing to let a friend borrow
my smartphone for the day.
My smartphone is extremely useful in
helping me achieve my goals.
I know how to use all of the features of
my smartphone.
I have taken a lot of time to personalize
my smartphone.
My smartphone makes me feel more
capable.
I am very familiar with my smartphone.
My smartphone is an extension of myself.
I would feel lost without my smartphone.
My smartphone is a kind of “home-awayfrom-home.”
I am able to accomplish a lot more as a
result of having my smartphone.

PROCEED.




















2




















Go ahead and proceed to the next page. Thank you!

3

4

5

6=
Definite
ly True
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Smartphone Use Questionnaire
We are interested in learning more about how college students user their smartphones.
Please provide some information about your smartphone and how you use it.
9. To what extent do you rely on your phone for each of the following? Indicate your
choice by placing a mark in one circle per row.
0 = Not
at All

Accessing the Web
Sending/Receiving Emails
Social Media
Making/Receiving Phone
Calls
Listening to Music
Sending/Receiving Text
Messages
Maps/Location Services
Shopping
Playing Games
Calendar/Reminders
Watching Videos
Taking Photos/Videos
Other Applications
(Finance Apps, Fitness
Apps, etc.)















5 = To a
1

2

3

4

Great
Extent







































































10. What make (iPhone, Android, etc.) and model (5s, Galaxy s5, Droid Turbo, etc.) of
smartphone do you have? ______________________________________________
11. At what age did you first get a smartphone? ____________ years old.

PROCEED.

Go ahead and proceed to the next page. Thank you!
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12. How many months have you owned your current smartphone? ___________ months.
On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being that your phone does not work at all and 10 being that
your phone works perfectly, how well does your current phone function?

1 = Not
At All

10 =
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Perfectly

         
13. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being completely dissatisfied and 10 being completely
satisfied, how satisfied are you with your current phone?
1=

10 =

Completely
Dissatisfied

Completely
Satisfied



2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

       



14. What is your biological sex?





Female
Male
Other / Prefer Not to Reply

15. What is your age? _________________

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Part 2: Instructions
Before we continue, please be sure to silence your mobile phone, and place it in
the clear container provided by the experimenter. Later in the experiment, you will be
asked for some information which you may be tempted to obtain from your mobile
phone. For this reason, we are asking you to place your phone in the clear container on
the table at the front of the room where you will not be able to access it.
Once you have completed this step, please wait until the experimenter instructs
you to proceed.

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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BIS/BAS
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. Place a mark
inside one circle per row indicating the choice that is most applicable.
1=
4=
Strongly
2
3
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
When I go after something, I use a “no holds
 
 
barred” approach.
I worry about making mistakes.
 
 
When good things happen to me, it affects me
 
 
strongly.
When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep
 
 
at it.
When I see an opportunity for something I like, I
 
 
get excited right away.
I’m always willing to try something new if I think
 
 
it will be fun.
I have very few fears compared to my friends.
 
 
I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at
 
 
something.
I go out of my way to get things I want.
 
 
When I want something, I usually go all-out to get
 
 
it.
I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know
 
 
somebody is angry at me.
If I see a chance to get something I want, I move
 
 
on it right away.
Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I
 
 
rarely experience fear or nervousness.
When I get something I want, I feel excited and
 
 
energized.
I often act on the spur of the moment.
 
 
Criticism or scolding hurt me quite a bit.
It would excite me to win a contest.
I crave excitement and new sensations.
If I think something unpleasant is going to happen,
I usually get pretty “worked up.”
I will often do things for no other reason than they
might be fun.

STOP!





























Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Raffle Entry Game
In addition to the experimental credits that you are receiving for your
participation, we are offering two $150.00 Amazon gift cards. To determine how many
raffle entries you will receive for your participation, you will roll the two 10-sided dice
that you have been given. Each die is numbered from 0 to 9. First, you will roll the
white die and record the number rolled in the box on the right. That number will become
the ones digit for the number of raffle entries you earned. Second, you will roll the black
die and record the number rolled in the box on the left. That number will become the tens
digit for the number of raffle entries you earned. Depending on the number you roll, you
may earn anywhere from zero to 99 raffle entries. If you prefer not to enter the raffle,
please select the appropriate box below.

______________

______________

Tens

Ones

If you prefer not to enter the raffle, please check this box:

STOP!

□

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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Exit Survey
1. Please try and recall how many apps you currently have installed on your smartphone:
____________ Apps
2. Data collection sessions are run in various rooms. To assess the suitability of different
rooms for data collection, please provide some feedback regarding the room that you
completed your experiment in today by indicating how strongly you agree with each of
the statements below.
1=
4=
Strongly
2
3
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
The room was well-lit for the
experiment.
I experienced a lot of distractions
during the experiment.
I had complete privacy during the
experiment.
The room was quiet for the
experiment.





















3. To what extent did today’s experiment cause you to feel each of the following emotions?

Happy
Angry
Excited
Sad
Anxious
Peaceful

PROCEED.

Not at
All
0

1

2

3

4

Very
Strongly
5











































Go ahead and proceed to the next page. Thank you!
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4. If you had to guess, what would you say that the purpose of this study was?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Thank you! Please wait for one moment to allow all other participants to finish, and
for the Experimenter to collect your packet.

STOP!

Please wait for experimenter instructions before proceeding to the next page. Thank you!
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“Dear Participant,
You are receiving this email today because you participated in a study entitled ‘A
Study of College Students’ Smartphone Use / A Study of Decision Making’ during the
Spring 2016 semester at Loyola University Chicago. This email is intended to provide
you with more information about hat study now that data collection has been completed.
During the study you were asked either to keep or give to the experimenter either your
smartphone or your student ID depending on your condition. The purpose of the study
was to better understand how access to one’s smartphone influenced an individual’s
behavior. Previous research has found that access to an individual’s smartphone
increased his or her psychological power (Egan & Larson, 2015). The study in which
you participated was intended to replicate that study
I’d like to thank you again for your participation. The results of this study will
make an important contribution to the fields of psychological power, and humancomputer interactions. If you are interested in learning more about these fields, some
references to related articles have been provided below. If you have further questions
regarding this study, please direct all communication to the primary experimenter,
Amanda Egan (adye4@luc.ed).
References:
- Egan, A. C. & Larson, J. R. (2015). The empowering effect of smartphones: The
influence of smartphones on psychological power and self-efficacy. Manuscript in
preparation. 11
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and
inhibition. Psychological review, 110(2), 265.
Thank you,
Amanda Egan
Doctoral Candidate
Applied Social Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
Adye4@luc.edu”
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